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Abstract 
 
 
 
There is an increasing recognition within the international system, of the need to 
understand Islamic law and legal system. This is due to the realisation that it either 
underpins or at least influences to some degree not only the legal but also the socio-cultural 
outlook of about a quarter of the world’s population. In line with this reality, this study 
investigates delictual liability of the state under Saudi law. It evaluates what is the position 
of the Saudi courts in determining the liability of public authorities for delict and the extent 
to which the applications of the current principles of delictual liability are useful and 
sufficient for effectively tackling the growing number of cases that are confronting the 
public bodies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
 
A focal point of this study is the focus on a system of law which claims universal 
applicability, even more, a law for all times. For Muslims, the Shar’iah is a code that 
covers all aspects of life and is applicable to all situations. It governs individual and social 
relations and as such is claimed to be applied, to various degrees, all across the Muslim 
world and beyond even where Muslims live as minorities. However, a persistent concern, 
with advocates and sceptics of the system, remains the viability of a legal system steeped in 
a specific historical and even contextual setting, in societies and climes across the world. 
This study has sought to engage an aspect of that issue; namely the applicability of 
Shar’iah principles to state liability for delictual conduct through an interrogation of the 
experience in Saudi Arabia, commonly perceived to be a conservative Islamic society. The 
exploration in this study hopefully provides a useful insight on the veracity or otherwise of 
the adaptability of Islamic law to all aspects of life and in the contemporary period. The 
position argued in this study is that Shari’ah does contain mechanisms that make its 
application viable even in complex areas of law like the delictual liability of the state.  
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Chapter One:   Introduction 
 
This study investigates the delictual liability of the state under Saudi law. There is an 
increasing recognition within the international system, of the need to understand Islamic 
law and legal system. This is due to the realisation that it either underpins or at least 
influences to some degree not only the legal but also the socio-cultural outlook of about a 
quarter of the world’s population. This study follows the developing practice in recent 
decades of scholarship that engages not just the theory and doctrines of Islamic law, but 
also everyday life, especially the practice of the courts. In this regard, a cardinal objective 
of this study is to contribute to the understanding of Islamic law.  
 
Specifically, it is a study of the non-contractual liability of the state for civil wrongs, i.e. 
the field of law known in Scots law as ‘delict’ and in English law as ‘tort’. The choice of 
delict/tort as an area of study is of particular significance, the Islamic law of civil wrongs is 
one of the least studied and understood particularly in the contemporary period. The 
specific focus of the study on state liability for delict in Islamic law is of even greater 
significance in an era of globalisation where the world has in the estimation of many 
people, become a village in which not only natural disasters, but also issues of governance, 
have effects beyond national borders.  
 
The focus on Saudi Arabia is particularly apposite since despite its well-known status as 
the world’s largest oil exporter, not much is known about its governance and the 
interaction of the state with its citizens. What is popularly known though is its claim of 
adherence to Islamic law which plays a fundamental role in its religion, constitution, 
history, governance, law and society. This study which investigates state liability for delict 
engages these areas of the corporate existence of the modern Saudi state with a view to 
presenting a coherent picture of the role of the Saudi Board of Grievances in dispensing 
justice in claims against the state for delictual liability. 
 
Aims of the Study 
 
The aims of this research are as follows: 
 To demonstrate the existence of the concept of state liability for delict under Saudi 
Law 
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 To show the importance of the concept of state liability for delict in the Saudi legal 
system  
 To present a systematic analysis of the dimensions of state liability for delict under 
Saudi Law 
 To provide a systematic analysis of the principles guiding the determination of state 
liability for delict under Saudi Law through critical evaluation of judgements of the 
Board of Grievances  
 To establish the presence (or absence) of any consistent jurisprudential approach in 
the decisions of the Board of Grievances on state liability for delict under Saudi 
Law  
 To highlight comparative aspects of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s law and 
practice and that of the UK where applicable 
 To facilitate a better understanding of the legal principles guiding the work of the 
judiciary in Saudi Arabia in general and the Board of Grievances in particular. 
Approach and Method 
 
The research is not designed to be primarily comparative, however, wherever appropriate, 
references will be made to relevant aspects of Scots and English law. Given the major 
contextual differences including cultural, religious, political and legal systems, care must 
be taken in using concepts derived from Scots and English law in analysing and 
understanding the Saudi legal system of state liability. However, provided such care is 
taken Scots and English law and academic literature provide valuable sources of 
experience of grappling with issues of state liability and possible frameworks for analysing 
state liability. Therefore, this study adopts a referential rather than full-scale comparative 
approach to the issue of state liability for delict. It is the view of the researcher that a full-
scale approach will be a much larger task and will not assist with achieving the main 
objective of the study, which is to provide a systematic account of Saudi legal system in 
relation to delictual liability of the state. The aim of this referential comparative approach 
is to explore the similarities and differences between the two legal systems in this area of 
the law where relevant for clarity of presentation.  
 
While a comprehensive comparative approach would be quite valuable, it is the view of the 
researcher that a full-scale comparative approach would be best if a systematised account 
of the nature of delictual liability in Islamic law and the law of Saudi Arabia exists in the 
literature. Further, it would also be important to have at least some reliable literature on the 
Ch 1 Introduction 
 3
nature of state liability for delict in Islamic law. However, there is paucity of materials on 
both counts. This necessitates research that will first address these gaps before conducting 
a feasible investigation of a full-scale comparison of Islamic law and any other legal 
system (s). This research aims essentially at addressing some of these lacunae. 
 
Both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom face the challenge of 
regulating the public authority, addressing claims for their delictual conduct, and paying 
compensation where legally required. This study affords an opportunity for an exploratory 
critical analysis of how similar or different the operation of the two systems can be with 
regard to a specific shared value of balancing the public and private or individual interests 
in an area of sometimes, inevitable tension. While the scope or ambit of certain relevant 
concepts and jurisprudential preferences on the issue of state liability for delict are 
different, nonetheless, relevant similarities can be identified, a few of which have been 
specifically selected for this study. These include parallels between the basic elements of 
delict within both systems and the concern with the need to ensure compensation for harm 
brought about by public authorities. The analysis around these and other relevant issues, 
doctrines and principles supports the referential comparative approach adopted in this 
research.  
 
However, in view of the recognition of important differences between the two systems, this 
research does not claim it is possible nor in fact is it intended to embark on a full-scale 
comparison between the two. Rather, the study proposes an analytical approach for the 
evaluation of delictual liability of public authorities in Saudi Arabia with a limited, what is 
referred to as a ‘referential,’ comparison in this study, with the UK. By this is meant that 
the study proposes to identify congruencies between the two systems where possible to 
facilitate clear understanding of the discussion. This, though a basic point, is an important 
one, considering the fact that Islamic law is either not usually a familiar subject, or 
somewhat difficult to understand for those not trained in it.  
 
There are specific aspects of Scots and English law of delict that are quite relevant to the 
development of Saudi law on delictual liability of public authorities that support the 
adoption of the referential approach proposed in this study. In this regard, at least two 
broad areas have been identified through a preliminary investigation of the liability of 
public authorities in the UK. These are case law and literature.  
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First, there is the case law. Here Saudi legal system stands to benefit from the experience 
of UK’s developed case law on delictual liability of public authorities. The former’s 
developing jurisprudence on public authority liability can take benefit, albeit to a limited 
extent, of the reported cases and judicial opinions of UK courts developed over time in 
meeting the growing challenges of claims on public authority liability for delict in the 
Saudi jurisdiction. This is particularly so in view of the absence of a law reporting system. 
Certain types of situations have never yet arisen in the decisions of the Board of 
Grievances but they have come up for determination before UK courts. They could be a 
source of ideas for resolving such cases where the applied principles are not incompatible 
with the Shari’ah. For example, so far there have been no cases in Saudi law that involve 
the scope of a relevant public authority’s duty to take a child into care. It is logical to 
expect this could happen in the future. This could come about for instance in the work of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs which has a Department for Juvenile Affairs charged with 
the care of orphans and vulnerable children; powers which can lead to the same set of 
challenges that have arisen in a case like X v Bedfordshire.1 Scots and English law could be 
useful in providing ideas and guidance to the Board for deciding such issues. Further, UK’s 
developed case-reporting system is in fact relevant not only at the jurisprudential level, but 
also at a more basic methodological level. This latter point is now important because the 
judicial authorities in Saudi Arabia have most recently initiated a policy of law-reporting 
for the Board of Grievances. The Scots and English law-reporting system with centuries of 
experience is an attractive reference point for this project. 
 
A second possible source of learning is provided by the abundance of legal literature which 
provides both descriptive and analytical material on this aspect of Scots and English law. 
The academic literature in the UK is more developed and that can be used as a source of 
ideas. Scots and English law is recognised as a well-defined system and has been grappling 
with the liability of public authorities in delict for a long time. There are extensive 
discussions and substantial debates in the literature that might be a source of ideas for 
shaping Saudi jurisprudence in this area of law. Here again, the legal scholarship 
constitutes valuable comparative reference material on this unsettled aspect of law. This is 
particularly useful for a developing system like Saudi Arabia, which has over time 
developed into a welfare-regulatory state like the UK, faced with the challenges of 
addressing public authority liability in contemporary times. A likely question arises on the 
foregoing propositions. The question is the plausibility of such a legal cross-fertilisation 
                                                 
1
 (1995) 2AC 633. 
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considering the identified differences between the two systems which in the view of some 
are diametrically opposed to each other. It is contended that the seeming problematic 
divide can be bridged through internal mechanisms of Islamic, and by extension, Saudi 
law. This can be achieved through the instrumentality of Fiqh. As will be made clear, the 
mechanism of Fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, is key to the application and development of the 
Shari’ah. This is a point often missed in consideration and analyses of the Islamic legal 
system but which is crucial to the understanding of the system. 
 
Cases 
 
It is relevant to briefly comment on the decisions of the Board (and of the General courts)2 
considered in this study. This is as regards the representativeness of the decisions made by 
the courts and, therefore, of their approach to questions of delictual liability. While it 
cannot be proven in a scientific manner that these cases are completely typical of the cases 
decided by the Board, considerable effort was made to obtain the spectrum of available 
cases. So far as the researcher is aware, there is no reason to claim that the cases 
considered are atypical. The research, it must be noted, faced a serious challenge in this 
important area. The system of Saudi Arabia is not a common law system; there is no rule of 
precedents or a system of law reporting.3 The option available has been to search courts’ 
archives for records of cases and judgements on this slowly developing area of law in the 
Saudi jurisdiction. This was supplemented with numerous visits to various judges to secure 
judgements and records of their previous, recent decisions or even (in few instances) 
current cases. In short, it is submitted that in the circumstances, the cases discussed in this 
study represent what the courts are doing in practice.  
 
On a related note, since there is no law of precedent in Saudi Arabia, judges are not obliged 
to decide consistently with earlier cases. Each case exists independently and is judged on 
the merits of its adherence to the Saudi constitution and Islamic law. In theory, the 
decisions in cases ought to be consistent with one another because all judges are applying 
the same laws, but there is no mechanism analogous to precedent in common law systems 
for ensuring that they do so. Therefore, rather than assuming that the courts are taking a 
consistent approach it is important to test this. The approach taken in this research has been 
                                                 
2
 All references here and throughout this thesis to the ‘general courts’ or to ‘ordinary courts’ are references to 
the Shari’ah courts. 
3
 In 2008, the Board of Grievances has recently published the first ever compendium of the cases decided in 
2006/2007. However, not surprisingly, less than five percent of the cases are on delictual liability. Thus even 
this report was not of much help in real terms to this study.  
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one of collecting a sample of cases from various judges to gain an understanding of how 
the courts are arriving at judgements and operate in practice, and in particular how they 
apply the laws relevant to state liability for delict. 
 
Terminology and Translation 
 
In this thesis I will refer throughout to the law of ‘delict’ to indicate the field of study 
except where the context makes the use of other terms appropriate, for example, referring 
to the law of ‘tort’ when summarising the views of persons writing about English law. It is 
also relevant to clarify that the decisions of the Board of Grievances, in line with the 
official language of Saudi Arabia, were delivered in Arabic and there are no English 
versions of the cases. I have translated these decisions myself with some support from 
professional translators. I have also similarly translated most of the references to Islamic 
principles and texts which are available only in Arabic but indicated these at relevant 
points in the thesis. There are many translations of the Qur’an in English language but I 
have preferred not to rely on any one though I consulted a number in rendering translations 
of the Qur’an. Here also, as with most cases of the Hadith; sayings of the Prophet, I have 
provided translations of the texts. Any exceptions to this (and there are few) have been 
appropriately referenced. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
This study is roughly divided into two parts. Chapters two and three provide a background 
to the work while chapters four, five and six constitute the analyses of the key chapters of 
the study. Chapter Two provides account of aspects of the administration and conduct of 
governance in Saudi Arabia in as much as it constitutes the background to the incidence of 
delictual liability of the state in the country. This chapter provides the contextual 
background to this study. It offers an insight into government and governance of Saudi 
Arabia by describing the nature and functioning of its institutions.  The chapter starts with 
an overview of the historical and political background of the state. This is followed by a 
description of the nature of the legal system. The chapter then moves to an examination of 
the structure of the state and some basic functions of governance. Here, it briefly describes 
the public services and regulatory activities provided by government ministries and 
departments. It explains changes in the functions of the state and the way they are 
performed. It gives also an explanation on how the activities of government are funded. 
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The nature of the study requires an understanding of the legal system in Saudi Arabia and 
in particular, the court vested with jurisdiction on the central issue of delictual liability of 
the state. Chapter Three introduces the recently reconstituted Administrative Court, Diwan 
al-Madhalim, the Board of Grievances which is the judicial body vested with jurisdiction 
over claims on state liability in the country. The chapter includes a discussion of the 
constitutional basis, composition, jurisdiction, powers and working methods of the Board. 
 
At the heart of this study is the nature of delictual liability in the Saudi jurisdiction. 
Chapter Four sets out the main principles of delictual liability under Saudi Law. This part 
of the study is crucial for understanding the liability of public authorities in Saudi Arabia 
that will be considered in detail in the following chapter. This chapter discusses the 
concept of delict under Saudi law in terms of its definition, nature, general rule, limitations, 
types and elements. The chapter further draws some comparison between Saudi and Scots 
law. 
 
Chapter Five provides an analysis of the jurisprudence of the Board of Grievances with 
regard to the liability of public authorities for delict. The chapter proceeds by examining 
the nature of the liability of public authorities both in the UK and Saudi Arabia. A critical 
analysis of a number of cases is provided by adopting taxonomy from Scots and English 
law. The taxonomy is constructed in order to provide a categorisation and sub-
categorisation of forms of liability as well as forms of harm which will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
 
The Board’s practice regarding compensation for state liability for delict is evaluated in 
Chapter Six. The focus in this chapter is on the Board’s approach to the assessment of the 
categories of harm which merit compensation and of the appropriate amount of 
compensation for them. It discusses the nature and relevance of compensation for harm 
under Saudi Law. The chapter sets out the types of damage that considered as harm for the 
establishing a right to compensation. Two auxiliary issues relating to the assessment of 
damages, contributory negligence and the use of expert witnesses for calculating damages 
in making compensation awards are also briefly discussed in this chapter. Chapter Seven 
presents the conclusion of the study.  
Ch 2 Government and Governance in Saudi State 
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Chapter two: Government and Governance in Saudi State 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Not much is known about the nature and structure of government and governance of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The nature of this study with its focus on the delictual liability 
of the state in Saudi Arabia requires knowledge and understanding of both issues as a 
background matter. In other words, a proper appreciation of which persons and institutions 
constitute the state and what their activities are is imperative in engaging with delictual 
liability of the state as envisaged in this study. It is also necessary to explain some basic 
features of the legal system. The description of the foregoing is the focus of this chapter. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief summary of the historical and political background of the 
state. This is followed by a description of the nature of the legal system. The discussion 
then moves to an examination of the structure of the state and some basic functions of 
governance. Here, it briefly describes the services and regulatory activities provided by 
government ministries and departments. Finally, the chapter outlines some new trends in 
Governance.   
 
2.2 Saudi Arabia: A Brief Historical and Political Background 
 
What is now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has its origins in the religious and 
political cooperation between Sheikh Muhammad bin ‘Abdulwahab (d.1791) and 
Muhammad bin Saud (d.1765). In the early part of the 18th century, Sheikh Muhammad bin 
‘Abdulwahab started a movement calling on Muslims to return to the pristine principles of 
their religion in the Najd area of the Arabian Peninsula. His call was resisted initially and 
he faced serious persecution until he found support and protection with the ruler of the 
town of Diriyah, Muhammad bin Saud.1  
 
 By the early 19th century, the Al-Saud family ruled most parts of the Arabian Peninsula. 
While the Al-Saud maintained political power, bin ‘Abdulwahab was granted spiritual 
                                                 
1
 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, London “Country Profile” available at: 
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/Detail.asp?InSectionID=1545&InNewsItemID=24408 (Site visited 10 March 2009). 
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leadership.2 The growing power and influence of the Al-Saud was a great source of 
concern to the Ottoman Empire. The empire then sent its armies to counter the influence of 
the Al-Saud. This led eventually to the take-over of Diriyah. The capture of Diriyah by the 
Ottomans marked the end of the first Saudi State in 1818.3 However, by 1824, the Al-Saud 
family had returned to power in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1901, after some further political 
setbacks, including exile to Kuwait, Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud left Kuwait and 
recaptured Riyadh in 1902. This takeover of Riyadh which he established as his capital 
marked the beginning of the formation of the modern state of Saudi Arabia.  From his 
capital in Riyadh, Abdulaziz took over Hijaz which covers the territories of the two Holy 
cities of Muslims, Makkah and Al-Madinah and unified it with Najd in 1924. He then 
became King of Najd and Hijaz. King Abdulaziz then went on gradually to unite the all 
different regions into one nation. The country was named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 
23 September, 1932.4  
 
The historical factor of the partnership between an Islamic movement (led by Sheikh 
Muhammad bin ‘Abdulwahab) and political power (represented by Muhammad bin Saud) 
in the establishment of the first Saudi state is remarkable. As will be seen throughout 
discussions of the legal system in Saudi Arabia, it has left an abiding influence on Saudi 
society. One of the most important and commonly known effects of this union is the 
adoption of Islamic Law as state law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
 
2.3 Sources and Principles of Saudi Law 
   
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was never colonised by one of the Western powers.5 
Islamic law is traditionally, the law of the land. This historical factor has led to the 
situation where, unlike most other Muslim societies, the ‘essential core of the Saudi legal 
system’ never witnessed an invasion by western conceptions of law.6 As Vogel noted, most 
of the people regard Islamic law as their ‘indigenous law, natural and inevitable.’7 With 
regard to the centrality of the Shari’ah in the life of Muslims generally, and in the Middle-
East in particular, Al-Rimawi has observed that:  
  
                                                 
2
 F E Vogel Islamic Law and Legal System- Studies of Saudi Arabia (Konninklije Brill NV Leiden the 
Netherlands 2000) xv. 
3
 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, London note 1 supra. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 There was a brief period of Ottoman control of parts of what is now Saudi Arabia.  
6
 Vogel note 2 supra at xiv. 
7
 Ibid. 
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Owing to the belief that the principal source of its moral juridical precepts is 
revelation rather than reason, much of Shari'a's fundamental legal principles 
have remained impervious to change. Additionally, unlike Western legal 
systems, which long separated canon and secular laws, Shari'a principles 
still continue to constitute an important source of legislation in the majority 
of Arab countries.8 
 
This position on the significance of the Shari’ah in society is perhaps nowhere more 
pronounced in its dominance as an organising principle than in Saudi Arabia. It is more 
accurate to say in the specific case of Saudi Arabia, as a number of writers had noted, that 
Islamic law remains the law of the country. 9 
 
 Following the unification of Najd and Hijaz in 1924, King Abdulaziz passed a Royal 
Decree in September 1924, setting out the Shari’ah as the groundnorm and basis of 
governance. The Decree further provided that governance in the country is based on 
Shurah, consultation. The sources of legislation are the Qur’an, the Sunnah, the traditions 
of Prophet Muhammad, and Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).10 The Decree committed the 
state to be governed by the principles of Islamic Law and all legislation to be in accordance 
with it. 
 
 This was followed by another Royal Decree in December 1924 which proclaimed the 
general law to be Shari’ah. The four orthodox (Sunni), most representative jurists and their 
schools of thought (Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi’) were the examples to follow.11 The 
status of Shari’ah in the law and governance of Saudi Arabia was further confirmed in 
several other Royal Decrees.12  
 
                                                 
8
 L M Al-Rimawi ‘Relevance of Shari'a in Arab Securities Regulation with Particular Emphasis on Jordan as 
an Arab Regulatory Model’ (2006) 27 (8) Company Lawyer 227, 227.  
9
 See for example Vogel note 2 supra at xiv, A A Al-Ghadyan ‘The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia’ (1998) 13 
Arab Law Quarterly 235, 235, I Al-Hudaithy ‘Historical Review of Saudi Administrative Contracts’ (2002) 3 
Public Procurement Law Review 186, 186 and W M Ballantyne ‘The States of the GCC; Sources of Law, the 
Shari’a and the Extent to which it Applies’ (1985-1986) 1 Arab Law Quarterly 3,3-4.  
10
 Umm al-Qura Gazette, 12 September, 1924. 
11
 Umm al-Qura Gazette, 19 December 1924. It is fundamental to note that though there are other schools of 
Islamic thought or jurisprudence, all references to Islamic law and jurisprudence in this thesis will be limited 
to the four stated above for two reasons. First is the fact of their being the most representative. Second and 
even more important to this research, they are the generally recognised ones in administration and legislation 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the major focus of this research. 
12
  See for instance Umm al-Qura Gazette 6 November 1925. 
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 The primacy of Shari’ah in Saudi Arabia was restated in the constitutional reforms carried 
out by the late ruler of the country, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz. This is reflected in the 
Nidham Al-Assasy Lil Hukm, the Basic Law of Governance (the Basic Law),13 promulgated 
on 1st March 1992.  Specifically, the importance of Shari’ah is restated in the ‘General 
Principles’ and ‘System of Governance’ provisions of the Basic Law. Articles 1 and 7 
respectively of the Basic Law provide: 
  
Article 1 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its 
religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the 
Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger, may God’s blessings and peace be 
upon him. Its language shall be Arabic and its capital shall be the city of 
Riyadh14 
         
Article 7   
Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the 
Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of his Messenger, both of which 
govern this Basic Law and all the laws of the State.  
 
Thus, the effect of Article 1 is that the Qur’an and the Sunnah, the sources of Islamic Law, 
rather than the Basic Law itself, remain the constitution of Saudi Arabia. The Qur’an and 
the Sunnah are the sources of Islamic Law and all the other methods and principles are 
based on and must conform to these sources to be valid.15 This is a very important point to 
note as Islamic law, methods and principles have to be taken into consideration in the 
making of legislation. Considering the centrality of Islamic Law in governance and 
legislation in Saudi Arabia, it important to briefly consider the nature of Islamic Law and 
how it will be understood in this study. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Royal Decree No. 91/A. See Umm al-Qura Gazette No. 3397, 5 March 1992. The Basic Law, like other 
laws of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now available in English on the official website of the Bureau of 
Experts of the Council of Ministers available at:  http://www.boe.gov.sa/English/saudilaws1.html (Site 
visited 9 March 2009). 
14
  Emphasis mine. 
15
 I A K Nyazee Outline of Islamic Jurisprudence (Advanced Legal Studies Institute Pakistan 2000) 100. 
 
 
Ch 2 Government and Governance in Saudi State 
 12
2.3.1 The Nature of Islamic Law 
 
There is usually some confusion as to what Islamic Law is and there is thus the need for a 
brief clarification about the use of the term.  According to Baderin, there is ‘a traditional 
misconception about Islamic law being wholly divine and immutable.’16 The source of this 
misconception he further notes is the failure to distinguish between the sources and 
methods of Islamic Law. For a proper understanding of the nature of Islamic Law, it is 
important to distinguish between Shari’ah and Fiqh. It is commonly the case that both 
these terms are referred to as Islamic Law but from the technical point of view, they are not 
synonyms. 
 
 Literally, Shari’ah means ‘a path to be followed’ or ‘right path.’ Shari’ah refers basically 
to the sources of Islamic Law. Further, it is to be noted that Shar’iah includes not just legal 
prescriptions but also principles of faith, ‘Al-Aqeedah. Fiqh on the other hand means 
‘understanding.’ Fiqh, as Nyazee explains, is essentially, the jurisprudence of 
Shari’ah.17 While Shari’ah is immutable deriving from the sources of Islamic Law, Fiqh is 
subject to change depending on circumstances.18 As Baderin usefully notes:  
 
The term Sharī ah can also be used in a general legal sense in reference to 
the Islamic legal system as a distinct legal system with its own sources, 
methods, principles and procedures, separate from other legal systems such 
as the common law and civil law.19  
 
The distinction between Shari’ah and Fiqh is very important in the understanding, 
application and development of law in the context of the legal system in Muslim countries. 
Failure to make the distinction between Shari’ah and Fiqh in discussions about the Islamic 
legal system leads to serious confusion. This is because it leads to ‘the tendency to perceive 
the whole Islamic legal system as completely divine and thereby to (mis) represent the 
whole system as inflexible and unchangeable.’20 Indeed, the representation of Shari’ah as 
‘Islamic law’ is only partially correct. It is correct to the extent that the sources of law are 
derived from the Shari’ah but the Shari’ah is better understood as a system rather than just 
law in the western sense. It will be argued later that Fiqh is of particular importance in the 
                                                 
16
 M A Baderin International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford University Press Oxford 2003) 33. 
17
 Nyazee note 15 supra at 39. 
18
 Ibid. at 33-34. See also A I Doi Shari’ah: The Islamic Law (TaHa Publishers London 1997) 2. 
19
 M Baderin ‘Understanding Islamic Law in Theory and Practice’ (2009) 9 Legal Information Management 
186, 187. 
20
 Ibid. 
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development of the law of delict especially as it relates to the liability of public authorities 
in countries whose legal systems are based on Islamic Law like Saudi Arabia, the primary 
focus of this study.  
 
Some authors state that Islamic law has secondary sources but it has been noted that this is 
rather a misrepresentation particularly from a western perspective.21 It is more accurate to 
say that what is presented as ‘secondary sources’ constitute juristic methods and principles. 
So the terminology, ‘Islamic law’ commonly used in the literature discussing the Shari’ah 
is best understood as ‘consisting of three main elements, namely, sources, methods and 
principles.’22 It is with this in mind that the term Islamic law is used throughout this study 
as distinct from Shari’ah. In what follows, the discussion will turn to the aforementioned 
elements of Islamic law. 
  
2.3.2 Sources of Islamic Law  
 
Islamic law has two divine sources, namely, the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, 
both of which are, to Muslims, literally immutable.23 These are transmitted sources that are 
taken to be definitive. They are further discussed below: 
 
a. Qur’an: This is the word of God revealed to His Prophet. Muslims are united in the 
belief that the Qur’an is the non-imitable and direct words of Allah which have remained 
preserved from the point and time of revelation up to the present day. It contains provisions 
covering spiritual, moral and secular affairs (from the western prospective). It makes 
provisions on purely religious matters (such as prayer, fasting and charity) as well as 
ethical and moral issues like care and respect for parents, courtesy and so on. More 
germane to the context of this study, the Qur’an further contains ‘legal-specific’ provisions 
on temporal affairs like contract, trade and crimes. These provisions incorporate the public, 
private, international and domestic aspects of societal life.24 A few ‘legal-specific’ 
provisions in the Qur’an are in the nature of statutory provisions but most are of a 
constitutional nature.  These are verses which make clear provisions on aspects of personal 
or community life like the law of bequests and the payment of tax on wealth by the 
wealthy. The Qur’an is divided into 114 chapters and was revealed over a 22 year period 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. at 187-190. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
  Baderin note 19 supra at 187. 
24
 Ibid at 188. 
Ch 2 Government and Governance in Saudi State 
 14
between 610 and 632 AD. For Muslims, it is a complete code for living both as individuals 
and as a society.25 
 
b. Sunnah: The literal meaning of Sunnah is ‘the well-known’ or ‘well-trodden path.’26 
The technical meaning which is relevant in this context is the collected and transmitted 
words, actions, and approval (of the conduct of others) of Prophet Muhammad.27 There are 
disciplines in the Islamic sciences that are concerned with validation and legal 
interpretation of such reports. Many such transmissions are also tawatur (mass-transmitted) 
thereby forming key legislative instruments. Much of the Sunnah relates to personal law, 
and law of interactions (financial transactions, marriage, behaviour, speech etc) within 
communities.28 
 
2.3.3 Methods of Islamic Law 
 
The methods discussed here are confusingly referred to as ‘secondary sources’ because 
they derive their legitimacy in the Islamic legal system from the primary sources.29 
However, as stated earlier, they are best referred to, and considered as, methods of juristic 
reasoning rather than sources of law. In other words, these are rational methods used for 
extending the rules and principles stated in the sources mentioned above to meet the needs 
and challenges of new situations.30 They have been described as the ‘vehicles’ utilised by 
jurists to ‘transport the Shari’ah into the future.’31 They are:  
 
a. Ijma’: It is the consensus of independent jurists from the Muslim ummah (nation) after 
the demise of the Prophet within a defined period upon a rule of Islamic Law.  It has to 
fulfil certain conditions for its validity including that the agreement or consensus must take 
place among the mujtahids or independent jurists of the four Islamic Schools of thought 
(mentioned earlier) and that the agreement must be unanimous that is, based on a 
consensus of all independent jurists.32 Ijma’ seeks to establish rules or principles based on 
consensus of scholars who have to seek authority or foundation for those rules in the 
                                                 
25
 Vogel note 2 supra at 3-4,  Doi note 18 supra at 21-22 and Nyazee note 15 supra at 130-132. 
26
 Nyazee note 15 supra at 132. 
27
 Ibid. at 133. 
28
 Ibid. at 132-139. See also  
29
 See for instance Ibid. at 146-147 and Doi note 18 supra at 64. 
30
 Nyazee note 15 supra at 146. 
31
  Baderin note 19 supra at 189. 
32
 Nyazee note 15 supra at 141-144. 
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Qur’an and Sunnah, judicial authorities are subsequently required to abide by the Ijma’.33 
 
b. Qiyas: This means analogical deduction. It refers to the process of using analogies 
between cases in order to reach legal decisions about cases which are new (by nature) to 
jurists. More technically, it means ‘measuring or estimating one thing in terms of 
another’.34 It applies by drawing similarities between two cases to see how they can be 
made ‘equal’ and applying a known decision of one case to the other (sometimes with 
uncertainty attached).35 In other words, Qiyas is the legal method introduced to derive ‘a 
logical conclusion of a certain law on a certain issue that has to do with the welfare of 
Muslims.’36  
 
A crucial principle in the application of Qiyas is that it must be in accordance with the 
Qur’an, Sunnah and Ijma’.37 Three conditions must be observed in the application of 
Qiyas. The first condition is that there must be an Asl, an original case which is provided 
for or covered by the Qur’an or Sunnah. The analogy has to be based on this Asl. The 
second condition is the Far’, the new case on which a decision or ruling is required but for 
which there is no specific mention or coverage in either the Qur’an or Sunnah. The ‘Illah, 
the effective link is the third required condition. The proper determination of the ‘illah is 
very critical in the process of Qiyas. As Moghul explained, the ‘illah is the reason for why 
any particular law or rule is believed to have been legislated by the Lawgiver. It is thus 
essential to know the ‘illah in order to understand the law itself and to determine the scope 
and applicability of the law.’38 Knowledge of the ‘illah is essential to Muslim jurists and 
society in their desire to conform to the dictates of their religion and its law even in the 
experience of changed or changing circumstances.39 There must be an effective link 
between the Asl, original case and the Far’, the new case. On satisfaction of these 
conditions, a Hukm, ruling on the original case can then be applied to the new case by 
analogy.  
 
A classic example of Qiyas is the prohibition of narcotic drugs in contemporary times 
under Islamic law even though they are not specifically mentioned in the Qur’an or 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. at 144. 
34
 Ibid. at 146. 
35
 Ibid. at 146-147. 
36
 Doi note 18 supra at 70. 
37
 Ibid. and Nyazee note 15 supra at 146. 
38
 U F Moghul ‘Approximating Certainty in Ratiocination: How to Ascertain the Illah (Effective Cause) in 
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Sunnah. The prohibition is by analogy to the prohibition of Khamr, intoxicants because 
narcotic drugs have the same intoxicating effect as liquor (or alcohol) as alluded to in 
chapter 5 verse 90 of the Qur’an.  On the example, the Asl here is the Khamr while the 
Far’ is narcotic drugs. The ‘Illah is intoxication resulting from the use of both. Thus, the 
new ruling on prohibition of narcotics is derived from the specific similar ruling on 
Khamr.40 
 
2.3.4 Principles of Islamic Law 
 
There are a number of principles that are taken into consideration in deriving specific rules 
or arriving at judgments either in the context of rule-making (in the private sphere), 
legislation or judicial determinations. The most notable are:  
 
a. Istihsan: Literally, this means to consider something good. In the field of Islamic 
Law, it means juristic preference and it refers to the legal principle of giving up a weaker 
authority for a stronger one. To do this, two valid references from the sources are 
considered and compared and the stronger one is chosen over the weaker one. It may also 
operate through the restriction of one reference by another.41 It has been suggested by 
Zahraa that Istihsan is ‘a method of identifying a ruling and assigning it to a new event 
through the interaction between Shari’ah texts and factual reality’42 but there is no doubt 
that the literature on the matter regard it as a principle considered in juristic reasoning. An 
example of Istihsan is that Islam places considerable importance on female modesty and 
proper dressing of a women (satrau al‘aurah). Further to this, no man except her husband 
is allowed to view certain parts of her body. However, a physician is allowed on account of 
medical necessity to examine and diagnose a woman in the interest of saving her life and 
protecting her health.43 The preference here is for saving life over protecting modesty and 
privacy in view of the emphasis on preservation of life as one of the cardinal objectives of 
Islamic law. Thus, the rule on privacy will be dropped for the need to preserve life as a 
foremost objective in the circumstances. 
 
                                                 
40
 Baderin note 19 supra at 188 – 189. 
41
 Nyazee note 15 supra at 150-151. 
42
 M Zahraa ‘Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of  Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research’ (2003)18 Arab LQ 215, 238-239. 
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b. Istishab (Presumption of continuity): The existing laws of a community are 
recognised to be consistent with Shari’ah unless something comes to light that would 
suggest that existing laws (of personal conduct, governance etc) are not consistent with 
Shari’ah and, therefore, illegal. It means that everything is assumed to be permissible in 
that society unless there is a specific provision in Shari’ah to the contrary. In other words, 
it refers to maintenance of the status quo in a society as long as it does not violate any of 
the Shari’ah provisions. This principle is responsible for taking into account the ‘urf and 
‘adaat, culture and customs of a people and integrating it into the Islamic law that is 
applied to those people. In this way Islamic law differs according to where it was applied 
except in its central principles and thereby allows the indigenous culture of the people and 
place to grow naturally albeit with a stronger moral focus.44  
 
c. Al-Maslaha Al-Mursalah: In a general sense, al-Maslaha al-Mursalah has a 
meaning similar to public interest in western legal discourse. According to Nyazee, the 
literal meaning is the acquisition of benefit or the repulsion of injury/harm. Technically 
however, it refers to ‘the preservation of the purposes of Islamic law in the settlement of 
legal issues.’45 It is the ‘systematic consideration and evaluation of the various interests 
that have public and general effect on the Muslim Community.’46 However, it is relevant to 
point out that al-Maslaha al-Mursalah is a little different from western conceptions of 
‘public interest’. While it clearly allows for and promotes consideration of some of the 
arguments that would be put forward as public interest arguments in countries like the UK 
and USA, it does not necessarily contrast with private interest. In some cases it would in 
fact do so but not in others, since its overarching purpose is to preserve the purposes of 
Islamic law which in a good number of cases will be independent of any sort of private 
interest. 
 
Scholars such as Doi and Zahraa have stated that preservation of the public interest is 
recognised as an important basis for, or source of, law in the Islamic legal system.47 
However, in line with what has been stated above, it is accurate to assert that this is an 
important principle in legal rationalisation in the Islamic legal system which can play an 
important role in law and policy making in Muslim states. This may be in legislation or 
judicial interpretation from time to time. As a contemporary author, Izzi Dien elaborates: 
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The concept of public welfare and interest in Islamic law occupies a central 
position in the formation of legal opinion and the interpretation of the legal 
texts. It acts as a ‘key turner’ that harmonises all sources of the law...it 
carries with it a wider sense than just serving the public since it includes 
every cause and effect that contributes to the betterment of life and faith in 
Islam.48 
 
 An example of the operation of this principle can be made in the socio-economic realm. In 
the Islamic socio-economic system, special taxes may not ordinarily be levied as the state 
is expected to fund public services through the imposition and collection of the Zakat, the 
general tax on wealth through which the privileged support the less privileged. However, 
the imposition of new taxes by the state can be legislated if it does not have the funds to 
enable it to provide security for the people like policing and defence costs for example, a 
fundamental obligation of the state under Islamic law. The principle of al-Maslaha al-
Mursalah or promotion of public welfare and prevention of harm is very important to the 
organisation and governance of the state under the Islamic system. A liberal construction of 
the mechanism may also provide a viable basis for the development of appropriate 
principles in the challenging and ever-expanding area of delictual liability of public 
authorities.  
 
It is noteworthy that the Board of Grievances does not directly refer to the principle of al-
Maslaha al-Mursalah very often in its judgements. However, there are some decisions that 
implicitly reflect the adoption of the principle such as S v Civil Defence Corps, Z & 29 Ors 
v Municipality of Riyadh and B v Municipality of Abha (discussed in chapter five). In fact 
the whole idea of risk-based liability, which will be discussed in chapter five, is an 
application of this principle. In the case of S v Civil Defence Corps for instance, the Board, 
it can be argued, is implicitly applying the principle of al-Maslaha al-Mursalah. It did not 
interfere in the work of a public body (fire-fighting) which aimed to preserve the public 
interest in the safety of life and property. At the same time, it did not leave the claimant 
who suffered unjustified loss in his property as a result of such work without 
compensation.  This approach that seeks to balance between the public interest and 
individual rights, it is argued, can be taken forward in dealing with complex cases in the 
future and find legitimation within the broad principles of Islamic law. 
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d. Saad Al-Dhari’ah: A related concept to the above is that of blocking the lawful 
means to an unlawful end. This principle is used in juristic determination (and legislation) 
to address situations where an act is ordinarily lawful but doing it may result in an 
unlawful end. The need and uses of this principle varies according to time and place. For 
example, the planting of poppy seeds is ordinarily considered a lawful act under Islamic 
Law. However, it has been adjudged an unlawful act in current times if it leads directly to 
the production of hard drugs because the latter are dangerous to human health and such 
substances are generally banned under Islamic Law. In view of the public interest element 
implicit in this principle, some scholars regard it as a variant of al-Maslaha al-Mursalah.49  
 
 On the whole, the sources are those that generally agreed upon, transmitted and definitive. 
Importantly, extensions of the law can be based upon them. The methods and principles on 
the other hand (usually, but inappropriately, referred to as ‘secondary sources’) are 
mechanisms for achieving such extensions and the continued applicability and flexibility of 
Islamic law. Before leaving this issue of the nature of Islamic law, it is relevant to briefly 
comment on the ‘Schools of Thought’ or ‘Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence.’50  
 
 
2.3.5 Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence 
 
As Baderin has noted, one of the most common features of Islamic Law is its 
‘complexity.’51 By this is meant the realisation that it is not a ‘monolithic’ system.52 
Islamic jurisprudence thrives on a plurality within a unity based on the recognition of the 
diversity of human society.53 This is reflected in the acceptance of the validity of schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence which are considered a fundamental blessing to the Islamic legal 
system in that they are ‘different manifestations of the divine will.’54 There is admittedly 
some divergence of opinion on certain legal issues amongst these different schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence. However, rather than constituting a source of confusion in the 
operation of Islamic Law the schools of jurisprudence represent ‘a diversity within unity.’55 
Although hundreds of schools of jurisprudence initially developed, four Sunni Schools; 
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanabali have endured through the centuries.  
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2.3.6 Legislation as a Source of Law 
 
Apart from the above, there are several legal instruments that are used principally in the 
administration of the state in Saudi Arabia as with all other system which adopts Islamic 
law. All of these instruments must conform to the sources discussed earlier. These are 
regulations which include Marsoom Malaki (Royal Decree), Amr Malaki (Royal Order), 
Lawaeh-wa-Qararat (Council of Minister’s Regulations) and Ministerial Regulations.56 
The economic boom and increasing contact with other parts of the world has led to the 
need for more legislative enactments to govern foreign and domestic commercial activities. 
However, such legislation was designed to supplement but not to contradict the Shari’ah.57 
 It is further relevant to any study of the laws and legal system of Saudi Arabia to examine 
the Basic Law. This is because as mentioned earlier, the Basic Law now forms the major 
point of reference for any discussion of the law and legal system of Saudi Arabia. 
However, before going further to examine the Basic Law, it is appropriate to make a brief 
comment on the codification of laws in Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.3.6.1 Codification of Saudi Laws 
 
 Formerly, a good part of what can be regarded as Saudi Law was not codified. However, 
in the recent past, the government has initiated an ongoing policy of codification of laws 
‘that appear modern and western’58 relating to various aspects of life in the country. This is 
why, as mentioned above, there is now a growing body of legal instruments in the 
administration of the state. This has been traced to a process of modernisation which has 
taken root in the country deriving presumably from what Vogel describes as ‘an extensive 
exchange’ between Saudi Arabia and the ‘West.’59 Thus, laws relating to the media and 
publishing, culture, national security, criminal laws and civil status have now been 
codified. The same applies to legislation on commerce, investment and economy, 
education and science as well as health, social care and labour laws.60 Some of these laws 
have been revised and reformed over the years subsequent to their codification. 
 
Furthermore, the codification project is quite significant for any informed observer of the 
legal and political system of the country. More than that, it is important, in the context of 
this work that the process of codification (at least indirectly) furthers attempts to provide a 
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systematic presentation of the principles of delict. This is the case inasmuch as the various 
laws potentially map out in some primary way, the foundations of delict as it relates to 
public authorities thus providing further guidance for judicial officers in the task of 
adjudicating delictual claims against the state. It is apt at this point to consider the Basic 
Law of Governance and certain (limited) constitutional changes that have been constituted 
in Saudi Arabia.   
 
2.3.6.2 The Basic Law of Governance and Constitutional Changes  
 
 Interestingly, until 1992, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, like the United Kingdom, had no 
written constitution, at least not in terms of the modern western conception of it.61 The 
founder of the state and his immediate successors ruled for decades without a written 
constitution, political party, electoral system or organised labour or even professional 
associations. This was due, as Aba-Namay noted, to the nature of the royal family’s claim 
to leadership; ‘it alone had the political and moral qualities to rule the state.’62 However, 
there had been longstanding opinion that there should be a clear statement of the powers of 
the state and the structure of government both from within certain elements in the royal 
family itself and outside of it.63     
 
External factors like conflict with Yemen and Egypt in the early 1960s and the Iranian 
Revolution in the 1979 prompted successive rulers to promise reforms of the legal and 
political system with little or no positive action in the period leading up to 1992. However, 
the economic boom from oil revenues and the transformation of the state to a wealthy and 
educated one made the need for political change, albeit limited, inevitable. The country was 
fast integrating into the global community and could no longer resist the need to be 
identified as a modern state. There was not only the consideration of the ever-growing 
number of pilgrims from all over the world visiting the country for the annual Muslim rites 
of Hajj, but pressure from the international community, particularly its economic allies in 
the West and elsewhere, for the establishment of the mechanisms of a modern state.  
 
The democratisation wave of the 1980 and 1990s as well as the Gulf War and heightened 
tensions in the middle-east (which have recently escalated) all acted as immediate impetus 
for the 1992 reforms. These developments appear to have encouraged the expression of 
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discontent with the political arrangements in the country with various groups, including 
sections of the religious scholars, academics and women groups either making written 
representations or staging public protests to express one form of socio-political demand or 
the other.64 Due to these varied political, social and economic challenges facing the 
country, the Basic Law along with two major pieces of legislation, the Law of the Shura 
Council and the Law of the Provinces, was enacted on 1st March 1992 to herald what were 
expected to be major constitutional changes in Saudi Arabia.65 
 
Although it is stated in the Basic Law that the constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
shall be the Qur’an and Sunnah, it should be noted that the Basic Law is formulated 
according to the structure of modern constitutional law. Thus, the Basic Law makes 
provisions for the system of governance, identity of the state and the organisation of the 
three branches of government identified as the ‘judicial,’ ‘executive’ and ‘regulatory.’66 It 
further makes provisions for state-citizen relations, the rights and duties of citizens, the 
powers of the Monarchy as well as the economic and financial system. The final provision 
of the Basic Law is the amendment procedure. 
 
The Basic law has been welcomed by some as being an exercise in constitutional reforms 
that has ‘introduced a major change in the state’s organic institutions’ which ‘may well 
break significant new ground in constitutional terms.’67 Others have expressed the critical 
view that the Basic law is merely an exercise in ‘ornamental constitutionalism.’68 It is 
simply a very ‘modest…step’ and ‘realistic document’ that ‘faithfully reflects the state of 
the relative power of the governing elite and society.’69 Critics of the constitutional 
changes have pointed out that the constitutional changes are not nearly far reaching 
enough. In their view, almost sixty years of waiting has produced a document that for the 
most part, is of ornamental, rather than real value in demarcating and separating the powers 
of the executive, judicial and regulatory (legislative) branches of government. In the words 
of Al-Fahad:  
 
the Saudi Basic Law signifies, if anything, a qualified rejection of the 
standard notions of constitutionalism in terms of rights and freedoms, while 
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ratifying a powerful executive circumscribed only by historical practices 
and Islamic ideas of governance.70  
 
In the view of critics of the changes, in reality, the changes have left the political landscape 
much as it was before the introduction of the Basic Law; the royal family, and particularly 
the King still concentrates state powers in his hands. The King for instance still has wide 
and mostly final powers over executive, judicial and legislative matters in the country 
through appointments of members to the relevant branches and consent to or approval of 
their decisions. For instance, the de facto legislative assembly members are all appointees 
of the King. Article 3 of the Law of the Shura Council provides that it shall consist of a 
chairman and one hundred and twenty members chosen by the King from amongst 
scholars, experts and specialists.71 
 
2.3.6.3 Some Implications of the Basic Law of Governance on the 
Liability of the State 
 
 Whatever the position taken on the nature of the constitutional reforms which the Basic 
Law represents, as briefly discussed above, one of its major positive contributions would 
appear to be its introduction of clarity on certain aspects of the relationship between the 
state and the citizens in Saudi Arabia. Foremost is how it gives clear expression to the 
(incredibly wide) powers of the King. For instance, it stipulates the powers of the monarch 
to constitute the Shura Council and even amend the Basic Law.72 A number of provisions 
of the Basic Law which are also relevant to this study in that they deal with the rights of 
citizens and residents against the state and the liability of public authorities. These 
provisions will be discussed as applicable in the course of this research.  
 
Suffice it to say at this point that they make provisions for and reinforce the position that 
Islamic Law generally, and its application in Saudi Arabia specifically, recognises and 
regards as important the liability of public authorities. They include specific provisions on 
the liability of the state (Article 43), a guarantee of the right of access to court and 
litigation (Article 47), extensive jurisdiction of the courts (Article 49). Of special interest 
and significance to this study is the constitutional recognition of the Board of Grievances 
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provided for in Article 53 of the Basic Law. As if the foregoing is not enough to 
demonstrate the commitment of the state to the recognition of the principle of state 
liability, the Basic Law further provides: 
 
The regulatory authority shall have the power to formulate laws and rules 
conducive to the realization of the wellbeing or protection from harm of the 
State in accordance with the principles of the Islamic Shari’ah.73   
 
From the historical point of view, it is significant to note that part of the specific provisions 
of Article 43, to wit ‘Every individual shall have the right to address public authorities in 
matters of concern to him’ conforms to the 1926 proclamation made by King Abdulaziz, 
the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, wherein he declared: 
 
 His Majesty proclaims to his people that anyone who suffers from injustice 
which is inflicted on him by whomever – a junior or senior official – and 
hides it, then he is responsible for his suffering.  Moreover, anyone who has 
a complaint can submit it through a Complaint Box which is placed at the 
government headquarters and whose key is with His Majesty the King.  The 
complainant should be sure that no one will harm him because of his 
complaint of injustice which was inflicted on him by any official. 74 
  
Thus, clearly, there is a serious case for investigating the law of Saudi Arabia as it relates 
to the liability of public authorities in delict since it has indeed been elevated to a 
constitutional issue.  
 
2.4 Governance in Saudi Arabia 
 
2.4.1 State Structure and Political System - Division of Powers and 
Tiers of Government 
 
The Basic Law as stated above, was promulgated in 1992. It makes provisions for the 
system of governance, identity of the state and the organisation of the three branches of 
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government identified as the ‘judicial,’ ‘executive’ and ‘regulatory.’75 The regulatory term 
used here is meant to indicate the legislative function. This is made explicit by Article 67 
mentioned earlier. 
 
It is clear that the framers of the Basic Law intended to avoid using the term ‘legislative’ or 
‘parliament.’ Commenting on this issue, Aba-Namay observes that Muslims generally take 
exception to Tashri’, the concept of legislation. From a traditional point of view, it is 
considered alien to Islam. God is regarded as the Supreme Legislator and ‘human beings 
can only interpret God’s law, not make their own.’76 Indeed, this approach is customary in 
Saudi Arabia. As Aba-Namay iterates, throughout its statehood, ‘the government has never 
claimed the right to legislate, only to ‘regulate’ in order to supplement, though not 
contradict, the Shari’ah.’77 
 
Saudi Arabia is a unitary state. There is a central government headed directly by the King 
who is also the Prime Minister. The King is vested with the power to declare a state of 
emergency as well as war.  He is assisted by an executive cabinet which comprises two 
deputy Prime Ministers and ministers each heading a department of state referred to as a 
ministry. The structure of the state and the political system are set out in what are officially 
referred to as the ‘basic laws.’ These are four in number: the Basic Law of Governance 
(discussed above), Law of the Provinces, Law of the Shura (Consultative) Council and the 
Law of the Council of Ministers. Together, they define the parameters of government and 
governance in Saudi Arabia. As already mentioned, the King retains ‘his hold on the main 
levers of power’ with executive and legislative functions under his control.78 This is in 
addition to occasional judicial authority exercised for instance through his ability to grant 
amnesty. Article 44 of the Basic Law says that:  
 
The authorities of the state shall consist of: Judicial Authority, Executive 
Authority, Regulatory Authority. These authorities cooperate in the 
discharge of their functions in accordance with this Law and other laws. The 
King shall be their final authority. 
 
Administration of the country is conducted at three levels, central, provincial and 
municipal. The country is divided into 13 regions each headed by a Governor appointed by 
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the King and accountable to the Minister of the Interior. Within each region there are 
municipalities of varying sizes. The municipality is the basic or local unit of governance 
and the closest to the people. The provincial government supervises the local offices of the 
central government in the discharge of their public duties.  
 
2.4.1.1 Central Government 
 
Governance in Saudi Arabia remains, to a large extent, organised around a powerful 
monarchy. The King is both head of state and head of government with the central 
government directly under his control. The King, as Prime Minister, rules with his Cabinet, 
the Council of Ministers, first established in 1953. The Council of Ministers, appointed by 
the King, advises on the formulation of general policy and directs the activities of 
government business.  
 
The country has a growing bureaucracy represented by the public service and the various 
ministries are headed by individual ministers. This is in accordance with Article 24 of the 
Law of Council of Ministers79
 
which provides that the Council of Ministers as the ‘direct 
executive authority’ has full power over all executive and administrative affairs. The 
executive powers of the Council of Ministers include monitoring the implementation of 
laws, regulations and resolutions as well as establishing and organising public institutions. 
 
 
The Council of Ministers, apart from being an executive body, also exercises some 
legislative functions. In some ways, it acts like an upper arm of the legislature particularly 
in view of the establishment of a formal legislative body, the Council of Shura. The 
Council of Ministers issues ‘Resolutions’ which have the force of law once signed by the 
King, the President of the Council.  
 
As previously mentioned, the principle of consulting with citizens in affairs of governance 
is an important part of Islamic socio-political principles and the law creating the Shura 
Council is one of the most important statutes in Saudi Arabia. It establishes the Shura 
Council as a legislative branch of government with the wide ranging powers which 
legislatures customarily have but which are in some ways circumscribed by the 
centralisation of governance and power around the monarchy as earlier mentioned. The 
members are appointed in the first place by the King for a four year term.  
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Although the new law of the Shura Council came into effect in 1992, the first session was 
held in 1994 consisting of a speaker and 60 members. Now in its fifth session, the 
membership has grown to a hundred and fifty members. In the past, the Shura Council was 
rendered largely dormant by the monarchy but the situation has gradually changed with the 
attempt to reconstitute the institutions of the state starting from 1992.  This has been in 
response to national and international calls for a more representative and modern system of 
governance in the country. 
 
In line with its constitutional mandate in the Basic Law, the Shura Council now plays a 
more active role in governance in the country. It not only performs legislative functions, it 
also scrutinises executive actions, inviting ministers to report on their ministries’ activities, 
discussing government policies as well as considering reports of the administrative court, 
the Board of Grievances.  
 
As in every modern state, Saudi Arabia has a judiciary for resolution of disputes. Judicial 
independence is emphasised by Article 46 of the Basic Law. A dual court system handles 
disputes as provided by Articles 49 and 53 of the Basic Law. Disputes between individuals 
and corporations are under the wide jurisdiction of the General Courts while disputes 
between private individuals and the state are under the exclusive jurisdiction of Diwan al-
Madhalim, (the Board of Grievances) except cases involving real estate which are also 
determined by the General Courts. The work of the Diwan al-Madhalim is of particular 
relevance to this study and it will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The central government is directly responsible for defence, security, policing, emergency 
services, and international relations. It also has full responsibility for education at all levels. 
Health matters also come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government. In 
addition, the central government also provides housing finance and construction though 
physical planning issues are the concern of the municipal governments. 
 
2.4.1.2 Provincial Government80 
 
In discussing decentralisation of powers in administration, Cohen and Peterson identify 
three types; deconcentration, devolution and delegation. Deconcentration, a rather weak 
form of decentralisation, refers to redistribution of the central authority’s decision making 
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powers only to different levels of the central authority itself.81 In other words, the 
responsibilities of the central authority are shifted to its offices in the provincial or 
municipal areas. There is no devolution of such powers to autonomous units at any other 
level of governance. In this way, the central government maintains control over every 
aspect of public administration through a unified structure. Devolution on the other hand 
refers to a system of governance in which the authority for decision making, finance and 
management is transferred to semi-autonomous levels of government like regional bodies. 
Delegation is a more extensive form of deconcentration through which central 
governments transfer responsibility for decision making as well as administration of public 
functions to semi autonomous organisations which are not wholly owned or controlled by 
government. Such services may be related to transportation, health or education for 
instance. Governments delegate some of their responsibilities when they create public 
corporations and semi-autonomous companies, housing authorities, transport authorities 
and so on.82 
 
The distribution of state powers in Saudi Arabia appears to follow a model of 
administrative decentralisation which can be described as quasi-devolution but not ‘de-
concentration.’ Quasi-devolution as used here refers to a mixed system of government 
which shares elements of de-concentration with devolution in varying degrees. In the Saudi 
context, quasi-devolution refers to the creation and recognition of autonomous units in 
form of provincial governments which have over time been granted some powers and 
control over their respective areas. Most of the functions of the provincial government 
revolve around monitoring and ensuring the proper functioning of the central 
administration’s departments and agencies within their geographical jurisdiction. The 
departments and agencies remain primarily accountable to the central government (their 
respective ministries) in the discharge of their public services. However, the provincial 
administration has the duty to supervise their activities and report as appropriate to the 
ministry or controlling body at the centre.  
 
The Saudi state is divided into regional and provincial units as mentioned earlier. The 
provincial government also oversees the activities of the officials of the various municipal 
governments under its jurisdiction. A key aspect of the work of provincial government is to 
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maintain security of lives and property and ensure stability in the provinces. Also of 
interest here is the duty of the provinces to ensure compliance with, and enforcement of 
court judgments relating to either private individuals or public bodies. Another important 
function of the provincial government is to ensure the protection and guarantee of rights 
and freedom of individuals as recognised by the Shari’ah and subsidiary legislation. In 
addition, the provincial government is empowered to protect and prevent infringement on 
State property and assets.83 
 
The Law of the Provinces creates local consultative councils for each province consisting 
of ten citizens appointed by Governors in consultation with the Minister of Interior. The 
Law of the Provinces confers extensive autonomy on the Governors and the local 
authorities (see municipal government below) in deciding development and economic 
planning and budget matters with reference to the respective provinces. The Governors are 
accountable directly to the Minister of the Interior under the law. 
 
The operation of the provincial government is strongly-centred on the person of the 
governor. In contrast with the two other levels, what should be stated as functions of the 
government are expressly stipulated as functions of the governor in Article 7 of the Law of 
Provinces. Thus, in theory and practice, the provincial governor is a prefect over the 
municipal government with (apart from, notably, security) policy and supervisory role in 
governance in the Kingdom. 
 
2.4.1.3 Municipal Government 
 
As stated earlier, municipal government is the lowest level of administration in Saudi 
Arabia. Municipalities have quite a number of important functions as provided by the 
Municipalities and Rural Areas Law (Municipalities Law).84 According to the 
Municipalities Law, a municipality is a legal entity which enjoys financial and 
administrative independence. Municipalities are established for virtually every city or town 
in the country, some large, some small. Functions of a municipality include organising, 
reforming and beautifying the city or town and maintaining its general health, safety and 
well-being. Thus, municipalities control layout and physical planning of their municipal 
areas. They have regulatory powers for issuing licenses for physical development and 
supervision of all construction works.  
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Municipal authorities also have the duty to dispose of refuse and keep their public areas 
clean. They build and maintain public parks, gardens, water fountains, public swimming 
pools, and related amenities. Environmental protection is another part of the functions of 
municipal authorities. Municipalities further have the obligation to monitor food and 
consumer goods and ensure compliance with government standards by goods and services 
providers. In addition, municipal governments are responsible for price-control of goods 
and services as well as weights and measures in conjunction with other relevant agencies.  
Other functions of municipal authorities are the construction and operation of abattoirs, 
creation of markets and the designation of sales outlets, issuing licences for the practice of 
various professions, occupations and crafts. Moreover, they are charged with cooperating 
with other relevant agencies on the provision of emergency, fire and rescues services. It is 
equally relevant to note that municipal authorities are responsible for operating local 
transportation in co-operation with relevant authorities. Additional functions of municipal 
government are expropriation of real estate for public benefit, protection of ancient 
buildings and archaeological sites and promotion of cultural, sport and leisure activities in 
cooperation with other bodies. They also establish and maintain cemeteries.  
The municipal authorities receive subsidies, grants and allowances from the central 
government which constitute the bulk of their income. They also raise revenue through fees 
and fines collected directly by the municipality, and a share from fees collected by the 
government as allocated for the municipality in the system. Other sources of income 
include bequests from wills and gifts and fees imposed by special schemes to cover 
exceptional emergency expenses.85 
 
2.5 Administration and Functions of the State 
 
This part briefly examines the functioning of government and general administration as it 
relates to the specific issue of direct service provisions or regulation of the provision of 
public goods by the private sector. This examination will be limited essentially to the most 
important public services and public necessities and it is not intended to constitute a 
comprehensive account of government functions in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Government business is conducted through ministries and agencies, bodies referred to in 
this study as ‘public authorities.’ Saudi Arabia has largely become a welfare/regulatory 
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state with government occupying a central position in the provision of services and in some 
cases, maintaining a regulatory role. The state provides social services in the fields of 
education, health and social care, food and agriculture as well as transport and other areas. 
For the purpose of the subject of this research, namely state liability for delict, it is 
proposed to limit the description of the administration to these main areas since they are 
the main points of contact between citizen and state. 
 
 
2.5.1 Education 
 
When the state was established in 1932, education was the privilege of very few people, 
mostly children of wealthy families living in the major urban centres. However, the state 
has put in place a system of public education that provides formal and vocational education 
and training from pre-primary through tertiary and university education. The government 
has built tens of thousands of schools around the country and it currently has 14 
universities. Tuition, books and relevant materials are all provided free in the country’s 
schools, colleges and universities in all areas of learning in the fields of commerce, arts and 
sciences.  
The institutions of learning are run, funded and managed by the Ministries of Education 
and Higher Education. It is important to note that public universities86 are autonomous 
legal bodies though under the general supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education.87 
Every University has a special independent budget that is approved by a royal decree 
defining its revenues and expenditures and it is subjected in its implementation to the 
monitor of the General Auditing Bureau.88 
Educational facilities are provided by the government for pupils and students with special 
needs like the blind, deaf, other categories of physical and mental handicap.89 Adult 
education is similarly provided by government. The Ministry of Education has established 
and runs a large number of adult education centres. In collaboration with the Ministry of 
Labour, it manages most of the Kingdom’s vocational training centres and higher institutes 
of technical education. The Ministry of Education also sets and monitors overall standards 
for education in the public and now, the gradually developing, private education sector. 
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2.5.2 Health  
 
As part of its welfare programmes, government provides free health care services to the 
public, citizens, residents and visitors alike (especially pilgrims). The health care network 
is administered by the Ministry of Health which employs medical and ancillary personnel 
for, as well as provides required facilities. Initially, the emphasis was more on establishing 
the necessary medical infrastructure: hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, laboratories and 
research facilities and so on. After the facilities were put in place, the focus has in recent 
years shifted to improving the quality of medical care and services. The Ministry of Health 
provides comprehensive medical services. These include preventive and surgical care 
across the full range of medical needs covering primary health care, community health and 
specialized medical facilities. Some government agencies, including the Ministries of 
Education and Defence, the National Guard and the Public Security Administration, have 
their own hospitals and clinics. According to the Law of Health90 the health care services 
are financed by the general budget of the state, donations, wills, bequests, gifts, and the 
revenues of Cooperative Health Insurance.91 
 
The government has also encouraged private sector participation in health care and put in 
place a number of incentives to facilitate this.92 The Ministry of Health regulates the 
activities of private health-service providers through a number of mechanism including 
licensing and facilities inspection and general supervision to ensure compliance with 
appropriate standards. Training of private-sector health care providers is supervised and 
supported by the Ministry.  
 
2.5.3 Social Services 
 
The recently created Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for delivery of social care 
and citizens’ welfare. It provides a wide range of social welfare programs: social security 
pensions and benefits; relief assistance to the disabled, elderly, orphans and widows 
without income. The Ministry provides facilities for the treatment and social rehabilitation 
of the mentally and physically challenged. It has established Centres throughout the 
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country to teach the mentally and physically impaired social, educational and vocational 
skills so that they can enter society as independent, productive individuals. There are also 
special education institutes for the blind and the deaf throughout Saudi Arabia, as well as 
centres for disabled children.  
 
In pursuit of a policy of ensuring a decent standard of living for citizens in line with 
Islamic principles, the government established the General Organization for Social 
Insurance (GOSI).93 It administers a number of key programs to support workers or their 
families in cases of disability, retirement and death. In 1982, it launched a programme to 
cover employees who suffer occupational hazards and has since helped millions of 
workers.  
 
The government has also been active in housing development. The Ministry of Housing 
engages in direct construction and provision of housing which are then sold to members of 
the public on long-term instalment repayment basis. In addition, it provides interest-free 
mortgage for personal use and these are an important and long-standing aspect of the work 
of the government social-service bodies. The Real Estate Development Fund has been 
particularly noted for this. Financing of housing construction has been directed especially 
at low-income Saudis, public employees and students. Companies also benefit from the 
financing arrangements. 
 
2.5.4 Transport and Aviation 
 
Apart from meeting the domestic transportation needs for the movement of goods and 
people, the government also faces the challenge of ensuring the smooth movement of the 
Muslim faithful on annual pilgrimage. The figure has now grown to over 2 million a year. 
The Transport Ministry is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the wide 
road network in the country. The public road transport system is dominated by the Saudi 
Public Transport Company (SAPTCO) a public limited liability company. The company’s 
fleet of over 2,000 buses carry passengers across various intra and inter-city routes. The 
Transport Ministry also has responsibility for licensing and supervising the operations of 
private sector operators engaged in transporting passengers across the country.  
 
The Kingdom’s ports are operated by the Saudi Ports Authority, which supplies equipment 
and building piers while maintenance is provided mostly by private companies. The 
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Ministry of Defence and Aviation on the other hand is in charge of the construction and 
operation of airports. The national airline, Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAA) with its large fleet 
of aircrafts, is in the process of being privatised.94 
 
2.6 New Trends in Governance – Privatisation, Regulation and 
Outsourcing 
 
In line with global trends of economic liberalisation and globalisation, the role of the state 
in Saudi Arabia appears set for change in three main ways. These are increased 
privatisation of state assets, increased regulation and increased use of outsourcing in public 
service delivery. The Saudi government has recognised the importance of privatisation as 
one of the most critical measures for securing the growth and transformation of the Saudi 
economy. On the one hand, government has emphasised its commitment to the welfare of 
the people; on the other it has made known plans for achieving this through a public-
private sector partnership. Government strategy for the promotion of this program of action 
is aimed at ‘invigorating privatisation policies’ along with the development of the relevant 
‘regulatory and monitoring framework’.95  
In pursuit of its economic liberalisation program, the government has established some 
regulatory authorities like the Saudi Foods and Drugs Agency, the Telecommunications 
and Information Technology Authority and Electricity Regulatory Authority responsible 
for the regulation and control of foods and drugs, regulation of the telecommunications 
industry and electricity industry respectively. These last two sectors of the economy have 
recently undergone some privatisation of state utilities.96 
 Similarly, government has divested some of its holdings in the country’s national 
insurance company to the private sector and established a regulatory body for the insurance 
sector. Joint private and public sector activity has also been gradually developed in the 
important sectors of mining and mineral resources as well postal services, seaports and 
shipping management, aviation (as stated earlier) and the railways, all sectors formerly 
under complete control of the state. The government has also been out-sourcing some 
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public services. Thus some public hospitals are now operated by private companies under 
operation and management contracts.97 
Furthermore, under the country’s Eighth Development Plan (2005-2009), the government 
sets out its privatisation plans for various strategic public utilities, services and activities as 
well as liberalisation of the economy. The government also set out in the plan, a 
determination to focus on further developing the regulatory role of the State. The plan 
highlighted a program of action on further administrative restructuring of government 
agencies to improving their efficiency among other related measures.98  
Recently, the government launched the country’s Ninth Development Plan (2010-2014). 
This plan not only states the future government plans, but provides sketchy information 
about the current state of privatisation in the country. It states for instance that there has 
been progressive privatisation of the electricity, gas and water sector under the Eight 
National Development Plan. In this regard, the private sector has been allowed to 
participate in electricity generation and transmission services, under the umbrella of the 
Saudi Electricity Company (such as Rabigh on the Red Sea coast, and the eleventh 
generation plant in Riyadh).99  
The report further indicates that the government had offered for public subscription, 50% 
of the state-owned shares in the National Company for Cooperative Insurance. Ports 
facilities concessioning were also completed in some ports, such as the general cargo and 
the bulk grain terminals at King Fahd Industrial Port as well as the container terminal and 
cargo berths at Jubail Commercial Port and other ports in the Kingdom. The government 
has finalised plans to privatise the country’s national airline, Saudi Arabian Airlines. There 
are ongoing privatisation of telecommunications and a joint-stock company for the 
construction and operation of the country’s railway system is well underway.  
There is still much to be done in the area of regulation. In furtherance of government’s 
functions, the Agency for Classification of Contractors of the Ministry of Municipal and 
Rural Affairs classifies contracting companies every three years according to their financial 
and technical capacity. This classification has been made a requisite for participation in 
public sector bidding and tendering.100 
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In sum, it is possible to hazard that apart from economic efficiency, government plan and 
current programs are ostensibly geared towards better public-service delivery. It suffices to 
say that implementation of these measures may have an impact one way or the other on 
state liability for delict. The current programs of government clearly indicate a preference 
for moving away from its virtual dominance in the direct provision of infrastructural 
services and public goods. The regulatory authorities are still very much in their infancy. 
The private sector is slowly taking on more aspects of public service delivery across the 
various sectors. However, these initial steps towards privatisation, the relatively thin (in 
terms of numbers of authorities and their experience) regulatory regime and a low-level of 
public awareness of the implications of these changes do not appear to have led to a 
significant increase in the volume of litigation on state liability for delict in the interim. 
Thus, despite the foregoing, it is noteworthy that at the end of the 8th Development Plan 
(2005-2009), the state still dominates the arena in terms of provision of public services. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Like any modern state, the aspiration of the Saudi Government is to ensure a comfortable 
life for its citizens. This is to be achieved within the framework of its cultural allegiance to 
the Islamic system. Its laws and the mechanism of state governance ostensibly operate to 
deliver and maintain social and infrastructural services to the society under a welfare 
approach. Thus, the institutions of governance and government departments are in the 
forefront of the provision of services. 
In some cases, public agencies and departments promote government’s welfare policies 
through encouraging private-sector participation in the provision of services. In this regard, 
government has become increasingly aware of, and has been involved in regulating 
private-sector activities particularly as they have an impact on the well-being of citizens. 
However, government remains the dominant player in the provision of infrastructure and 
public goods through the operations of the various ministerial and extra-ministerial bodies. 
At all events, it remains necessarily involved, even if indirectly, in virtually every aspect of 
life in the country, at the very least through its regulatory function. The recent restructuring 
of the Administrative Court, Diwan al-Madhalim, including its historical significance 
within the classic Islamic system as well as the entrenchment of its special status in the 
Basic Law are very important to this study. Together with the foregoing insights on 
governance in Saudi Arabia, they provide an interesting and fertile context for engaging the 
theme of state liability for delict investigated in this study.  
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Chapter Three:   The Board of Grievances as an 
Administrative Court 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The structures of government and governance of the contemporary Saudi state were 
presented in the previous chapter. It emerges from the discussion that in the welfarist 
aspirations of the state, the government remains the dominant player in the provision, 
management and regulation of social services with implications for state liability for delict. 
As stated earlier, the welfarist outlook of the Saudi state is arguably rooted in the classic 
Islamic system. Under the Islamic political system (as in others), public authorities act on 
the authority of the state and are thus bound by the principles that bind the state. One such 
fundamental principle is that which prohibits oppression and misuse of power or privilege. 
There are several verses of the Quran as well as the Sunnah, the sources of Islamic Law 
that touch on this issue. One very important reference is from the narration of the Prophet 
where Allah said: 
 
 ‘O my servants, I have forbidden dhulm, oppression/wrongdoing to Myself 
and made it prohibited among you; do not oppress one another!’1  
 
The concept of oppression and wrongdoing are quite wide in the Islamic social order and 
extends to not providing a remedy where unjustified harm has been committed. It arguably 
extends to situations where a wrongdoer fails to provide redress for delictual conduct to the 
victim. This largely explains the concurrence of a compensation regime alongside a 
punitive one in Islamic criminal law. Thus, as will be discussed in some detail later, at the 
inception of the Islamic state, the liability of state or public authorities was established as a 
fundamental principle of the social system and enforced. That principle is connected to the 
subsequent development of Nidham al-Madhalim, the system of adjudicating grievances 
against the state, or in the context of this research, public authorities as an integral part of 
governance in the Islamic state. The system of redress from the actions (or even decisions) 
of public bodies has evolved over time. This chapter focuses on that evolution with specific 
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reference to Saudi Arabia where the system of adjudicating grievances against the state has 
evolved into the creation of an institution specifically for that purpose; Diwan al-
Madhalim.  
 
The chapter, therefore, introduces the recently reconstituted Administrative Court, Diwan 
al-Madhalim, the Board of Grievances which is the judicial body vested with jurisdiction 
over claims of state liability in Saudi Arabia. This is a hybrid body which has both powers 
of judicial review and the powers of a regular court that awards damages. Thus, it is a type 
of administrative as well as regular court for redress in administrative disputes. The work 
of the Board of Grievances is central to this research. This chapter includes a discussion of 
the constitutional basis, composition, jurisdiction, powers and working methods of the 
Board. Setting out the nature of the Board in this way is essential to an understanding of 
the liability of the state for delict in Saudi Arabia.  
 
3.2 The Grievances Jurisdiction - Adjudicating Claims against the 
State in Islam   
 
In order to understand the nature of the system of adjudicating grievances against the state 
in Islam and Saudi Arabia, it is relevant to consider the foundations laid down by the 
Prophet during the inception of Islam. When he migrated to Al-Madinah from Makkah, he 
established the Islamic State. The Prophet is considered by Islamic scholars as not only the 
head of religious affairs but also the head of the judiciary. In the early period of Islam, all 
decisions and rulings were made by the Prophet.  This was logistically possible as the 
Islamic community during this period was relatively small. As the number of people 
embracing Islam grew and the territory expanded in the Arabian Peninsula, the Prophet 
delegated judicial authority to a number of people.  Specially chosen personnel acted as 
judges in certain provinces to which the Prophet was unable to physically gain access.2    
 
The Caliphate generations (in successive periods following the demise of the Prophet) were 
able to apply this notion of delegation of power.  Although the head of State (the Caliph, in 
this case) had both executive and judicial powers, he was able to delegate the judicial 
powers, one of his main functions, to whoever he considered competent. This point can be 
illustrated during the rule of Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, the second Caliph in Islam (634-644). 
The major expansion of the Islamic empire which took place during his Caliphate meant 
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that Umar was unable to carry out all his judicial obligations personally. He then appointed 
a number of judges in several regions in the rapidly growing Islamic state to deal with 
these functions. It is interesting to note, for example, that there was a judge by the name of 
Zayd bin Thabit appointed to Al-Madinah, the capital of the Islamic state at the time when 
Umar was exercising his authority as the Head of the state from Al-Madinah itself.3 This 
highlights the progression of separating the executive and judicial powers of the state 
despite overall state powers being vested in the Caliph. 
 
During the early period of Islam, grievances against governmental officials were capably 
dealt with by the ruler. As previously stated, the Prophet was the legislator, judge and 
executive, and grievances were dealt with by him. Payment of levying and collection of 
Zakat (Islamic tax on wealth) constitutes one of the functions of the Islamic state. Thus, the 
state, under the leadership of the Prophet employed Zakat-collectors. It is recorded that one 
of the workers commissioned by the Prophet in his position as the head of the Islamic state, 
Abu Jahm, in a fit of anger threw a hard object at an uncooperative Zakat-payer injuring 
the latter on his head. The injured individual complained to the Prophet demanding 
retaliation. The Prophet refused this demand. However, he ordered that the claimant be 
compensated from the public treasury for the injury he sustained.4  
 
Such recognition of state liability for the conduct of public officials is also demonstrated 
during the early Caliphate. For example, Umar Ibn Al-Khattab used to closely monitor 
governors and officials for any grievances or complaints made against them. On one 
occasion, one of Umar’s military leaders led an army expedition. As this army approached 
a river, the commander ordered one of the soldiers to search for a shallow part of the river 
so the rest of the army could cross. The soldier argued that the river was too cold and that it 
would endanger his life. Ignoring this plea, the commander forced the soldier to cross and 
this order led to the soldier’s death. Once Umar learnt of this incident, he dismissed the 
commander and ordered that compensation be given to the soldier’s family.5  
 
The early period of Islamic history furnished similar examples highlighting the role of the 
ruler in dealing with grievances against the state. From the Umayyad era onwards, the 
Islamic state had grown to such an extent that it led to an exponential rise in governmental 
functions. Naturally, with the increase of the population and territories, there was an 
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increase in the number of grievances from the public against government. For instance, 
during the rule of the Umayyad Caliph, Abdulmalik bin Marwan (685-705), one can see a 
marked difference in how grievances were dealt with. 
 
 According to the renowned jurist, Al-Mawardi, in his al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, 6 (which is 
regarded as one of the earliest and authoritative writings on the judiciary in the Islamic 
system) Abdulmalik was the first to assign a specific day in which all grievances against 
officials were examined in his palace. This served as a ‘clearing house’ on such matters. 
On such days, he initially examined all grievances and then referred those he considered 
required adjudication to his judge, Abu Idris Al-Awdi. The judge then dealt with these 
cases in the presence of Abdulmalik bin Marwan who ordered the enforcement of such 
judgements.7 This can be considered an important, albeit not definitive, step towards the 
ultimate separation of the Shari’ah and grievances courts. It is also on record that during 
the caliphacy of Umayyad ruler Umar Ibn Abdulaziz (716-719), a complaint was made 
against a government official who had usurped land from an individual. The case was 
examined by a Judge supervised by the Caliph, which led to the land being returned 
together with compensation given to the claimant.8  
 
The approach of the Umayyads as the previously mentioned instances of the practice in the 
early period of the Islamic state shows that no separate judicial body was given exclusive 
jurisdiction over claims against the state, albeit there was some delegation of judicial 
functions by the Caliphs. The central feature of the system at the time was for the head of 
the executive to be closely involved in the adjudication of a grievance against the 
government. The expansion of the Islamic empire, however, led to a need for 
decentralisation of state power and the appointment of officials around the various 
territories for effective administration. This included judicial power which had hitherto 
been largely exercised by the Caliph from the centre hence the progressive appointment of 
judges for the resolution of claims not only against individuals, but also the state.  
 
Importantly, despite the power of the Caliph, he never had immunity against the grievance 
jurisdiction. There were instances of complaints being made by individuals against the 
ruling Caliph. For example, during the rule of the Abbasid Caliph Haroun Al-Rasheed (786 
- 809), he was the subject of a complaint made by an individual regarding the ownership 
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rights of a piece of land. The judge dealing with the complaint, Abu Yusuf, who had been 
appointed to the position by Haroun Al-Rasheed, summoned the claimant and the Caliph 
for a hearing. The claimant alleged that the Caliph had usurped a piece land from him but 
the Caliph argued that it was land inherited from one of his relatives. The claimant could 
not provide proof that the land was his and he asked the Caliph to take an oath that the land 
was his. The Caliph duly obliged and the case was closed.9  
 
It is relevant to identify the reason (s) for the creation of Diwan al-Madhalim as a separate 
institution from the ordinary courts. According to Khadduri, the development of al-
Madhalim jurisdiction is somewhat analogous to the equity jurisdiction in Roman or 
Common law. The grievance jurisdiction has developed into a distinct institution in order 
to foster the dispensation of justice on matters not covered by the letters of the Shari’ah.10  
He notes the ostensible paradox in asserting that al-Madhalim jurisdiction developed as a 
‘higher form of justice’ sometimes ascribed to the equity jurisdiction in a system of law 
which is regarded as the ‘embodiment of Divine Justice.’ However, he emphasises, quite 
rightly, that ‘in reality, the standard of justice embodied in all law is not always applicable 
in all situations.’11  
 
For Kamali, the origin of the jurisdiction can be traced back to the time of the Prophet 
when, as stated earlier, he dealt with complaints against government officials. This is 
evident from the fact that he appointed Rashid bin Abdullah to adjudicate such complaints. 
Such complaints against government officials were adjudicated in the presence of the 
caliph under the Umayyads. However, this changed under the Abbasid period when         
al-Madhalim was separated from the office of the Caliph. According to Kamali, Diwan al-
Madhalim served two functions, one of which was to adjudicate complaints against 
government officials while the other was to serve as an appellate court to review the 
decisions of the Shari’ah court.12  
 
Most authors agree with Kamali and firmly locate the formal creation of Diwan               
al-Madhalim jurisdiction in the Abbasid era. During this period, according to various 
accounts, adjudication of grievances flourished and started to evolve into a separate 
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entity.13 The grievances against government officials in this period were heard by an 
assembly of sorts with a judge designated to adjudicate them.14 It can be deduced that the 
intention was to assure the public that these matters were taken seriously and also that there 
was a reasonable level of supervision of the state officials. 
 
It has been noted that the power and jurisdiction of al-Madhalim court was immense. In the 
words of Al-Mawardi, it combined under its jurisdiction ‘the justice of the judge with the 
power of the sovereign.’15 Of special interest to this study on the jurisdiction of                
al-Madhalim is the insight that historically, ‘the Mazalim procedure was applied to all 
torts, caused not only by an individual, a group or an administrative body to another 
individual, but many other diverse means, when the victim is an individual.’16 However, it 
is clear from the work of Al-Mawardi that complaints against state officials or organs 
constituted the jurisdiction of the court.17 The Madhalim court dealt with cases of the abuse 
of power by governors, extortions by tax collectors and usurpation of land by state officials 
or even powerful neighbours among others.18 In general, the focus of al-Madhalim  
jurisdiction was to ‘ensure government under the rule of law in that abuse of power by 
influential persons and state dignitaries did not escape the law due mainly to their capacity 
at resisting it.’19    
 
Whether it was simply an appellate jurisdiction over and above the Shari’ah courts and/or, 
a court to deal with issues not covered expressly in the Shari’ah, it remains an important 
historical point that the grievances jurisdiction as discussed above originated from 
fundamental principles of social justice in the moderation of the powers of rulers. What 
appears fairly certain - as contemporary authors, Shaybat Al-Hamd and Al-Refa’ai, inform 
us - is the continuous existence of the grievances jurisdiction, as distinct from the Shar’iah 
courts, through succeeding Islamic governments in the Muslim territories over the 
centuries.20 Thus, it has been reported that Sultan Nur-ul-deen Zingi (1146-1174), for 
example, established a court in Damascus where grievances were heard and adjudicated. It 
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was called Dar al-‘Adl or the Centre (or House) of Justice.21 It is relevant to note that while 
not all Muslim rulers down the ages instituted the Madhalim jurisdiction, it does appear 
that many did. Thus, the literature records the use and recognition of the Madhalim 
jurisdiction in Muslim India between 1210-152622 where the head of the judiciary was also 
the head of the Madhalim court.23  
 
Similar references have been made to the establishment of the Madhalim jurisdiction first 
under the Fatimids in Egypt (circa 969-1171) and their successors, the Mamluks 
(circa1250-1517). The Chief Judges of the Shari’ah courts were also appointed the Sahib-
al-Madhalim, Complaints Officer with the latter office considered distinct, even more 
prestigious than the former.24 The Madhalim jurisdiction was ‘institutionalised and 
bureaucratised’ with some degree of pomp and pageantry attending the sittings of the 
Madhalim courts. The ruler sometimes attended the sittings of the court with key officials 
of state and a full complement of security guards on designated days in very spacious 
assembly halls.25 Zubaida notes that in many of those courts, Sahib-al-Madhalim exercised 
‘an extra-ordinary jurisdiction’ which included not only complaints against powerful state 
officials, but also private individuals though they sometimes sent complaints to the 
Shari’ah court for adjudication when they considered such cases a waste of time of their 
important jurisdiction. 26  
 
In sum, it is fairly clear that the grievance jurisdiction has endured from its informal origins 
in the practice of the Prophet and his immediate successors, through the centuries, to its 
formal establishment and operation in successive Muslim states to recent times. There are 
substantial records for instance that show that the Ottoman Empire established and 
operated Diwan al-Madhalim in various parts of its provinces. Ursinus for instance has 
done work which shows that the Ottoman province of Sofia in the 18th century did have 
such a court. 27 Indeed, it has been suggested that it was in operation in parts of the Muslim 
world in the 18th century and reinstituted in Egypt in the 19th century. In addition, it has 
been observed that the Madhalim jurisdiction was an important contributory influence to 
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the establishment of Egypt’s Majlis al-Dawlah, the Administrative Court first proposed in 
1879 but created in 1946.28 Finally, it is interesting to note the suggestion by Zubaida that 
the Madhalim jurisdiction is linked to the operation of shakwa, literally, ‘petition’ or 
‘complaint’ system in early 20th century in Yemen. 29   
 
3.3 Adjudicating Claims against the State - the Case of Saudi 
Arabia 
 
The recognition of the system of redress against the state in the context of Saudi Arabia as 
a state is practically as old as the state itself. In the early period following the establishment 
of the state of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz the founder of the country regularly dealt with 
grievances against public authorities directly.30 As mentioned in the previous chapter, he 
issued a proclamation in 1926 where he urged people who had complaints against 
government officials to submit their claims through a complaints box whose key was in his 
sole possession. This evidently showed the King’s willingness to maintain and promote 
justice by giving value to grievances against those in power. However, as the number of 
complainants increased it became impracticable to take care of complaints directly and 
personally. Consequently, there was a need for a specialised organisation, taking constant 
measures, investigating cases and addressing weaknesses. As a result, Shu’bah al-
Madhalim, Bureau of Grievances (the Bureau) was first established in Saudi Arabia in 
1953.31  
 
Article 19 of the Council of Ministers Act 1953 established the Bureau as one of four 
bureaus of the Council of Ministers. Articles 17-24 of the Regulations of the Bureaux of 
the Council of Ministers outlined the structure and functions of the Bureau. It was headed 
by an appointee of the King who was directly responsible to him. The jurisdiction of the 
Bureau was however quite vague; power to investigate ‘all complaints’ and make 
recommendations to the King. The Bureau was not independent as it was more or less 
regarded as a department of the Council of Ministers.  These factors may have accounted 
for the virtual absence of any account or report of the work of the Bureau. 
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 In 1955, following a Royal Decree, the Bureau was separated from the council of 
Ministers and renamed as the Board of Grievances (the Board) which had its own president 
and procedures. In the early period of its existence, the Board had essentially the same 
investigatory role as the Bureau. At that time, it had some form of quasi-judicial status. The 
Board only had power to recommend a solution rather than make a binding decision and it 
was subject to the King’s approval.  
 
The Royal Decree provided that the Board would be presided over by an appointee of the 
King. Again, the President of the Board was directly responsible to the King. The Board 
had the power to investigate any complaints that were brought before it and to prepare a 
report, including the fact of the complaint and the result of any investigation and the 
proposed remedy that the Board would recommend. It also provided that the President of 
the Board would forward the report to the Minister concerned and a copy of it to the King. 
The Minister concerned should inform the Board within two weeks of his implementation 
of the proposed/suggested remedy or his objection to it and in that event, justify the 
decision to reject such recommendation. Then the President of the Board would send that 
to the King who would give his instructions regarding the matter.32 
 
What can be regarded as an important development in the evolution of the Board took 
place in 1967. A case was filed before the Shari’ah court by a claimant against the 
Ministry of Health claiming damages for wrongful termination of a contract. The 
acceptance of the case by the Shari’ah court and its order that the Minister appear before it 
was resisted by the executive but the court was adamant. After several exchanges of 
correspondence between the King and the Chief Justice, the King issued a Royal Order to 
the effect that Shari’ah court should not hear any case against a public body without 
obtaining the consent of the King.33 This case constituted in the affirmation of the 
exclusive nature of the Board on claims against the state. In 1976, a Royal Order was 
passed to broaden the jurisdiction of the Board. It was granted jurisdiction over cases 
involving claims for administrative acts which had resulted in damage to contractors.34  
 
The Board was formally constituted into an independent judicial body in 1982. Article 1 of 
the Law of Board 198235 provided that ‘The Board of Grievances is an independent 
administrative judicial body affiliated directly with His Majesty the King’. The Board is 
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regarded as the most important administrative tribunal in Saudi Arabia.36 In addition to its 
jurisdiction as the judicial authority over disputes between citizens and the state, it also had 
jurisdiction over several commercial matters, civil service disciplinary matters, and claims 
and pension matters of civil servants.37 
 
The Board of Grievances has recently been reconstituted by law in 200738 with a 
jurisdiction now limited to: (i) civil service pensions, (ii) review of administrative 
decisions and (iii) liability of public authorities. The implications of these changes will be 
examined below. Suffice it to say at this point that this development underscores the 
growing relevance of the issue of the liability of public authorities in Saudi Arabia. 
. 
3.4 Composition and Structure of the Board  
 
The Board consists of a President of the rank of a minister and one or more vice presidents 
appointed by Royal Order.39 In addition to a number of assistant vice presidents and a 
number of judges, the Board employs a number of technical and administrative employees 
and other personnel ‘attached’ to the Board members for the discharge of their functions.40 
 
The President’s accountability to the King raises questions about the issue of the 
independence of the Board. Al-Jerba examined this through interviews he conducted with 
some judges of the Board. According to them, the authority to appoint is within the powers 
of the King due to the fact that the head of the Islamic state has judicial authority. 
Consequently, the King is able to delegate the judicial power that he has to another person 
and naturally this person will be accountable to him.41  
 
 The Explanatory memorandum provided with the 1982 Act justifies this by stating that 
‘The Board’s direct affiliation to His Majesty the King is natural because His Majesty is 
the Ruler.’ The power to appoint however, does not give the King authority to intervene in 
the Board’s decisions. In reality, the King’s role is to oversee the administrative 
functioning of the Board.  Article 20 of the law of the Board 2007 states that: 
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At the end of each year, the administrative judicial council shall prepare a 
comprehensive report of the Board’s activities including any 
accomplishments, obstacles, observations and recommendations. The 
President of the Board shall present this report before the King. 
 
The above justification has precedents in the historical practice of the Islamic state where 
the Head of State was the Prophet and he appointed judges who were accountable to him. 
The (four) immediate Successors of the Prophet were then appointed by consultation from 
those perceived to be from the most pious and knowledgeable from among his companions. 
They also followed the Prophets’ practice of being the Head of State as well as Chief 
Judge. Scrutiny was thus effected by the head of state in accounting for the actions of 
judges, and by consultation among advisors as to the appointment of the new head of state. 
As mentioned earlier, the Caliphate generations were able to delegate their judicial powers 
to other to act as judges and their practice was not to intervene in specific decisions.42 
 
The specific idea of the head of state being the head of the judiciary cannot be adopted 
today due to (a) the complexities of modern government and (b) the benefits of a 
separation of powers as a means of checking abuse and ensuring accountability. Therefore, 
the head of state has delegated judicial functions to professional judges led by the President 
of the Board. The current structure responds to the needs of modern government in Muslim 
states whilst being consistent with historical precedents. 
 
The independence of the judiciary in general under Saudi law has been emphasised in the 
Basic Law. Article 46 states that ‘the judiciary shall be an independent authority, there 
shall be no power over judges in their judicial function other than the power of the Islamic 
Shari‘ah.’ Although there is currently no arrangement for scrutinising the king’s 
appointment of the President of the Board, such an arrangement could be developed in the 
future. In addition, since Islamic law has been understood as permitting the leader to 
delegate his judicial function, an arrangement for scrutinising that delegation would be 
compatible with Islamic law.  
 
The President oversees the General body of the Board. He can appoint some members of 
the Board to inspect work that is carried out.  In addition, he authorises the composition of 
the disciplinary committee. Furthermore, he can also instigate disciplinary proceedings 
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against any Board members either by his own initiative or through recommendations of the 
President of the Panel. The President’s role is vital in the judicial work of the Board.  He 
assigns cases to the relevant Panels and heads the organisation of judicial work.43   
 
The Deputy President carries out all the duties vested in him by the President.  In the 
President’s absence, the Deputy undertakes all the functions of the former.44 The deputy’s 
role is also very important. His powers are wide ranging but can only be exercised with the 
President’s delegated authority. In order to perform his duties the Deputy is guaranteed his 
tenure, by statute, for a certain period.  Under the Board’s regulation, the Deputy cannot be 
displaced, unless it is for a higher position provided that he is capable of performing at the 
required standard.  
 
The Administrative Judicial Council was established under the Law 2007 in order to look 
into the personnel affairs of the judges. It has a supervisory function over the Courts, 
judges and their jobs. The Council comprises the President of the Board as the President of 
Council, his most senior deputy, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and 
four appeal judges appointed by Royal Order.45    
 
The cases of litigants are heard by the members who are appointed to perform judicial 
functions.  The Laws of the Board 1982 and 2007 have stated the membership rules in 
terms of appointment, promotion, retirement, discipline, transfer and assignment. Although 
the Law of the Board 1982 referred to the members as Mustashar ‘counsellors’ or 
‘chancellors’46, the Law of the Board 2007 clearly refers to them as judges and states that 
they are equal to the judges of the ordinary court, under the Law of the Judiciary, in terms 
of their salaries, promotions, training, retirement etc, and they enjoy the guarantees set 
forth in the Law of the Judiciary.47    
 
The judges of the Board are appointed in a similar manner to ordinary judges, under the 
Law of the Judiciary.  The selection decision is issued by the King.  The requirements of 
appointment are as stipulated in the established procedures in the Law of Judiciary.48 These 
require the candidate to be a Saudi national, of good character and conduct, of the age of 
not less than twenty two years, fully qualified to carry out judicial work, and a holder of a 
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degree in Shari’ah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (or another equivalent degree but in 
which case the candidate must pass a special exam set by the Supreme Judicial Court). In 
addition the candidate must not have been sentenced for a crime impinging on integrity, 
nor been subjected to a disciplinary decision for dismissal from public office, even if 
subsequently rehabilitated.49  
 
The Board’s judicial functions are performed by a number of panels in accordance with the 
forms of jurisdiction that have been given to the Board. The panels are divided into a 
general and a subsidiary panel. General panels are of three types: administrative; 
commercial; and penal and disciplinary. Each General panel consists of three judges; a 
president and two members.50 A subsidiary panel is constituted by a judge who sits alone. 
 
3.5 Jurisdiction of the Board 
 
 
Under the 1982 Law of the Board, its jurisdiction spanned administrative, commercial, 
penal and disciplinary cases. It also had jurisdiction over the enforcement of foreign 
judgments. In addition, it dealt with those cases referred under special law or from the 
Council of Ministers. Administrative panels have jurisdiction over claims involving 
judicial review, and claims for compensation based on the delictual and contractual 
liability of public authorities.51  
 
Article 8 of the 1982 Law of the Board provided that it had jurisdiction over cases related 
to the rights provided for in the Civil Service and Pension Laws for government 
employees, hired hands, independent public entities and their heirs and claimants. It further 
had jurisdiction to hear objections against administrative decisions where the reason of 
such objection is lack of jurisdiction, a deficiency in the form, a violation or erroneous 
application or interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of authority.  
 
The Board was also empowered to adjudicate disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of 
Control and Investigation against officials of government departments or general corporate 
bodies that involve allegations of violations of financial or administrative regulations.52 It 
was also empowered to adjudicate cases involving appeals from public servants against 
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disciplinary decisions issued by a public body against them.53 The jurisdiction of penal 
panels included cases of bribery, forgery, allegation of breaching the Public Funds Act of 
1975 and cases filed against persons accused of committing crimes and offences provided 
for by regulations, where an order to hear such cases has been issued by the President of 
the Council of Ministers to the Board.54 
 
The Board was given jurisdiction over commercial disputes in 1987 when the Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes Committee was abolished and its power was transferred to the Board 
temporarily until the establishment of specialised commercial courts.55 In 2007 the 
Commercial Courts were established along with General, Penal, Personal Status (Probate 
and Family Court) and labour Courts as part of the recent Law of Judiciary.56 Thus, the 
Board no longer has jurisdiction over penal and commercial cases.  
 
Subsidiary panels are vested with power to handle several types of claims. Firstly, claims 
regarding the rights of government employees or their heirs and legatees as provided by 
civil and military service, retirement and pension laws and regulations. This jurisdiction is 
also distributed between the administrative and disciplinary panels. Secondly, requests for 
enforcement of foreign judgments. Thirdly, cases where the claimant has failed to apply 
within the designated time over financial rights, but demonstrates a reasonable excuse. 
Finally, cases which the President of the Board considers are insignificant matters.57  
 
In October 2007, the Government of Saudi Arabia promulgated both the Judiciary Law and 
the Law of the Board of Grievances which together were intended to overhaul Saudi 
Arabia’s judicial system. The reformation has been promulgated with the allocation of 7 
billion Saudi Riyals (around £1.2 billion) for training judges and developing judicial 
facilities.58 This project involved re-organising the entire judicial system which has led to 
the Board of Grievances coming to resemble the ordinary courts more closely. The Board 
was formerly divided into two levels; a court of first instance and an appeal court, whereas 
the general judiciary has three levels, first instance, appeal and supreme court. The Board 
was restructured by the recent law into three stages, a court of first instance (now referred 
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to as the Administrative Court), a court of appeal (now referred to as the Administrative 
Court of Appeal) and the Supreme Administrative Court. Each Court exercises its powers 
through panels, each consisting of three judges. However, as noted above, it is permissible 
for the Administrative Court to be constituted by one judge.59    
 
In accordance with the 2007 Law, the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction covers all areas 
of state liability. It has exclusive jurisdiction over claims regarding the rights of 
government employees (civil and military) or their heirs and legatees as provided by civil 
and military service, retirement and pension laws and regulations as well as the jurisdiction 
to quash final administrative decisions by those affected by such decisions on specified 
grounds. The Board’s jurisdiction extends to claims for compensation by those affected by 
the decisions or acts of administration. Equally of note is the retention of the jurisdiction 
over state contractual liability as well as the implementation of foreign judgements and 
foreign arbitral awards.60 The jurisdiction over ‘acts of administration,’ covers delictual 
liability of public authorities.  
 
It is further important to note that the 1982 Law of the Board referred to cases of 
compensation filed by parties concerned against the actions of al hukumah, the government 
or ahad al ashkhas al ma’anawiyyah al mustakilah, any independent public corporate 
entity. The 2007 Law refers to claims for compensation by those affected by the decisions 
or acts of al idarah, the government or administration. Neither of the two statutes defines 
these important terms regarding the subject of the Board’s jurisdiction. The discussion that 
follows will examine the significance of these terms, particularly with reference to this 
study. 
3.5.1 Definition of Public Authorities  
 
Commentators of Saudi administrative law have defined public authorities as ‘institutions 
established by the state in order to achieve the public interest under the control of the 
state.’61 As mentioned above, there is no definition of public authority or even the term 
‘any independent public corporate entity’ mentioned in the 1982 Law of the Board as 
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. However, the amendments in terms 
of the body (ies) covered by the old and new laws is helpful in reflecting on what ‘public 
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authorities’ mean for the purpose of this study. While the 1982 Law talks about the 
government or any independent public corporate entity, the 2007 Law refers only to the 
government or administration.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, there are generally speaking, two types of public bodies, both generally 
established in the public interest to provide public services. The distinguishing feature is 
that it is possible to identify some as being established to provide public services without 
any view to making a profit. The other type, while providing public services, may initially 
have been established also simply for the provision of public services without a profit 
motive, but have since been (or are in the process of being) reorganised through 
commercialisation or privatisation with the clear motive of making profit like privately 
established corporations. Public Corporations that have undergone this process are now 
being referred to more commonly as ‘joint-stock’ companies.  
 
The ministries, government departments, the various branches of the security services and 
agencies readily come to mind as examples of the first category. Bodies such as Saudi 
Airlines, Saudi Telecommunications and Saudi Posts are examples of the second category. 
In terms of the 1982 Law, the first category is what was referred to as ‘al hukumah’, 
‘government’. It is further submitted that reference in the 2007 Law to ‘al idarah,’ ‘the 
government or administration’ means the same thing. The reference in the 1982 Law to 
‘ahad al ashkhas ma’anawiyyah al mustakilah’, any independent public corporate entity 
means those bodies of the second category. The omission of this latter category in the law 
of 2007 suggests that the intention was to limit the Board’s jurisdiction to public 
authorities in the conventional sense, and that the expression ‘government or 
administration’ would cover broadly the same institutions as in the UK context by the 
definition offered by Booth and Squires in relation to English law.62 The second category is 
understood as being excluded from public authorities at the least, for the purposes of the 
jurisdiction of the Board. The decisions (so far at least) suggest clarity on this point.   
 
A recent decision of the Board regarding the Saudi Telecommunications Company which 
took over the functions of Saudi Telecommunications is relevant here. In F v Saudi 
Telecommunications Company63 the claimant’s three phone lines had been disconnected by 
the defender for alleged non-payment of bills. The claimant brought a claim for the money 
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they had paid to the defender on the basis that the three lines in question were wrongfully 
attributed to it. In fact, the lines had been obtained by a third party with forged documents 
of the claimant without authorisation. In striking out the claim the Board stated that the 
defender is not regarded as ‘jiha idariyah,’ ‘part of the government or administration’ 
because it is a joint-stock company operating on commercial basis.64 The foregoing 
analysis also accords with the definition of public authorities offered in the literature on the 
subject as indicated earlier.  
 
Public corporations on the other hand, have independent management and control 
mechanisms as suggested in the 1982 Law which mentions their independent status. 
However, another panel of the Board assumed jurisdiction over a case after the 2007 law 
involving a public corporation. In H v Saudi Airlines,65 which will be further considered in 
chapter five, the Board allowed the case against the defender though it referred to the  2007 
Law of the Board without discussion of whether the defender is part of the administration 
or not.  
 
It is suggested that this decision was in error and the case ought to have been struck out for 
lack of jurisdiction in view of the exclusion of independent public corporations in the 2007 
Law of the Board as stated earlier. It appears the decision is a product of what has 
colloquially been termed ‘transition-blues;’ a failure to grasp the full extent of the 
implications of the new law since the case was obviously decided shortly after its passage. 
More importantly, the fact that Saudi Airlines is still in the process of being privatised 
could have implications for admissibility of the case. The consideration of operating for 
profit  (‘operating on commercial basis’) would probably have led to the Board declining 
jurisdiction in the matter if the privatisation process had been completed when the case 
arose. However, it is argued that the Board ought to have simply refused jurisdiction given 
the express provisions of the 2007 Law.   
 
3.5.2 Appellate System 
 
Every decision of the Courts of first instance (the Administrative Courts) will be liable to 
appeal within thirty days from the date when the aggrieved party receives a copy of the 
final decision. Otherwise, the decision will be final and enforceable.66 According to Article 
12 of the law 2007 ‘the Administrative Court of Appeal shall consider judgments liable to 
appeal as decided by the Administrative Courts’. The import of this is that the right to 
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appeal is an unqualified one. This is also the case in practice. This is however not the case 
for appeals to the Supreme Administrative Court. 
 
The Supreme Administrative Court has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the 
Administrative Appeal Courts where the reason for such appeals is a violation of Islamic 
Shari’ah rules or regulations that are not contradictory with Shari’ah or erroneous 
application or interpretation of these including violation of a judicial principle established 
in a judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court. The permissible grounds of appeal 
also includes that the decision was made by an incompetent Court or a Court whose 
composition is contrary to Law or which uses an incorrect adaptation or description of the 
case. Further, an appeal can be made on the grounds that a decision in a dispute was 
contrary to another judgment made between the same parties or that there was a conflict of 
jurisdiction between the Board’s courts.67  
 
 It would appear that the recent Law limits the jurisdiction of the Board to purely 
administrative disputes. The Board would have exclusive jurisdiction over any claim 
involving the state as a party. However, two types of cases are explicitly excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Board: cases involving requests related to ‘amal assiyadah’ (sovereign 
actions), and appeals filed by individuals against judgments or decisions issued by other 
courts which fall within their jurisdiction.68  
 
There is no specific definition of the concept of ‘sovereign action’ which was first 
introduced to the Board by the Act of 1982.69 It is the Board that evaluates which act is a 
sovereign act and which is not.  The lack of criteria used to evaluate whether the act is 
sovereign can lead to a situation where the Board extends its power to cover decisions 
which are in fact sovereign, or limits its powers by refusing to hear cases that may not be 
sovereign.70  According to Shaybat Al-Hamd, the Islamic legal system does not recognise a 
concept of sovereignty which limits the liability of the ruler, as both the ruler and subjects 
are bound by the rules of Shar’iah. He goes further to state that judges under the Islamic 
judicial system were entitled to adjudicate any kind of cases irrespective of its nature.71  
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What constitutes a sovereign act remains unclear. Some authors have suggested that the 
conduct of international affairs may pass the test of sovereign act over which the Board 
should not have jurisdiction.72 Specific state security matters such as the declaration of war 
and state of emergency have also been put forward as other instances of what ought to be 
regarded as constituting sovereign acts.73 The decisions of the Board suggest sovereign act 
has been very rarely invoked as a defence or reason for inadmissibility of a claim. In L v 
National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development74 the claimant (a 
company) claimed that the defender confiscated chimpanzees intended for sale in a pet 
shop belonging to the claimant. The claimant requested an injunction restraining the 
defender from confiscating the animals and for payment of compensation for the damage 
and losses it suffered as a result of the confiscation. Alternatively, the defender should be 
ordered to pay the commercial cost of the animals. The defender stated that its action was 
in compliance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora, to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a signatory.  
 
The Court of First Instance struck out the claim for lack of jurisdiction. It noted that 
although the law did not specify the claims and applications that fall into the category of 
‘acts of sovereignty,’ it includes those claims arising from administrative decisions relating 
to the framework of the state’s relations with other countries and regional and international 
organisations and the like. Placing those claims amongst the ‘amal assiyadah,’ ‘acts of 
sovereignty’ is no more than a mere convention in the naming of some administrative 
decisions. There is nothing in the Shari’ah that prevents the use of the term ‘amal 
assiyadah.’ Hence, the Court of First Instance held that there was no legal reason to 
prevent the use of this term to describe claims and cases beyond the mandate of the Board 
of Grievances in this regard. This was upheld by the Appeal Chambers of the Board.75 
Suffice it to say that the Board should apply a very narrow meaning to ‘acts of sovereignty’ 
since the law has given the Board the discretionary power to decide what can be regarded 
as ‘acts of sovereignty’ or otherwise. A contrary approach will may open the way to 
executive lawlessness in the name of act of sovereignty which will patently negate the very 
reasons for the creation of the Board both from the historical and contemporary 
perspective. 
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With regard to the second limb of Article 9 - decisions of other courts that fall under their 
jurisdiction - it is submitted that the General Courts have equal standing with the Board 
and both exercise judicial powers. In addition, the General Courts have their own avenues 
of appeal against first instance judgements. Moreover, the Board has its specific 
jurisdiction over claims involving the state, whereas, the General Court has the general 
jurisdiction over all matters of disputes except those exempt by a specific regulation.  
Consequently, this can lead to a conflict between the two bodies if there is any examination 
of one courts judgement by the other.76 This latter provision is ostensibly to affirm that the 
Board is not to act as a court of last resort in all types of cases; a power which according to 
some authors, as mentioned above, was included in al-Madhalim jurisdiction at some 
points in the past. 
   
Furthermore, conflicts may arise if the subject of the dispute concerns real estate and a 
public authority is a party. In theory the Board has the power to adjudicate this type of 
case. However, in practice the General Courts still handle such disputes, utilising their 
wide jurisdiction over civil and criminal disputes. According to the Law of Procedure of 
Shari’ah Courts77 ‘without prejudice to the provisions of the Grievances Board Law, the 
General Courts have the jurisdiction over all cases in rem dealing with real estate’.78 But 
the General Courts have to obtain the King’s consent before the commencement of hearing 
the case.79 
   
Where there is a dispute between the Board and the Shari’ah Court as to which has 
jurisdiction, the Law of Procedures before the Shari’ah Courts provides that an application 
must be made by the courts to the Jurisdiction Disputes Committee of the Supreme Judicial 
Council to determine the authority which is competent to decide the matter. This is 
important where for instance a case is brought simultaneously both before any court which 
falls under the law of Judiciary and the Board of Grievances, and both either reject or 
accept the case as being under their jurisdiction. The committee consists of three members: 
one from the Supreme Court selected by the President of the Supreme court, another from 
the Board of Grievances or other relevant authority selected by the President of the Board 
or the President of the other body, and the third from the full-time judges of the Supreme 
Judicial Council selected by the President of the Council and the latter will be the 
committee’s President. This committee’s jurisdiction includes resolving disputes regarding 
                                                 
76
 Al-Jerba note 41 supra at 217. 
77
 Royal Decree No. 21/M (2000). 
78
 Article 32 of Law of Procedure before Shari’ah Courts. 
79
 Royal Orders No. 20941 (1967), 1478/M (1988) and 5058/M (2009).  
Ch 3 The Board of Grievances as an Administrative Court 
 57
the execution of two contradictory final judgements, one pronounced by any court which 
falls under the law of Judiciary and the other by the Board of Grievances or other relevant 
authority.80 The decision of the committee will be by majority and is not liable to appeal.81  
 
Apart from the Shari’ah courts, there are also some administrative or quasi-judicial bodies 
whose jurisdiction may come in conflict with that of the Board. Examples include the 
Commercial Papers Committee and Freight and Cargo Committee. Such committees are 
under the authority of Ministries.82 Article 15 of the 2007 Law of the Board provides that 
in such cases, an application must be made to the Jurisdiction Disputes Committee to 
determine the relevant authority competent on the matter. This committee comprises three 
members: one from the Administrative Supreme Court selected by the President of the 
court, another from the other relevant authority selected by the President of the body, and 
the third is a member of the Administrative Judicial Council selected by the President of 
the Council and the latter will preside over the committee. The committee’s jurisdiction 
includes resolving disputes regarding the execution of two contradicting final judgements, 
one pronounced by a court of the Board of Grievances and the other from the other relevant 
authority. This committee adjudicates this kind of dispute in accordance with the 
procedures and rules established by the Law of Judiciary.  
 
3.6 The Board: Practice and Procedure 
 
Historically the Madhalim Tribunal had a much broader procedural discretion than general 
Shari’ah courts. For example, it had the discretion to initiate proceedings on its own 
initiative contrary to the General courts where the claimant has to initiate a case.83 
However, this is perhaps no longer so in Saudi Arabia where the procedures of the two 
courts have become relatively similar. Indeed, the Board currently has a more detailed code 
of procedure therefore, it may have less flexibility than the traditional Madhalim 
jurisdiction.   
 
In 1989 the Rules of Procedure and Proceedings (1989 Rules) before the Board were 
promulgated, even though the Law of the Board in 1982 stated that the rules would be 
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issued by a decision of the council of Ministers.84 These rules are still in effect to this day 
and comprise five key chapters. The first relates to administrative cases dealing with 
applications of review, preparation of cases and conditions. The second relates to penal and 
disciplinary cases. The third chapter is about the rules relating to governing hearings. The 
fourth chapter details methods of reviewing the Board’s decisions and the fifth chapter 
highlights general rulings.  
 
There is no provision in the 1989 Rules specifying the applicable law for adjudicating these 
various categories of cases. They focus principally on the procedures for filling cases. It 
would appear to be that it was assumed that the Board, like all other courts in the country, 
will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 48 of the Basic Law of Governance 
‘apply to all cases before them, the provisions of Islamic Shari’ah, as indicated by the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, and whatever laws not in conflict with the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
which the authorities may promulgate.’ Indeed, the practice and procedure of the Board is 
largely similar to that of the Shari’ah Courts with two notable exceptions. The first is the 
power of the Board to grant injunctions to suspend the action of a defender public authority 
until the determination of the case. An example is the application for an injunction that was 
requested in L v National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development 
mentioned above. The second procedural difference is the existence of a time bar to 
challenging the administrative decision or act complained about which does not apply to 
the cases before the Shari’ah Courts. 
 
It has been noted that there are three important qualities of the procedures of the Board 
worth mentioning here. Firstly, the Board covers different types of jurisdiction and thus it 
has different procedures for each of these jurisdictions.  Secondly, the procedures for the 
administrative panels can be described as being both ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘adversarial’ which 
is a feature also of the general courts. While the Rules of the Board provide for the right of 
the parties to challenge the testimony and case of each other, the judges are not restricted to 
the documents submitted or testimony provided by either party.85 The judges play a very 
active role in the proceedings throughout even where the other party is absent the judge has 
the power and will be expected to investigate the claims of the claimant. It is as a result of 
this nature of the judge’s power that Article 18 of the Rules of the Board provides that if 
the defender does not appear before the Board after the second notification, the Panel 
concerned may decide the case and the decision will not be a decision in default. This is 
                                                 
84
 Article 40 of the Law of the Board 1982. 
85
 Article 19 of the Rules. 
Ch 3 The Board of Grievances as an Administrative Court 
 59
because ‘the burden of preparing the case for decision, controlling the hearing, and 
following its progress’ is the function of the judge. This reduces the impact of the absence 
of either party.86  
 
One of the features of the practice of the Board, again shared by the general courts, is visit 
to the locus in quo.  Article 23 of the Rules provides that: 
 
 If the panel feels that during the proceedings it is necessary to go to the site 
of the dispute for inspection, it has the power to do so. It also has 
competence to undertake a supplementary investigation if needed, and the 
panel may carry this out itself or direct one of its members to do so. 
 
The third quality (similarly found in the practice of the general courts) is that the primary 
method for proceedings is in written form which is prepared through an exchange of briefs.  
However, claims can also be submitted orally as both forms of submissions are possible.87  
Recently, there have been moves to change the pleading system by restricting submissions 
to written only unless otherwise required by the court. This is to make the process more 
efficient in terms of time and effort.88 The plan includes the possibility to submit claims 
electronically.89   
 
The initial steps before the hearing depend on the case being compatible with the 
jurisdiction of the Board. In addition to this condition, three procedural conditions must be 
fulfilled before the litigation is brought forward to the Board.  These are that the claimant 
must have adequate interests, he must sue the relevant public authority and he must comply 
with the time limits.90     
 
In some cases involving civil servant claims and annulment actions there is a requirement 
to complain to the administrative department before taking legal action within sixty days 
from the date that the claimant was informed of the decision concerned.91 The department 
involved should answer the claim within ninety days of the claimant’s application.  If this 
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is not done or the reconsideration of the aggrieved decision is refused, the claimant then 
has sixty days to bring his claim before the Board from the date the department refused to 
act or from the expiry of the ninety day period.92   
 
However, this requirement is not applicable to cases involving compensation for delictual 
or contractual liability as the claimant can address the Board directly. For these kinds of 
cases the statutory time for bringing claims is a period of five years from the occurrence of 
the incident that gave rise to the claim.93 In exceptional circumstances, a case can still be 
accepted by the Board if the claimant has a legitimate excuse for any delay in bringing the 
proceedings within the fixed time but this must be proved before it.94  
 
The claimant initiates the case by submitting an application to the President of the Board or 
someone delegated by him.95 The application should be in writing and should include 
details of the parties involved in the litigation and the subject of it. The Board’s President 
or the person authorised by him will assign a registered case to a panel located in a 
geographical area with the same jurisdiction as the relevant public authority.96   
 
In general, the enforcement of the administrative decision that is under appeal before the 
Board will not be restrained simply because of the appeal.  However, as mentioned above, 
the panel has the power to issue a stay of execution by the public bodies as well as urgently 
issuing temporary measures as soon as the case is referred or an application is submitted by 
the claimant.  The panel takes this action in such cases where it deems that the enforcement 
of the administrative decision would cause the claimant to sustain irreparable 
consequences. In such cases, the administrative decision will be suspended until the 
decision of the Board is made.97      
 
It is the duty of the President of the panel to designate a specific date for hearing and 
inform both parties. The time period from the notification and the first hearing should be at 
least thirty days.98 The Rules stipulate that all the three panel members (in those panels that 
comprise more than one member) should be in attendance throughout all sessions of the 
hearing. If one of the panel members is absent in a session, that particular session will not 
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be valid.99 If one member is unable to attend a particular session, another panel member is 
required to be appointed. 100    
 
However, Al-Jerba observes that the actual practice of the Board has been different. In 
reality, when the president of the panel receives a case, he designates a member of the 
panel to handle it and this member will be the only one of the panel’s members to be 
present at most of the sessions. The full panel members will be present together during the 
discussions of the facts and the outcome.101 According to him, the disparity in the practice 
of the Board with the rules is explained by some judges of the Board. They argue that this 
is due to the increasing number of cases over time and accumulation of cases which makes 
implementation of the rules difficult.102 However, as mentioned earlier, the recent Law of 
the Board 2007 has allowed the initial phase of judgement (by the Administrative Court) to 
be formed by a single judge.103 It is useful to briefly consider how the sessions of the 
Board are conducted. 
 
3.6.1 The Court in Session- Hearing of Cases by the Board 
 
 
On the day fixed for hearing of case, the parties sit side-by-side facing the judge who may 
be joined by one other or even two other judges. The witnesses, unlike the case in the 
Scottish and English courts, sit in throughout the session to be called upon as required to 
present their testimony. The court permits legal representations of any of the parties but in 
practice, most claimants present their claim in person or through a person without 
professional legal qualifications. The representatives of public authorities are usually sent 
from their legal departments. The judge, similar to the practice elsewhere, will also 
normally sit after the arrival of the parties in court. A court transcriber takes down the 
proceedings which are automatically viewed on computer screens available to the parties as 
well as the judge. The judge calls on the claimant to present his/her case and oral 
testimonies as well as any relevant document are admitted in evidence. Each party is 
obliged by the court to provide a copy of any document to be tendered in evidence to the 
other party for inspection along with the original which is the court’s copy. Both parties 
then present their cases and call any witnesses where relevant.     
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During the hearing, when one party provides briefs or documents, the panel allows the 
other party to scrutinise them and to give his answer if s/he has.  Otherwise, such briefs or 
documents will not be relied upon.104 The panel is required to have a record of all briefs 
and documents that are presented by the parties. The record contains all the procedures 
carried out by the panel from the commencement of the case.105 It should also be signed by 
the judges of the panel, the secretary and the parties to the case.106        
 
When the panel is satisfied that both parties have provided their claims and evidence, with 
sufficient examination of the facts, it can then close the hearing. The panel judges (in case 
more than one) then engage in private deliberations.107 The judgement is based on the 
majority of the panel judges and the decision will be ascribed to the panel even though the 
dissenting judge may remain.108 The dissenting judge has the right to express his point of 
view and the reasons behind this, which will be recorded in the case record but not in the 
final decision. The majority of the panel can respond to the view of this judge and it will be 
written in the record of the case. The record will be signed by all judges of the panel and its 
secretary.109 
 
The decision taken by the panel should detail the name of the panel, the date, the place of 
issue, the case type, names of the judges, names of the parties, their position and addresses.  
It should contain the facts, reasons and judgement.110 Once the judgement has been 
announced, the panel is required to inform the person losing the case that they have the 
right to appeal.  If one of the parties feels aggrieved by the decision of the panel concerned 
they can appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal.  The rules of the Board state that 
the party who wants to appeal must do so within the fixed period of thirty days from the 
date when the aggrieved received a copy of the final decision. As stated earlier, if the 
aggrieved party fails to appeal within this period, the decision will be final and 
enforceable.111     
 
Decisions of cases involving compensation for delictual acts or contractual liability will be 
automatically subject to appeal if they are against the public bodies even though there 
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might not be any appeal from the parties.112 The reason behind this seems to correspond to 
a policy as the compensation would be paid from the State Treasury. Therefore, this 
measure would protect the public purse by assuring the accuracy of the judgement.113  
Other kinds of decisions go through ordinary procedures of enforcement as long as they are 
the final decisions of the panel.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
The Qadi, Shari’ah Court judge is the popular, even the dominant, face of the Islamic legal 
system. In virtually every Muslim state, past and present, the Qadi and his court, organised 
formally or informally, with or without the backing of the state is identified as an almost, if 
not indispensable, institution. However, the Qadi and the Shari’ah court have hardly ever 
existed alone as the institution for justice or resolution of disputes. Whereas the Qadi may 
represent the standard formal face of the Islamic legal institution, there have been at 
various times, so called ‘extra-shari’ah jurisdictions’ alongside or competing with the 
powers of the Qadi and the Shari’ah courts.114 These include the Hisbah and Muhtasib 
(Ethics and Accountability Agency) and Shurta (Police). An even more telling one for the 
authority of the Qadi was the Madhalim.  
 
Without the benefit of Islamic history, an observer may be forgiven for viewing the 
existence of Diwan al Madhalim in Saudi Arabia today as an anachronistic institution. 
However, as highlighted above, the Madhalim jurisdiction does have a long-standing 
pedigree. In view of the historical tracing of the recognition, establishment, and operations 
of the Madhalim jurisdiction in Muslim states through the centuries down to (near) recent 
times, any suggestion that it is an innovation or importation from another legal (western) 
system would appear difficult to sustain. The foregoing demonstrates that whereas it 
appears to have all but disappeared in most Muslim states in the contemporary period, 
Diwan al Madhalim had, and arguably continues to have, a significant role to play in the 
Islamic socio-legal system. The need for a Madhalim jurisdiction is perhaps now more 
relevant than ever given the prevailing experience of authoritarianism and corruption in 
Muslim countries.   
 
                                                 
112
 Article 34 of the Rules. 
113
 Al-Jerba note 41 supra at 340. 
114
 Zubaida note 13 supra at 51-60. 
Ch 3 The Board of Grievances as an Administrative Court 
 64
Khadduri’s point on the roots of the Madhalim jurisdiction mentioned above, understood in 
the broad context of Shar’iah and Islamic Law is germane. This is because the Shari’ah 
recognises that when faced with a new situation (as ostensibly created by the myriad of 
situations arising from the operation of statehood and officialdom) the jurisprudence of 
Islamic law allows the judge to come to a reasoned judgement through the process of 
Ijtihad. The process of independent reasoning is open to all categories of Muslim judges 
past and present.115 Hence it is well within the rationalisation of the Shari’ah that an 
institution like the Madhalim be established to further its spirit of even-handed justice 
where its letters may not make express provisions.  
 
The expansion in the territory of the Muslim state and complexity of the exercise of state 
powers as well as the opportunities for, and experience of abuses of power justify the 
establishment of a flexible mechanism for checking the state and its officials. This is in line 
with the need to maintain social justice as a cardinal objective of the Shari’ah albeit that 
the letter of the law (limited as they have always been in terms of volume and context but 
not deemed scope of application as divine law) may fail to capture the myriad of 
experiences of oppression or misuse of state power.  
 
In comparative perspective the current situation seems anomalous. Saudi Arabia has 
separate courts for disputes between citizens and the state but the substantive law that 
regulates such disputes is the same as the substantive law applied to citizen-state disputes. 
It is not clear whether this state of affairs came up for consideration in the process of the 
recent reforms. The separation of the jurisdiction of the Shari’ah courts and the Board of 
Grievances (the Administrative Courts) as stated earlier, has deep historical roots. 
However, there are separate questions as to (i) whether this has consequences for the 
substantive law of governmental liability, i.e. would the law have developed any 
differently if there had not been a separate administrative jurisdiction?; (ii) whether any 
other consequences flow from the separation such as differences in procedure at trial and 
assessment of damages for instance. The possible effects of the two issues on substantive 
law are at least implicitly addressed in the second part of this study which engages the 
context of the work of the courts. The next chapter moves away from the background 
aspect of this study, to the substantive one. It considers the main principles of delict which 
is at the heart of this study on state liability for delict under Saudi Law. 
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Chapter Four: The Main Principles of Delict in Saudi Law 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The last chapter considered the nature, composition, jurisdiction and workings of the 
administrative court in Saudi Arabia charged with the function of adjudicating cases of 
state liability. It has been said that the Board of Grievances is the sole institution with 
jurisdiction over cases of delictual liability involving the state in the country and that it is 
required to follow Shari’ah in adjudicating claims. That raises the question what precisely 
is the nature of delictual liability under Saudi law which is based on the Islamic legal 
system? 
 
 This chapter sets out the main principles of the non-contractual liability in Saudi Law. As 
indicated in chapter one, I will refer to this as the law of ‘delict’ even though there is no 
directly equivalent concept in Islamic Law. This part of the study discusses the functionally 
equivalent doctrines in Islamic law, i.e. those which require compensation to be made 
when harm has been caused. I will discuss the basic concept of non-contractual liability, 
the general rule, the elements required for a successful claim, the limits of non-contractual 
liability, and defences. The discussion in this chapter lays the foundation for the 
examination of the liability of public authorities in Saudi Arabia that follows in the next 
chapter.  
 
The first part examines the development of delict in Islamic Law in general and Saudi Law 
in particular. The social context and general ideas that have influenced the development of 
legal doctrine and specifically, the law of delict in Islam are examined in the next part. This 
part is intended to allow a proper appreciation of the social context of the legal system as a 
whole. The third part focuses on the definition of liability and delict in Islamic law. This 
part also addresses the concept of obligation and legal capacity and its application to 
delictual liability. The key concepts of delictual liability in Islamic law; Ta’ady, Darar and 
Ifdah, (respectively breach of legal of duty not to cause unjustified harm, damage and 
causation) are considered in the fourth part. Vicarious liability as well as corporate liability 
are important to the focus of this study and are discussed in the fifth and sixth parts of this 
chapter respectively. The penultimate part draws some comparison between Saudi and 
Scots law. The final part concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 The Origins and Development of Delict in the Islamic and 
Saudi System  
 
For Muslims, Islam is a complete way of life. Islamic law is considered by them as a 
comprehensive system that is dynamic and applicable for all times. Protection of both the 
individual and society is considered to be a fundamental aspect of the Islamic social 
system.1 Thus, liability for wrongdoing in general is well entrenched in Islamic Law. 
Nevertheless, it is common to find the claim among many contemporary writers that 
Islamic law (particularly in its classic origins) is devoid of a comprehensive theory of 
obligations.2  
 
However, as Shabib recently pointed out, this contention may only be ‘partially true’3 for at 
least two reasons both of which are not peculiar to this aspect of Islamic law. First, delict 
as a general concept is not found in a single legal treatise or dealt with as a distinct issue in 
classical texts. Rather, the principles of liability for civil wrongs are scattered among and 
derivable from the jurisprudence of criminal law on punishment (hadd); quasi-criminal 
proceedings of fixed compensation for personal injury (diya and Irsh) and destruction of 
(other’s) property (itlaf) among others.4 Second, it is the nature of the Shari’ah as a legal 
form that it ‘did not progress methodologically on the basis of general rules and principles 
made up into theories.’5 In keeping faith with its status as a proclaimed universal, all-
encompassing and enduring system for Muslims, it has continued to develop and expand 
through jurisprudential mechanisms of independent juristic reasoning, analogy and 
scholarly consensus over time and space based on general or specific provisions of the 
sources of the Qur’an and Sunnah. In this way, Islamic law is seen to be in a continuous 
process of development and formulation of principles in documented works of classic, 
medieval and modern scholars.6 
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Traditionally jurists of Islamic Law, unlike their western counterparts, do not concentrate 
on theorisation. Rather they focused on expounding the sources of Islamic law as a 
pragmatic and accessible body of laws derived from a divine source, thus enabling its 
followers to apply and observe it in their daily lives. In this way, the scholarship was 
practical in nature rather than philosophical with respect for and acceptance of it being 
based not on ‘refined’, extensive or nuanced arguments but on faith.7 Thus, any general 
description of the law of delict especially as required by a study of this nature is produced 
by abstraction from many specific instances i.e. from many statements in the Qur’an and 
Hadith dealing with particular instances of liability as will be discussed below.  
 
The work of the Islamic jurist Abu Muhammad Al-Baghdadi of the 17th century, Majma’ 
Al-Damanaat (Compendium of the Law of Obligations) has been cited as the first recorded 
attempt to provide a compendium of ‘tort’ in Islamic law.8 It was limited to the Hanafi 
school of thought. Subsequently, the government of the Ottoman Empire, under pressure 
from the West to provide the empire with definite legislation on all aspects of life, 
appointed a committee to create a code on the law of obligations which was promulgated in 
1876, Majallah al-Ahkam al-‘Adiliyah (Compilation of the Rules of Justice). The Hanafi 
School of law again formed the basis of the committee’s work. It took seven years for the 
committee to produce the Majallah which was then applied in many Muslim countries until 
recent times.9 In general, western influences have been at the root of contemporary 
attempts to develop a theoretical presentation of the Islamic law of obligations (delict and 
contracts both) first as a result of colonisation and more recently, as a result of 
globalisation.10  
 
Saudi Arabia is the prime example of a jurisdiction where a codified law of civil 
obligations has never been promulgated and the system of civil obligations is still largely 
based on general Islamic law derived from classic Islamic jurisprudence.11 It is interesting 
to note however that there had been an initiative to secure a civil code for the country. In 
1926, King Abdulaziz (the founder of the country) requested Islamic scholars to compile a 
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civil code based on rules synthesised from all the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
based on the best evidences from the sources of Islamic law.12 But scholars were not 
receptive to the idea and it was stifled.13  
 
It is relevant to note that ‘unofficially,’ one of the scholars of the time, Ahmad bin ‘Abdul 
Allah Al-Qari took up the challenge and produced Majallah al-Ahkam al-Shar’iyyah 
(Compilation of the Principles of Islamic Law) which has been described by Vogel as a 
‘superb codification of the Hanbali law of obligations’14 much in the mould of the 
Majallah, although this text was only allowed to be published recently.15  
 
It does appear that the reservation of the Islamic scholars about the propriety of 
codification of any aspect of Islamic law was at the root of the resistance to the call by the 
King at the time. As discussed in chapter two the conservative attitude to codification has 
become somewhat relaxed though challenges remain from formidable quarters on the issue. 
In particular, a move to secure the support of Islamic jurists for codification of the civil 
code has been resisted on the premise that Islamic law does not allow the state to bind 
judges to a particular view or school of thought which codification inherently represents. 
On the other hand, there is a growing support for the view that indeed, the King as the 
Head of State has the power to lay down rules for judges to follow,16 and there have been 
calls in recent times for addressing the need for a codified civil law of obligations in the 
Kingdom.17 
 
4.3 The Social Context - The Nature of the Muslim Community18 
 
There are a number of important social concepts around which the Muslim Community 
(the Ummah) is organised. A proper appreciation of the content and application of any 
aspect of Islamic law is better achieved by some understanding of these key concepts as 
they constitute the social context of the legal system as a whole. On this view, it is relevant 
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to provide a brief overview of such concepts as they define the Muslim Community where 
Islamic law is expected to operate. The consideration here will be limited to those concepts 
that particularly impact on the specific issue of delictual liability. 
 
As Esposito explains, Muslims view their community as one with a ‘mission to create a 
moral social order.’19 Indeed, the Muslim society as envisioned by the Qur’an is one that is 
firmly based on social cohesion and equality. It is one where ‘moral and social justice’ 
counterbalance any form of oppression and economic exploitation.20 Thus practices such as 
usurpation of the legacies of orphans, women, the elderly and any other vulnerable person 
are prohibited and strongly condemned. Acts of bribery, cheating and usurious transactions 
are similarly prohibited.21 The latter are declared as a ‘war against God and His Prophet’ 
presumably because it tends to create socio-economic conditions that can cause hardship 
for the majority of the community, the antithesis of the message of Islam.22 The Prophet 
had emphasised that his message was to promote ease and warned against creating any 
form of hardship for the community.23 
 
In line with this, there is an emphasis on taking care of the needy and vulnerable members 
of society and all forms of social solidarity.24 In promotion of the values of social justice, 
the Qur’an declares turning away from supporting the needy as ‘declaring the deen 
(Islamic religion and way of life) false.’25 This implies a serious consequence which every 
Muslim with an understanding of the precepts of Islam will take quite seriously. This same 
promotion of social justice is the basis for the institutionalisation of Zakat (the Islamic tax 
on wealth) designed essentially to facilitate re-distribution of wealth and discourage 
unfettered accumulation of capital. The Islamic position on social justice and equity is well 
articulated thus: 
 
The Quran enjoins human beings to set up a social order wherein justice, 
equality and fairplay should prevail. The quranic goal of an ethical and just 
society is affirmed by its condemnation of the unjust and social-
economically unfair society of the pre-Islamic Makkahan social order. The 
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Quran lays down that wealth should not circulate among the rich. It does not 
ban private property; but in order to ensure distributive justice, the Quran 
prescribes Zakat, an Islamic system of tax. 26  
 
 Related to this, Islam prioritises the protection of certain interests; preservation of life, 
property, health, reputation. The Islamic social system identifies as pivotal the preservation 
of life, property, health and reputation as ‘universal obligations’ on the community.27 The 
social system is obliged to jealously guide these elements as the very basis of its legitimacy 
as they constitute the raison d’être for its formation. The sources of Islamic law are replete 
with injunctions on the importance of protecting these elements.28 There is this famous 
proclamation in the Hadith of the Prophet: ‘Your blood (life), your property, and your 
honour (reputation) are inviolable as is the inviolability of this day, in this city of yours and 
in this month of yours.’29 The significance of this Hadith in the historical context is best 
appreciated when it is understood that he made this statement reportedly before over a 
hundred thousand pilgrims on the day of Arafah which is the single most important ritual 
of the Muslim pilgrimage in Makkah. The occasion of Hajj (pilgrimage) generally, and the 
day of Arafah in particular, is considered the most auspicious in the life of Muslims.  
 
The most important of the elements is individual life. There is in general an obligation on 
the community to preserve the lives of each and every member of the community. This 
transforms into an individualised duty at a point where an individual action or intervention 
is required subject to the limitation of capacity. It is stated in the Qur’an that ‘whoever kills 
a soul unless for a soul (i.e. in legal retribution for murder) or for corruption done in the 
land (i.e. which require the death penalty) it is as if he had slain mankind entirely and 
whoever saves a soul (or refrains from killing) it is as if he had saved the entire mankind.’30 
As will be further discussed below, this obligation on the preservation of life impacts on 
consideration of delictual liability. 
 
Islam places considerable emphasis on creating and preserving social harmony.31 Al-
Taharuz and As-Salamah, social harmony here, is the requirement that individuals, groups 
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and institutions alike act in a manner that is mindful of the safety, rights and privileges of 
others.32 In this regard, the function of the Islamic state is succinctly expressed by Baderin: 
 
The Islamic state does not exist merely to maintain law and order or to 
protect its territory. Its viability depends also upon its ability to achieve 
social justice, promote public good and balance the relationship between 
individuals, society and government. 33   
 
 There is a breach of social harmony where an individual, irrespective of status, acts 
contrary to what is considered normal, acceptable and conventional. The finding that an act 
is contrary to the custom or convention can be of particular relevance to the determination 
of delictual liability as will become clear later in this chapter and those that follow. 
 
4.4 General Legal Concepts of Delictual Liability 
 
4.4.1 Definition of Liability and Delict 
 
The concept of liability in Islam or the Islamic Law of Obligations is generally referred to 
as al-Damaan. Literally, al-Damaan means a ‘commitment’ or ‘guarantee.’ Under Islamic 
Law, it refers to ‘the obligation to compensate for harm’34 done to others. Other scholars 
define al-Damaan as ‘the duty or obligation that arises from an act or omission that has 
caused harm to another.’35 A comprehensive definition is provided by Az-Zuhayli who 
defines it as ‘an obligation to compensate another for an act or omission that leads to 
economic loss or loss of other benefit or personal injury.’36 This study adopts Az-Zuhayli’s 
definition in view of its relative comprehensiveness. However, it is important to note that 
this study is specifically concerned with the aspect of al-Damaan referred to by jurists of 
Islamic Law as Damaan al-Itlaf or Damaan al-f’il al-dar, liability for harmful acts. 
Delictual liability as an aspect of the law of obligations is a well recognised feature of 
Islamic Law. 
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In many Arab countries, delict is provided for under, al-Masuliyah al-Madaniyah, the law 
of civil liability. In those countries, civil liability is divided into al-Masuliyah al-
Taqsirriyah, delictual liability and al-Masuliyah al-Aqdiyah, contractual liability. As in the 
Saudi system, delict in these countries is specifically limited to liability for illegal or 
harmful actions in which the defender is responsible for compensating his victims.37  
 
4.4.2 Legal Capacity 
 
 As stated in chapter two, Fiqh, is essentially, the jurisprudence of Shari’ah. This 
jurisprudence has a methodology and system of rule-deduction referred to as usul al-Fiqh, 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Usul al-Fiqh is mainly concerned with establishing 
procedural rules and principles for the determination of substantive cases from the sources 
of Islamic law.38 The development of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence arose from the 
need to meet the challenge of securing the proper and correct application of a system of 
law with a divine source through the agency of human reasoning. A fundamental aspect of 
usul al-Fiqh is setting out the parameters for the choice of the appropriate methods and 
principles of Islamic law to be adopted by a jurist in determining the al-hukm al-shari’i.39 
 
Al-hukm al-shari’i is the legal ruling on or value attached or assigned to any issue by the 
Shari’ah. There are three arkan, pillars of al-hukm al-shari’i namely the Lawgiver, Allah, 
the mahkum feeh, subject-matter of the law and the mahkum ‘alayhi, audience of the law.40 
Of particular significance to the discussion here on the nature of delict in Islamic law is the 
individual who is subject to law, the mahkum ‘alayhi. The individual as the subject of law 
brings into focus the issue of legal capacity, ahliyyah under Islamic law. In Islamic law, 
every individual has some form of legal capacity or the other,41 what can be regarded as 
some form of ‘legal persona.’42  
 
There are two types of capacity or ways in which the individual is viewed as a subject of 
law, ahliyyah al-wujub and ahliyyah al-aada. Ahliyyah al wujub, what Kamali referred to 
as ‘receptive legal capacity,’ means the capacity of the individual to have rights and 
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obligations. Ahliyyah al-aada, ‘active legal capacity’ obligates the individual to ‘fulfil 
rights and discharge obligations.’43 The fact of being alive is by itself sufficient to create 
receptive legal capacity. Thus, every individual, even the foetus, has receptive legal 
capacity under Islamic law. On the other hand, this criterion and three others; attainment of 
puberty, sound mind, and capacity to distinguishing proper and improper conduct, are 
jointly required for active legal capacity. Whereas both forms of capacity may jointly 
attach to an individual or not at certain points in his/her life, what is of particular relevance 
to the discussion here is the nature of receptive legal capacity. 
 
Kamali,44 as well as Izzi Dien45 have both noted that receptive legal capacity may either be 
deficient (or incomplete) or complete. As an example, the receptive legal capacity of a 
foetus is incomplete until delivery because s/he is only able to receive certain rights. Such 
rights include inheritance and bequest. The receptive legal capacity of the foetus is 
incomplete or deficient because it cannot bear any obligation towards others for instance. 
The individual acquires complete receptive legal capacity at the moment of birth. An infant 
or a child, through its guardian, can discharge certain obligations. Thus, a child (or even 
infant) can bear the obligation of maintenance, liability for services rendered to him/her 
and more relevant to our discussion here, liability for loss suffered or harm caused by 
his/her conduct. This is the same with persons of unsound mind and the unconscious. They 
all fall into the same category under Islamic law.46 
 
It is further relevant to state that al-Hukm al-shari’i has two main divisions; al-hukm       
al-takleefi and al-hukm al-wadi’i. While the former is concerned with the legal 
classification of the conduct of a mukallaf (a person of full capacity) the latter focuses on 
the causes and effect of conduct. Thus, Islamic scholars define al-hukm al-takleefi as 
communication from the Lawgiver concerning the conduct of the mukallaf which consists 
of a command or demand to do or refrain from an act. 47 An important point to note further 
is that the mukallaf is normally in a position to discharge the obligation prescribed or 
defined by the Lawgiver.48 By its nature requiring a duty (takleef), al-hukm al-takleefi is 
directed at the individual. It is constituted by prescriptions; ‘do’ and ‘don’t’ injunctions.49 
Al-hukm al-takleefi has five categories; fardh or wajib obligatory (such as the five daily 
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prayers), mandub recommended (e.g. giving in charity), haram forbidden (e.g. drinking 
alcohol), makruh detestable (e.g. walking around with one shoe) and mubah permissible 
(e.g. eating and drinking whatever is not prohibited).   
 
However, it is the latter division of al-hukm al-shari’i, the aspect focusing on conduct, 
which is of particular interest in this research. Islamic scholars consider al-damaan which 
delict, as stated earlier, forms a part of, as coming under al-hukm al-wadi’i. Al-hukm        
al-wadi’i is defined as that form of communication from the Lawgiver that enacts 
something into a cause (sabab) of, condition (shart) for or hindrance (mani’) to something 
else.50 Unlike the al-hukm al-takleefi, it does not take human ability or will into 
consideration in arriving at a legal determination. Rather, al-hukm al-wadi’i, as Izzi Dien, a 
contemporary writer has noted, is consequential in its operation rather than prescriptive 
like al-hukm al- takleefi.51    
 
An example of condition precedent for the validity of another conduct is the requirement 
for ablution before performance of the five daily prayers. An individual who is in debt is 
not obligated to pay Zakat as the debt is a hindrance to the obligation of paying Zakat. 
More relevant to the context of this research is sabab which locates delict as a legal 
category in Islamic law within al-hukm al-wadi’i. On this view, an individual even where 
he may be lacking in legal capacity for contractual obligation (and thus not liable for 
compensation) or with diminished responsibility for criminal acts (and thus exempted from 
punishment), will still be held liable in delict on the basis of ‘cause and effect’ where 
conduct emanating from an individual causes unjustified harm.52  
 
It serves to make the point clearer by comparing the position further in criminal law 
especially. People with diminished responsibility, for example, a sleeping person, a child, 
or a person of unsound mind, are not subject to punishment for any criminal act they 
commit. This is in a restricted sense, similar to the common law concept of doli incapax. 
However, the Islamic law conception of diminished responsibility in criminal law which is 
the principle applicable to individuals in this category differs in an important way from the 
common law concept of lack of legal capacity or doli incapax. The fundamental difference 
is that whereas a finding of doli incapax nullifies any culpability and thus compensation, 
individuals adjudged as bearing diminished responsibility remain liable to pay 
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compensation for specific offences which are stipulated in the Shari’ah. The offences in 
issue are those relating to personal bodily injury such as manslaughter.53 Thus, diminished 
responsibility is only a limited defence even in criminal law; it does not obviate the 
requirement of compensation for unjustified harm. This serves to emphasis the significance 
attached by Islamic law to securing reparation for unjustified harm as a means of ensuring 
harmony in the society. 
 
 The rationale for this form of diminished responsibility can be stated in two ways. The 
first returns to the ‘cause and effect’ rule stated earlier. However, since this rule does not 
apply to property offences it can only be a partial explanation. Indeed, Islamic jurists have 
stated that it is essentially based on the sacredness of preservation of life and physical 
integrity of the individual which are both paramount objectives of Shari’ah.54 From the 
foregoing position of criminal law on the conduct of those with diminished responsibility 
where their conduct results in personal bodily harm, it becomes clearer why the same 
category of people are liable for delictual conduct generally. 
 
4.4.3 Implications of the Concept of Legal Capacity for Delictual 
Liability 
 
There are a number of specific statements and incidents in the sources on which jurists 
have drawn to develop the principles of delict. One of the most noted references for the 
recognition of delictual liability in Islamic law, highlighted in several classical Islamic 
legal texts, is the declaration of the Prophet on the inviolability or respect for life, property, 
health and honour of each individual. Arising from this declaration there is a recognised 
duty upon every individual to respect the right of others to their lives, property and 
integrity. In other words, the broad statement in the Hadith creates a legal duty to abstain 
from causing harm, injury or damage in any form whatever that is not justified in or 
allowed by law to those one comes in contact with or might come in contact with. From the 
normative perspective, it underlines the importance of delict in the Islamic system and law.  
In addition, the Hadith directs an obligation to repair, compensate or make good any 
unjustified harm that flows from a violation of this duty.  
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Further, in conformity with the Islamic social system, every individual has a legal duty to 
abstain from causing unjustified harm to others generally because of the emphasis of the 
Islamic legal system on maintaining peace and justice as the basis of social harmony. With 
specific reference to liability of the state for delict, there are several recorded incidents of 
delictual liability of the state during the time of the Prophet and his successors in the first 
century of the Islamic state and the period afterwards as discussed in the previous chapter 
which traced the history of the grievances jurisdiction in the Islamic system. 
 
With regard to liability for delict, the general rule in Islamic law, it must be noted, consists 
of two important features: the first is personal liability. The second is the requirement of 
compensation for unjustified harm. On the first aspect, every individual is held accountable 
for his/her deeds, i.e. there is recognition of the rule of individual responsibility or liability. 
Thus, Islamic jurists refer to several verses in the Qur’an clearly stating this principle. The 
verse ‘No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another’55 is an example. In another, it 
is stated that ‘The blame is only against those who oppress others with wrongdoing and 
insolently transgress beyond bounds through the land.’56 A third similarly states that 
‘Every soul (or person) will be held in pledge for its deeds.’57  
 
Personal liability is the basic principle of liability in Islamic law but as will be discussed 
below, there are some exceptions to the rule. Personal liability applies both to the criminal 
and civil jurisdiction generally. As stated earlier, the rules of personal liability for injurious 
acts can be regarded as strict to the extent that they do not exclude minors or persons of 
unsound mind from the need to compensate for their delictual conduct. This is because the 
duty not to cause unjustified harm is regarded as a general and objective one.58 This 
position of the law has been restated by the Board of Grievances.  In M and N v Minsitry of 
Health,59 the Board stated that: 
 
the core of liability for delict is the occurrence of harm …it is for this reason 
that liability can be established from the actions of the under-aged or 
mentally imbalanced even though they do not have legal responsibility in 
Islamic Law. 
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Notwithstanding this broad statement of the principle, it must be borne in mind that not all 
harm leads to liability. Where there is a right to inflict the harm or the harm is in some way 
permissible then there is no ground for liability. Muslim jurists stipulate for establishing 
delictual liability that the action causing the damage must be in breach of duty not to cause 
unjustified harm. The act must be without legal justification or be carried out in a manner 
contrary to Islamic Law.60  
 
The second aspect of the general rule follows on from the first. It is the principle that where 
an injury has been suffered without justification, the victim must be compensated. Islamic 
jurisprudence emphasises the prohibition of causing unjustified harm to others in any way. 
This is referred to as the principle of ‘avoidance of harm.’ This aspect of the general rule 
(on the requirement for compensation) is well captured in the current Jordanian Civil Code 
(1976) which relied on the Shari’ah and the work of Muslims jurists (Fiqh) as the main 
sources of the code.61  Article 256 states:  
 
Every act that causes damage to another obliges the actor, though lacking 
discernment, to make compensation for such damage. 
 
This article strongly suggests that every harmful act must be compensated for. However, 
this is somewhat misleading as not all harm leads to liability. There are certain harmful 
acts which do not incur liability. They constitute defences to and limitation of the scope of 
liability in the Islamic law of delict as will be discussed below. 
 
The safety of the individual, property and reputation as stated earlier, are to be protected 
and jealously guarded.62 This is clearly stated in a well known Hadith of the Prophet, La 
darar wa la dirara,63 which literally means there should be neither causing of harm nor 
reciprocation of harm.64As a legal principle, it means ‘no abuse of right or causing any 
harm or damage is allowed’65 under the Islamic system. Thus, the principle of avoidance of 
unjustified harm constitutes a cardinal foundation for delictual liability in Islamic Law with 
a fundamental emphasis on obtaining redress for injurious conduct. 
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Muslim jurists have also derived from the above Hadith, several principles. The most basic 
are that harm must be removed66 and it must be avoided as much as possible.67 The former 
principle is akin to the common law principle of restituto in integrum. Where there is 
unjustified harm, the claimant must be restored to his former position as much as possible. 
The latter principle, that harm must be avoided as much as possible, as Az-Zuhayli tells us, 
means that such harm must be avoided before its occurrence.68  
 
The principle that harm must be removed is applied by the General Courts in Saudi Arabia 
even where the economic interests of the defender is affected. In T v S69 the courts applied 
the principle even where the defender had obtained the requisite permission or licence from 
the relevant public authority to carry out the activity that allegedly caused harm. The case 
of the claimant was that fumes emanating from a restaurant adjacent to his property was 
causing nuisance and had a negative impact on his health and that of his family as they had 
variously suffered ill-health as a result of it. Moreover, the fumes caused damage to his 
property and he had to undertake restoration on his property several times. While the 
claimant did not request damages, he asked that the court should order the harm to be 
abated. 
 
The court’s Panel of Experts was mandated to investigate the claim that the location of the 
defender’s restaurant’s pipes and chimney caused the release of foul smells and toxic 
fumes into the household and property of the claimant. They noted that an amendment to 
the structure of the pipes and chimneys would correct the situation. The judge accepted the 
report and ordered that the defender should comply with the experts’ recommendations. 
The court held that this was in view of the legal principle that ‘there should be neither 
causing of harm nor reciprocation of harm’ and that harm should be removed.  
 
Other principles include the rule that an injury may be excused where it is inflicted in order 
to prevent a greater injury.70 In situations where there are two harms, one less severe than 
the other (and the incidence of one of the two is inevitable), then the lesser harm can be 
occasioned. The more severe harm must be avoided or prevented from occurring. This 
principle is based on the understanding that carrying out a harmful action is ‘unlawful’ - 
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since it is essentially a transgression - and committing such an act is not allowed except 
where necessary. Necessity is evaluated carefully, and the less harmful act is allowed, since 
unavoidable circumstances make it necessary. For instance, it is allowed under Islamic law 
to cut the abdomen of a dead pregnant woman in order to rescue the embryo, if it is likely 
to survive.71 It is now relevant to consider the constitution of delict in Islamic law.  
 
4.5 The Key Concepts in Delictual Liability- Ta’ady, Darar and 
Ifdah  
 
This part examines the key concepts of delict. It is relevant to mention that while these 
concepts were identified and discussed in the work of classical Islamic scholars those 
scholars did not give a systematic presentation of liability to compensate for unjustified 
harm in these terms. However, what can be deduced from the analyses of their works is the 
existence of three such concepts or elements: 
 
I. Ta’ady, breach of the duty not to cause unjustified harm.  
II. Darar, Harm. 
III. Ifdah, causal connection. 
 
All three constitutive elements must be present in any given case to establish delictual 
liability whether by a private individual or a public body. The position of Islamic Law has 
been stated in a number of cases by the Board of Grievances. In F v Department of 
Immigration72 the Board, with specific reference to the delictual liability of public 
authorities, stated that:  
 
…it is judicially settled that the liability of public authorities for their 
delictual acts is based on three elements Ta’ady (breach of legal duty not to 
cause unjustified harm) Darar (harm) and Ifdah (causal connection).73 
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4.5.1 Meaning and Scope of Ta’ady 
 
As Al-Qasem has noted, the concept of Ta’ady has been developed over centuries by 
scholars of Islamic law into a term of art, indicating breach of duty not to cause 
(unjustified) damage or harm to others. 74According to Al-Zuhayli, Ta’ady, literally means 
‘exceeding the limit.’75 It refers to an injustice or a wrongful act in violation of a right.76 
Faidullah defines it as the absence or lack of due diligence in carrying out a specific act as 
well as ‘exceeding acceptable limits of law, convention, and customs.’77 Al-Zuhayli 
similarly agrees with this legal definition.78 Ta’ady also includes Taqsir, falling short of 
required standard. It has further been defined as ‘the harmful act without right or legal 
permissibility.’79 According to Al-Zarqa Ta’ady is violating others’ rights or encroaching 
on their properties or possessions.80  
 
From these and other definitions, it can be deduced that Muslim jurists use the term 
‘Ta’ady’ with multiple meanings, all of which are relevant in considerations of delictual 
liability. These meanings can be outlined into at least three broad categories:  
(i) Doing something which is specifically prohibited, without any special legal permit or 
exemption to do so. 
(ii) Falling short of required objective standards, acting carelessly, or without due 
diligence.  
(iii) Doing an act or making an omission which may be otherwise permissible in a manner 
that exceeds or breaches the acceptable limits of law, convention, and custom. 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is suggested that the concept of Ta’ady could be best 
captured by the principle of breach of a legal duty not to cause unjustified harm generally. 
The three strands highlighted here are best viewed as inter-related rather than separate or 
individualised standards of reference, definition or requirement that must be separately 
established. It is important to emphasise that in the Islamic system, the effect of any of the 
three strands are the same; they result in a breach of the duty not to cause unjustified harm.  
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Ta’ady is a comprehensive principle compared to a fault-based system. In discussing 
liability and compensation under Islamic law with reference to Saudi Arabia, a 
contemporary writer, Le Roy notes that:  
 
The notion of fault, in the technical sense that we [western legal scholars] 
know, does not exist in Muslim law, which uses the concept of ta’adi. This 
is a broad concept encompassing any illicit act that causes injury or damage 
to others. It is an act carried out without justification and which exceeds an 
individual’s right to encroach upon the right of another.81  
 
While the concept of Ta’ady is broad enough to cover cases which in many European legal 
systems would be considered as examples of negligence or some other type of fault, it does 
appear to involve a wider conception of breach of the duty not to cause unjustified harm to 
others.82 There are cases where it is not necessary to prove fault in order to establish breach 
of the duty not to harm others (Ta’ady). In such cases, the occurrence of harm without legal 
justification constitutes the breach of the legal norm not to cause harm to others. In other 
words, there is no requirement to prove dolus or fault in the strict and technical sense.83 In 
this regard, it has been suggested that Islamic law recognises what has been identified by a 
leading authority on Scots law as ‘absolute liability,’ in which liability applies even in the 
absence of a mental element but entirely as a result of statutory prescription.84 This is the 
sense in which Musleh-ud-deen iterated that: 
 
In view of the words of the Prophet which hold the life, property and honour 
of each individual member as sacred, the duty imposed upon [the] 
community seems to be of absolute character, breach of which will naturally 
result in absolute liability, so it may be said that the nature of civil liability 
in Islam is absolute. 85 
 
However, there is a danger that a simplistic acceptance of Musleh-ud-deen’s view amounts 
to clouding the correct Islamic perspective on delictual liability unless of course it is 
understood that the ‘absoluteness’ implies that the harm is unjustified. It is suggested that 
the correct statement of the Islamic position is that it is not essential to establish fault in 
                                                 
81
 P Le Roy ‘Liability and Compensation for Bodily Injury Under Islamic Law’ available at: 
  http://www.genre.com/sharedfile/pdf/Topics13LeRoy-en.pdf  (site vistied 22 April 2010)  
82
 Al-Qasem note 58 supra at 192. 
83
 Amkhan note 37 supra at 173 
84
 D M Walker The Law of Delict in Scotland (2nd ed W. Green & Son Ltd Edinburgh 1981) 32-50. 
85
 Musleh-ud-deen note 1 supra at 53-55. 
Ch 4 The Main Principles of Delict in Saudi Law 
 82
order to establish liability. There will be many cases in which liability is based on acts or 
omissions which would be treated as examples of fault liability in European legal 
jurisdictions, but there are also other cases where liability is clearly not based on fault. The 
critical distinction is between justified and unjustified harm. 
 
There is liability in delict for destroying the property of others without legal justification 
whether this is carried out with deliberation or not. Liability of a defender is established, 
with no need for proving intent. This is the case even where the act is essentially of an 
involuntary nature which can not be described as ‘permissible’ or ‘prohibited’ (in law). The 
key issue is that the act of the defender has resulted in a breach of the duty not to cause 
unjustified harm in contravention of the sources of Islamic law. Thus, a sleeping person 
who rolls over while sleeping and damages another’s property will still be liable despite the 
absence of deliberation or intent.86 This follows the discussion above of the context of 
delict being in the realm of ‘cause and effect’ in Islamic jurisprudence. The damage that 
results cannot be justified in terms of it not coming under any of the recognised defences.   
 
It is relevant to note that some writers like Masoodi claim that intention is crucial for civil 
liability in Islamic law. The basis of his claim is the assumption that intention is the basis 
for all action, and a key element for accountability and responsibility under Islamic Law.87 
Masoodi states that ‘In view of the clear and express scriptural dictates, it is very difficult 
to confine “intention” to crime only, which is an express negation of the divine law’.88 He 
claims that intention is considered in both ‘Ibadaat (acts of religious observance) and 
Mua’malat (social relations), whether the liability is toward God or man. He further argues 
that ‘there has been consensus among jurists that intention is the sheet anchor of civil 
liability in Islamic law of jinayah.’ 89  
  
However, this position fails to accurately discern between different aspects of Islamic law, 
and mistakenly cites classical jurists as supporting his position. Masoodi confuses the 
spiritual aspect (religion or worship) of Islam with the legal-jurisprudential aspect as will 
be made clearer below under the section of the meaning of Khata in Arabic language and 
Islamic law.90 Indeed, it is a crucial principle of Islamic law that rites or acts of worship are 
rewarded according to their intent. This is regarded as being entirely in the realm of the 
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spiritual but it is inaccurate to assume that this extends to civil liability in Islamic law as 
the discussion above and below has shown.  
 
In addition, the term jinayah has been used by Muslims jurists to refer to what corresponds 
to criminal liability and it is unusual, even inappropriate to extend that terminology to 
delict or tort. As the classic jurist, Al-‘Iz bin Abdulsalam, points out, Al-Jawabir, 
reparations, under Shar’iah are designed to restore the benefits or interests that have been 
lost or negatively affected by the conduct of another. On the other hand, Al-Zawajir, 
deterrence, is designed to ward off harm from the individual and society at large.  
Furthermore, reparation is obligatory in relation to intentional or wilful acts, whether done 
ignorantly or knowingly, in remembrance or forgetfulness, and whether by the unsound or 
children. Conversely, deterrence is directed at checking a sinful person in order to deter 
that person from sinful conduct. He goes on to state that all forms of compensation for 
harm constitute reparations while retaliation for harm (Qisas), corporal punishment (Jald) 
and imprisonment (Sijjn) are deterrent in nature, clearly vindicating the view that the last 
three are aspects of criminal liability.91 
 
Furthermore, there are cases of positive obligation created by (moral) prescription. A 
person incurs liability for failing or neglecting to perform such obligations. As an example, 
D who is apparently starving asks E for food or water (which the latter does not need for 
his immediate survival) but E refuses to oblige him. D dies of starvation. In this case, the 
legal position is that E is liable for D’s death for failing to give him the food and is obliged 
to pay compensation for the loss of life. The case would be different if E required the 
provision for his own survival. The same goes for failing to rescue a person in peril where 
one is able to do so.92 This is the firm position of the Hanbali school of Islamic 
Jurisprudence.93 In both cases there is an obligation to act which the wrongdoer has not 
fulfilled. Both examples seem to follow from the existence of the duty to preserve life as 
discussed above. This is well explicated by a classic Islamic jurist of the Malik school of 
jurisprudence who states that: 
 
A person will be liable if he omits to save a person or a property in jeopardy 
that he could have saved by his capability, prestige or money. As such, that 
person will be liable to pay compensation for the person or the value, for the 
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property. To save person or property is a duty on every person who is 
capable, even by paying from his own money, and he will be reimbursed by 
the owner of the property where the saving is limited to the payment of 
money, even if the owner of the property did not authorise him to pay the 
money for such saving.94 
 
The basis for this view is that the Islamic system (including its law) is a composite one that 
does not divorce morals from law and moral or religious obligation can transform into legal 
duty. From a ‘western’ positivist perspective, however, such prescriptions contained in the 
sources of Islamic law may not be regarded as constituting a legal obligation.95 This can be 
seen in the verse earlier mentioned on the implication of killing or saving a single person. 
The verse calls attention to the fact that ‘saving’ a person at the risk of death is not just a 
virtue but a duty since it is a grave infraction to cause the death of even a single individual. 
In this regard, the critical point is that preservation of life, as mentioned above, is one of 
the cardinal objectives of the Shari’ah. The obligation of the individualised responsibility 
(liability) dissolves only in the absence of capacity. Life is a trust which must be 
safeguarded by anyone in a position to do so. Thus, like the former position under Scots 
and English law96, suicide remains an offence under the Islamic system.97 The next issue 
for consideration is how to establish Ta’ady. 
 
4.5.1.1 Establishing Ta’ady 
 
Like many aspects of social relations, Mua’malat, in the Islamic system, delict is only 
delimited in terms of broad applicable principles which must be observed. In matters of 
social relations, as distinct from acts of religious observance, ‘Ibadaat, Islamic law 
recognises the need for taking into consideration, the dynamics of the society. Thus, there 
is no comprehensive statement in the sources of Islamic law of the contents or elements of 
breach of duty not to cause unjustified harm.  
 
As a result, the exact content or structure of the duty owed to others falls into an area that is 
not specifically defined in Islamic law. Where this is the case, the general principle is that 
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the criterion for establishing wrongdoing in that aspect of the law falls for determination 
under the concepts of ‘Urf, Convention and ‘Aaada, Customs. As procedural (rather than 
substantive) sources of Islamic Law, these refer to what can be broadly termed as ‘the 
general usages of mankind’ or more accurately, what is generally considered acceptable 
and appropriate in the context of the customs and habits of the society or a particular 
section of it, like professional bodies or trade guilds for instance within a specific time or 
geographical frame.98 The significance of custom and culture is reflected in the maxim 
‘custom is the basis of judgment’ which is one of five leading maxims of Islamic law on 
which there is unanimity of the classic schools of thought.99 As Kamali observes an Islamic 
court is 
 
 authorised to base its judgment on custom in matters which are not 
regulated by the text, provided, that the custom at issue is current, 
predominant among people, and is not in conflict with the principles of 
Shar’iah.100  
 
This characteristic of Islamic law provides a veritable platform for the reception of 
‘foreign’ ideas and development of the Islamic law of obligations of which delict forms a 
part in addition to allowing for variations of acceptable standards for conduct from one 
society to another as mentioned in chapter two. 
 
Further, a key consideration in determining whether there is breach of a duty not to cause 
unjustified harm in Islamic law is the need to preserve social harmony, al-Taharuz and       
As-Salamah. This is the requirement that individuals, groups and institutions alike act in a 
manner that is mindful of the safety, rights and privileges of others.101 There is a breach of 
social harmony, and thus a legal norm, where the defender, irrespective of status, acts 
contrary to what is considered normal, acceptable and conventional. As a result of this 
principle even an otherwise legally permissible act may be considered impermissible when 
given a specific context. This is regarded as lawfully caused but unjustified harm which is 
discussed in the next chapter along with other types of delictual liability of the state. To 
take an example of such harm, if a person lights a fire on his land on a windy day and the 
fire spreads to and destroys neighbouring property, he will be held liable in delict. This is 
                                                 
98
 M  A Al-Zarqa Al-Fiqh Al- Islami fee Thawbih Al-Jadeed Vol. 2 (Dar Al-Fikr Beirut 1967) 1001. 
99
 M H Kamali ‘Legal Maxims and Other Genres of Literature in Islamic Law’ (2006) 20 Arab Law 
Quarterly 77, 82. 
100
 Ibid. at 88. 
101
 Ibn ‘Abideen note 32 supra at 219. 
Ch 4 The Main Principles of Delict in Saudi Law 
 86
because while it is permissible to light a fire on his land as a matter of right, it will not be 
considered customary to do so on a windy day since it would be generally known there is a 
high probability of causing harm to another.102 Thus, performing a lawful act is restricted 
by the principle of al-Taharuz and As-Salamah, social harmony. Where a lawful act causes 
unjustified damage or harm to others, it becomes unlawful and is then considered a breach 
of a legal norm incurring compensation. This is important since all matters detailed in 
Shari’ah without specific rules, are referred to customs, traditions and conventional 
norms.103 This will not be the case, as stated earlier where the conduct is in accordance 
with customary practice. In the case, where C for instance, irrigates his farm in accordance 
with custom and the water flows to D’s land, causing flooding and damage to the latter’s 
crops, the former will not be held liable for damage.104  
 
In classic Islamic Law, the position is that prima facie, a person is responsible for the 
unjustified harm his/her conduct caused to another. In other words, establishing a breach of 
a legal norm not to cause unjustified harm is an objective rather than a subjective matter.105 
The criterion is objective in the sense that it does not derive from the intentional or 
unintentional act of the actor. This has led to the view expressed by some writers like 
Musleh-ud-deen that liability for delict in Islamic Law is damage-based. According to him 
‘Damage is the essential mark of liability in Islam…it is the damage suffered that is taken 
into account in Islamic law.’106 In the light of the foregoing discussion, this may be 
considered an over-statement. It would appear that it is more appropriate to regard the 
unjustified nature of the damage as a key element in establishing delictual liability and the 
need for compensation.  
 
Once there is a causal connection between the injurious act and the damage that results to 
the victim, compensation must be extracted from the defender if there is no justification for 
the damage. The emphasises on damage, as Al-Qasem further explains, is so to ensure that 
the victim is not left to suffer where there has been an invasion of the person’s bodily 
integrity, property or interest.107   
 
Generally, as has been indicated above, the Islamic system places a premium on preserving 
social harmony in evaluating harmful conduct. An actor is required to maintain an 
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awareness of the rights and well being of others and generally refrain from causing them 
unjustified harm. This is what is meant by the concept of la darar. Al-Qasem suggests that 
the standard of conduct that is required is one of the ‘extremely careful’ individual. This 
standard he argues is what is applicable in the codification of delict in Jordanian Law.108 
Such a position appears to pitch the required standard of conduct at a level that is higher 
than the common law principle of ‘the reasonable person.’ Others take the position that the 
standard of conduct that will be considered is that of the ordinary person. This is the 
position of the Egyptian courts on the matter.109 It is doubtful that either position is correct. 
 
The issue of the required standard of conduct failure to observe which may lead to liability 
in delict under Islamic Law remains sparsely examined in the literature. However, it is 
arguable that the correct statement of the law in this area is that the criterion of whether 
harm is justified or unjustified is whether the conduct causing the harm is contrary to 
Shari’ah or to custom. In other words, an act which is contrary to some specific 
requirement of Shari’ah as expressly stated in the sources, or is not in accordance with 
established conventions (‘Urf) and custom (‘Aaada) gives rise to liability as mentioned 
earlier. This view takes into consideration the very nature of Islamic law as one derived 
from a divine source which recognises conventions and customs as a binding principle of 
law where they are not in conflict with the divine corpus.  
 
 In Y v N110 the claimant alleged that the defender trespassed into a ravine belonging to the 
claimant’s ranch and dug drainage resulting in damage to the ranch. He demanded that the 
defender should be ordered to refrain from trespassing into his farm’s ravine again. In 
response, the defender stated that the claimant’s claims of trespass were not true and that 
the drainage was built in the street which runs alongside his own property. Court appointed 
experts determined that the disputed area was within approximately three meters in the 
street as agreed upon (before) between the parties. The court was unable to determine a 
precise boundary line. There was no harm to the claimant because the drainage was within 
a buffer zone between them. Therefore, the claimant could not establish a claim based on 
trespass or damage to his property. The court dismissed the claim based on these findings. 
It held that since the harm or damage the Shari’ah is meant to remove is the one that is 
contrary to customary practice then the claim ought to be dismissed.  
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In sum, the key question in establishing Ta’ady is whether the conduct causing harm is 
contrary to Shari’ah, convention or custom. In this way, it can be asserted that some form 
of wrong must have been committed. However, while this wrong would in most cases 
amount to fault in the western sense, this is not always the case. There is, therefore, 
liability for harm caused by a person’s conduct in a wider range of situations than in 
western fault-based systems. 
 
4.5.1.2 Limitation of Ta’ady: Justified Harm and Defences to Liability 
 
As stated earlier, it is simply not the correct understanding of the law to assume that every 
injury will attract compensation. This is because there are defined and recognised 
exceptions to the rule. The exceptions may arise either because the harm is not regarded as 
unlawful or because it is clearly impossible to attribute the damage that results from the 
relevant conduct to human agency. Ta’ady, breach of duty not to cause unjustified harm as 
mentioned above is the harmful act without right or legal permissibility. A number of 
categories limiting the scope of liability principally based on the inability to establish 
Ta’ady can be identified. In all of the cases which will be discussed below, the conduct 
which allegedly caused harm is justifiable in terms of Shar’iah or custom that does not 
contradict the Shar’iah. 
 
a) Harm caused to others by the exercise of one’s rights 
 
Ta’ady is not established where harm occurs as a result of the exercise of right. According 
to some scholars, even where harm occurs to another due to the legitimate use of one’s 
property for example, such harm is deemed justified. The operative maxim in this regard is 
expressed in Article 91 of Majalla: al jawaz al shari’i yunafi al damaan; legal 
permissibility negates liability. However, the leading classic Islamic jurists differed on this 
issue. Imams Abu Hanifa and Shafi held the view that the exercise of right is absolute and 
so even where harm results to another from such exercise, no compensation is due. By 
implication, there is no question of Ta’ady. In this regard, Abu Hanifa stated that ‘no one 
can be prevented from exercising his right in his property, although his neighbour may 
sustain an injury.’111 But Imams Malik and Ahmad bin Hanbal held a contrary opinion. In 
their view, the exercise of right is not at all absolute. Thus, where it results in harm, that 
amounts to Ta’ady and compensation then flows.112  
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There are some views in between these positions. For instance, some jurists of the Hanafi 
school like Abu Yusuf (and as prominently reflected in al-Majallah) hold the opinion that 
the exercise of right is limited where it results in excessive damage to the property of 
another. An example is where the building of a mill or a forge in one’s house threatens the 
foundations of an adjacent neighbour’s house. Article 1199 of al-Majallah defines 
excessive damage in this regard as ‘Anything which hinders basic use, that is any benefit 
intended from the building or makes it prone to collapse.’ 
 
Al-Majallah provides a number of other examples clarifying what amounts to abuse of 
exercise of right. Article 1197 for instance provides that ‘No person may be prevented 
from dealing with his property, which he owns in absolute ownership, unless by doing so 
he causes excessive damage to any other person.’ On this view, where the exercise of right 
by an individual interferes with benefits which are not considered to be fundamental 
necessities, but to which others are entitled, for instance blocking the view of a house, such 
an exercise of a right will be upheld. This is because the exercise of right in the 
circumstances will not be regarded as being excessive. However, as a leading 
contemporary scholar of Islamic and international human rights law has stated, the 
prevailing view is that exercise of right is not at all absolute (the Malik and Hanbali 
position).113    
 
It is suggested that exercising rights is limited to conduct in accordance to customary 
practices at any given time. To go beyond such customary practice in the pursuit of one’s 
rights may result in such conduct attaching liability. As will be discussed below, an 
assessment of customary practice centres on the concept of both al-Taharuz and              
As-Salamah, social harmony. In theory, a person is at liberty to do what s/he pleases in 
her/his property but custom acts as a limit to acceptable conduct.  It is suggested this view 
fits better with the basic principles of Islamic law on the point that acting in accordance 
with custom is generally a good guide to acceptable conduct unless there is a specific 
provision in the Shari’ah that prohibits this. This is because, as a modern scholar notes, an 
Islamic court is entitled to apply local custom in matters that are not regulated by the text. 
The only conditions are that the custom is common and currently practised and does not 
contradict the principles of the Shari‘ah.114  
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b) Consent of the victim 
 
In cases where the actions to which the ‘victim’ has expressly consented causes harm, there 
is no liability. This is analogous to the Scots and English law concept of volens captured in 
the maxim volenti non fit injuria; consent of the victim negates liability.115 It is however 
important to note that an important limitation applies to the application of this consent, 
namely that the harm must be of a nature that is permissible generally under Islamic law. 
Consent will not operate to eliminate liability where the act consented to is prohibited 
under Islamic law. It will not avail as a defence that the harmed person agreed to a 
prohibited act to be done. Thus for example, it will not be acceptable to kill another with 
his consent or cut a part of the body except for medical treatment. Otherwise, the act will 
attract compensation.116 Actions which could legitimately be consented to will often be 
related to property. For example, where a property-owner requests or employs another to 
demolish his property, the former cannot after such demolition claim damages for it, except 
of course where harm results from improper execution of such a request. 
 
c) Conduct of the victim 
 
 The conduct of the victim may in certain cases negate liability. This must be distinguished 
from the consent exception mentioned above. In this case, the injury or damage suffered by 
the victim results from or, can in fact be connected to, an act of another. But in such cases, 
the harm is principally a product of an initial illegal or unsolicited conduct of the victim in 
the first place. It constitutes self-induced harm. The example often cited in the classic 
Islamic legal literature is that of an individual who digs a well in his/her land, and a 
trespasser falls into it sustaining injuries thereby. No liability will attach to the owner of 
the land. Rather, the harm will be deemed to be self-inflicted on the part of the trespasser-
victim.117 Liability in this example is negated because the conduct of the ‘victim’ of the 
harm is in itself illegal or improper i.e. the act of trespassing. Other examples will include 
where a person prods an animal (say a horse) owned by another and the animal gives the 
person a violent kick that results in injury to that person, no liability will attach to the 
owner.118 In this example, the improper act of prodding the horse brought the harm that 
resulted to the ‘victim.’ The examples in the classic texts strongly suggest the conduct of 
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the victim only negates liability where such conduct is, on scrutiny, either illegal or 
improper. This remains the position in the Saudi courts.   
 
In A v F119 the case of the claimant was that the defender caused the death of his son. The 
claimant alleged that one of the workers on the farm of the defender asked his son to clean 
up a polluted pond. As the claimant’s son went into the pond to clean it, he was 
asphyxiated by the toxic fumes, fell into the dirty water and died. The claimant argued that 
since that pond belonged to the defender and he did not warn the claimant’s son against 
getting into it, but rather ordered him to carry out this work, the defender caused his death. 
Thus the claimant demanded that the defender should be made to pay compensation for the 
loss of his son’s life. The defender stated that he did not personally order the claimant’s 
son to get into the pond nor did he ask him to carry out any work. He did not know and had 
never met the claimant’s son. Therefore, he did not cause the death of the claimant’s son 
and had nothing to do with the incident.  
 
The court asked the claimant for any evidence he had. He stated that he only had the 
documents in the incident file. The Civil Defence statement included in the file showed 
that the death was accidental and that there was no sign of any criminal act. The court 
found that anyone who approached the pond would realise it was dangerous. It held that the 
claimant’s son should have taken all necessary precautions to protect himself. And since 
the claimant’s son chose to get into the pond willingly, the court could not find that the 
claimant was entitled to what he demanded and the case was dismissed.120 The decision 
was to the effect that any reasonable person would not assume the obvious risk assumed on 
the facts by the deceased. 
 
d) Extraneous causes 
 
Further, where the harm results from an extraneous cause which is not the responsibility of 
the defender then there is no ground for liability. The main category of extraneous causes is 
natural interventions or occurrences (such as earthquake, storm, thunder, flood, lightening, 
etc). This category is what is referred to as Act of God or damnun fatale in Scots and 
English law. If for example a boat collided with another due to exceptionally strong winds 
at sea, there is no liability on the owner of the boat.121   
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e) Self-Defence 
 
There is also the issue of lawful self-defence. Where this leads to injury, there is no 
liability for delict. Protection and preservation of life, property and family inter alia, are 
cardinal objectives of the Shari’ah as mentioned above. Thus where any of these are 
threatened, the victim is entitled to ward-off or repel the threat with such means or 
measures as are appropriate in the circumstances. The key point to note is that the measure 
of self-defence must be commensurate to the attack. This is in accordance with the verse of 
the Qur’an that provides: ‘And one who attacked you, attack back in the same manner as 
you were attacked.’122 On the issue of appropriate measures of self-defence, jurists have 
emphasised that where an oral defence will suffice, it is not proper to resort to violence and 
where measured physical force would be sufficient to repel an attack, there must not be 
recourse to a measure that would result in death and so on.123 Otherwise, the self-defence 
will not negate liability.  
 
4.5.1.3 Some Reflections on Justifications and Defences for Ta’ady 
 
Some reflections on the foregoing justifications or defences are in order here. There is a 
fundamental thread that runs through these justifications for excluding liability for delict in 
Islamic Law. The common thread appears to be that in the normal run of things, 
individuals are not likely to expect or attempt to extract restitution or compensation for 
harm resulting from any of these exceptions. Justice in the matter does not require 
compensation due to the conduct leading to the harm being viewed as arising from any of 
the exercise of another’s rights, consent of the victim, self-inflicted, self-defence or an Act 
of God, as the case may be. 
 
However, it may be contended that such justification or defence should extend to a cause or 
source of harm like the one which emanates from those with diminished responsibility such 
as the under-aged or unsound person who at least in part, in reality, may be said to be 
incapable of deliberation. But this category, as mentioned earlier, is not covered by the 
justification or defence regime. The reason is this that Islamic law as a divine legal system 
claims to recognise and operate on human nature; fitrah. On this basis, it seeks to achieve 
peace and harmony through law constructed firmly on a conception of justice and fairness 
to all. It emphasises in this view, justice not only to the victim, but also the offender in the 
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case of criminal law, and more relevantly to this study, not only the wrongdoer, but also 
the victim.  
 
Proceeding further then on a need to maintain harmony, it appears the decision to include 
those lacking in capacity is premised on two grounds. First is the fact that each system of 
law is based on certain values and at every point, it is possible to determine that the legal 
principles and laws of that system demonstrate a choice among competing values. Thus the 
value of liberty would be compromised in most legal systems to establish (or indeed, 
acquit) a criminal charge as demonstrated through detention pending trial or completion of 
trial. Imposition of liability on those with diminished responsibility can be viewed from 
this perspective. The competing values may be considered to be the propriety of holding an 
individual like one lacking mental capacity for deliberation, liable for causing harm, albeit 
emanating from his conduct against the sense of an unremitted injury felt by the victim. 
 
 Under the Islamic socio-legal system, it is felt that the rule of law and harmony desired in 
the operation of law in society is better achieved by addressing the latter. Otherwise, there 
is a latent, even real, threat of recourse to retaliation or self-help where the victim is not 
compensated. The second reason is an indirect extension of this last point, namely that 
were the table turned; with the victim being a person with diminished responsibility, this 
status (of one with diminished responsibility due to mental incapacity or age) would not be 
a defence for non-compensation or justification for harm suffered by such person. Indeed, 
rather, the opposite would normally be the case; that a sense of injustice done to the one 
with diminished responsibility would be stronger in the society and expectations for 
compensation, higher, bearing in mind the vulnerable status of the victim.  
 
In both possible cases involving an individual with diminished responsibility, there is 
arguably a constant. It is this: that the individual is not aware of the harm s/he has caused 
as wrongdoer, or suffered as victim. Such then is the nature of the Islamic law that justice 
must be even-handed, taking into consideration all rights and protecting them equally as a 
means for maintaining peace and achieving harmony. Both are cardinal objectives of the 
Islamic system. In other words, just as the personal integrity and proprietary rights of the 
individual with diminished responsibility has to be protected, in equal measure, s/he must 
be held liable for causing unjustified harm. Having discussed limitations of Ta’ady, the 
next section moves on to consideration of the consequences of the breach of a legal duty 
not to cause unjustified harm. 
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4.5.2 Darar, Harm 
 
  Az-Zuhayli defines Darar as any physical harm or injury to an individual, property, 
dignity, integrity or emotional well-being. Harm can thus be broadly divided into two 
types, material and immaterial.124 Material harm is damage that is occasioned to the 
individual body or to property. It refers to harm suffered by a person or something with a 
monetary value. This can occur through damage arising from the violation of a right or 
pecuniary interest. Material harm includes physical injury, damage to property, loss of 
earnings and similar tangible forms of loss that can be quantified.125 Immaterial harm on 
the other hand is harm that affects a person’s dignity, reputation, honour, feelings or ‘such 
other value people respect.’126 Thus, forms of harm under Islamic Law can be categorised 
into personal injury, damage to property, economic loss and immaterial harm. The 
application of the law in these categories will be examined in the analysis of damage and 
compensation later. 
 
As Az-Zuhayli acknowledges, the question of liability for immaterial harm has proven 
problematic. On a basic level, this is partly because certain types of immaterial harm can 
be properly regarded as criminal in nature and attracts punishment. Notable in this regard is 
the Islamic punishment for Khadf, sexual defamation.127 However, the crux of the matter is 
the divergence of views resulting from the alleged indeterminability of immaterial harm. 
This is articulated by Musleh-ud-deen citing the important example of harm to reputation:  
 
It is said that reputation is not a material thing, hence damage to it cannot be 
fixed or measured precisely. It is, therefore held that there can be no 
pecuniary compensation for the loss of reputation. The Qadi (Muslim 
Judge) is allowed discretion to deal with such cases.128 
 
This can be referred to as the ‘restrictive view.’ On this view, immaterial harm does not 
entail or deserve compensation. Others like Al-Zarqa have explained that there is 
considerable evidence in Shar’iah confirming the prohibition of causing moral damage. He 
cites the position of the Shar’iah on sexual defamation referred to earlier as a clear 
example. However, he goes on to state that the method adopted by Shar’iah in repairing 
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moral damage is deterring, warning or punishment, and not financial compensation. This is 
because Shar’iah does not consider a person’s honour or reputation a financial asset that 
can be repaired with financial rewards if attacked.129 Thus, financial compensation is not 
stipulated.  
 
Critics of this position, however, argue that it is inaccurate that delictual harm does not 
incur compensation unless it is financial in nature. This is clear in that Shari’ah makes 
Diyah -fixed compensation for particular injuries sustained by a human being or for loss of 
life- obligatory, as reparation for the lost soul, although it is not of the same kind nor is it a 
member of the human body so to say. This is simply a rule of ‘substitute’ as when the 
‘object’ is not possible to get. The soul in such a ruling is guaranteed compensation, 
although it is not financial itself.130 Thus, the emphasis remains on the need for 
compensation for harm resulting from breach of duty to avoid causing harm to others. In 
any case, as rightly argued by Musleh-ud-deen;  
 
…reputation though not material may yet have its value which can be 
measured with reference to its nature and character, the extent of its 
circulation, the position in life of the parties and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case. 131 
 
The other contending view, the ‘liberal approach’ is the opinion that immaterial harm is 
just like material harm. It involves an assault on another’s right or rights. Immaterial harm 
may also result in the loss of some benefit or benefits by the victim. It is therefore 
important to guarantee the victim’s right to compensation in compliance with the rules of 
justice in Islamic law.132 The strongest foundation of this position is the Hadith of the 
Prophet ‘There should be neither causing of harm nor reciprocation of harm.’ It is argued 
that based on this Hadith, the prohibition is general, and includes all types of harm and 
damage. Immaterial harm is a type of harm, and as such it is prohibited in the said 
Hadith.133 Hence, it is necessary to guarantee compensation for the victim, just like all 
other forms or types of harm prohibited and for which legal evidence clearly recommends 
compensation.  
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Reference is similarly made to another Hadith mentioned earlier that ‘Your blood (life), 
your property, and your honour (reputation) are inviolable as is the inviolability of this day 
in this city of yours and in this month of yours.’ Here, the Prophet specifically mentioned 
the inviolability of honour along with property and blood (life). In other words, the 
prohibition of assault on or attack of an individual’s honour is linked with the similar 
prohibition of violating the right to life, bodily integrity and property rights. This proves 
that the same rule applies to honour namely the requirement of compensation where there 
has been a violation of it. As earlier suggested, this Hadith is one of the foundations of 
delictual liability in Islamic Law. Further, those who hold this opinion cite the views of 
some Islamic jurists guaranteeing compensation for victims of immaterial harm in cases of 
honour and status. According to Al-Mawardi:  
 
If a suspended sentence is linked to a person’s rights, like in cases of verbal 
or physical abuse or assault, the victim’s right is guaranteed; and the ruler 
has the right to correct and reform. The ruler cannot use (the power of) 
pardon to deprive the victim’s rights. Instead, the ruler should restore the 
victim’s rights with a fine paid by the offender. 134 
 
Hence, if someone is injured in a way that leaves no scars, the judge has the discretionary 
power to award the victim compensation according to the judge’s evaluation of the amount 
of pain suffered.135 The classic jurist of Islamic Law, Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, and his 
famous student Ibn Al-Qayyim stated that deterrent or punishment in the shape of financial 
fines is acceptable in specific circumstances.136 It is submitted that the better view is that 
immaterial harm does constitute harm and ought to attract compensation once reasonably 
proved. It is unreasonable to, on the one hand recognise the possibility or existence of 
immaterial harm, and on the other hand, refuse to compensate for it on the excuse that it 
cannot be measured, thereby implying that immaterial and material harm should be 
determined or measured in the same way; they are clearly different.   
 
                                                 
134
 A Al-Mawardi Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Wilayaat al-Deeniyah (Dar Ibn Qutaybah Kuwait 1989) 
268.  
135
 Al-Sarkhasi note 118 supra Vol. 26 at 28. 
136
 M Ibn Al-Qayyim  Al-Turuq al-Hukmiyah fee al-Siyasah al-Shari’ah (Dar Al-Kutub Al’Ilmiyah Beirut 
1994) 213. 
 
Ch 4 The Main Principles of Delict in Saudi Law 
 97
 4.5.3 Ifdah, Causal Connection  
 
Ifdah, causal connection, is required to establish liability for delict in Islamic Law. There 
must be a causal connection between Ta’ady, the breach of duty not to cause unjustified 
harm and Darar, the harm that results from it under the ‘cause and effect’ framing of delict 
discussed above.137 As with Scots and English Law, to establish liability and obtain 
compensation, the claimant is required to show that the act of the defender is responsible 
for or caused the loss suffered.138 Under Islamic law, there are two forms of causation; 
direct and indirect. 
 
4.5.3.1 Direct Causation 
 
On the principles of Islamic law of delict, where there has been a direct action in violation 
or breach of a legal norm not to cause unjustified harm, liability for compensation is 
established. This is otherwise referred to as Mubashara, directly caused harm or in the 
words of one contemporary author, ‘the rule of immediacy.’139 No further condition is 
required because the wrong-doing is inherent in the resulting damage.140 Here, the basis of 
liability is the unjustified harm which originates from the direct conduct of the defender in 
breach of the legal norm not to harm others. The harm suffered must be the direct result of 
the immediate act of the defender.141  
 
In cases of Mubashara, the fact of direct involvement and the establishment of the 
violation of breach of a legal norm not to cause unjustified harm to others leave no doubt in 
the correct ascription of the action to the defender. This is because of the absence of a 
mediator or intervener between the act and the harm that results.142 As Le Roy rightly puts 
it ‘the system of liability [in case of direct causation] depends on the immediacy of the 
damage in relation to the action that caused it.’143 Al-Majalla cites examples of direct 
damage to include demolition of a building and cutting down of trees.144 It will also 
include hitting someone with a bare fist or an object like a stone.145 The key point to note 
                                                 
137
 See also Al-Qasem note 58 supra at 193. 
138
 C Booth and D Squires The Negligence Liability of Public Authorities (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2006) 251-252. 
139
 Le Roy note 81 supra at 80. 
140
 This has been codified in Article 257 of the Jordanian Civil Code. See also Article 887 of Al-Majallah and 
Le Roy note 81 supra at 80. 
141
 Musleh-ud-deen note 1 supra at 56 and Le Roy note 81 supra at 80. 
142
 Al-Khafeef note 102 supra at 65 and Az-Zuhayli1 note 36 supra at 27. 
143
 Le Roy note 81 supra at 80. 
144
 Articles 918 and 920 of Al-Majallah. 
145
 Vogel note 9 supra at 128. 
Ch 4 The Main Principles of Delict in Saudi Law 
 98
in all cases of direct causation, is that not only is the act causing harm directly attributable 
(without intervention of anyone or anything else) to the defender, but also, the harm done 
is immediate.  
 
It is important to note that some contemporary scholars of the Hanafi School of 
jurisprudence hold the view that there can be liability for directly caused harm even 
without the existence of Ta’ady.146 To put it in another way, on this view Ta’ady is only 
required in cases of indirectly caused harm but not in cases of directly caused harm. 
However, this view appears to contradict the general view of classic Islamic jurists. As 
discussed earlier with regard to Ta’ady, they stipulate that for establishing delictual 
liability the action causing the damage must be in breach of the legal duty not to cause 
unjustified harm and this applies to both direct and indirect causation without distinction.  
 
In addition, Islamic jurists exclude the exceptions of liability such as the consent of victim 
and self defence. In all such cases the harm can be directly caused. However, there is no 
ground for liability as explained earlier. The connection to the act in cases of directly 
caused harm is explicit in the correct ascription of the action to the defender because of the 
absence of a mediator or intervener between the act and the harm that results. Islamic 
jurists did not need to provide further explanation or make a stipulation of Ta’ady as it is 
inherent in the direct act that causes harm without right or legal justification. Therefore, 
there is no need for further discussion and analysis as in the case of indirectly caused 
harm.147   
 
4.5.3.2 Indirect Causation  
 
On the other hand, harm can also be caused indirectly or in a preparatory manner, Tasabub. 
As Vogel states, ‘Causation is indirect when between the act and the injury lies a chain of 
causation.’148 In such cases, there is an obvious prospect for harm to occur by the 
‘preparatory’ conduct even though this does not happen immediately the act is concluded 
unlike direct causation. Thus, it is the effect of the preparatory conduct not the conduct 
itself that causes harm to the claimant. For instance, if A falls into a hole dug by B without 
right or legal justification resulting in an injury to A, it is the hole that led to the fall and 
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subsequent harm to A.149 Vogel, like other modern writers explains that the requirement for 
establishing indirect causation is the location of ‘fault’ in the conduct of the defender. 
According to him:  
 
for harms of indirect causation, liability depends on showing fault. The 
criterion of fault is whether the injurious act in some way trespasses against 
the shari’a (which includes general moral duty) as in placing a stone in the 
public road or digging a well on another’s property. Very often, the fault 
consists of negligence, but that usually is not stated expressly.150    
 
It is interesting to note that what Vogel referred to here as ‘fault’ is not the western sense of 
the term but rather, Ta’ady as discussed above since his explication clearly envisaged 
breach of legal norm as conceived by the Shari’ah. So, then, it is most appropriate to state 
that what will be required to establish liability in cases involving indirectly caused harm, is 
to trace the harm to the initial preparatory conduct of the defender.151 
 
The question then is, what constitutes the difference between direct and indirect causation 
of harm? In theory, the difference between direct and indirect causation is that where the 
former is immediate, the latter can be properly regarded as ‘preparatory’152 thus requiring 
some form of tracing in order to establish liability or otherwise of the alleged defender. The 
analysis offered by Musleh-ud-deen serves to make the point clearer: 
 
 If one fact directly brings about another fact as its legal result, the former is 
regarded as a direct and effective cause of the latter. If, on the other hand, 
one fact leads to another not directly and immediately but remotely, the one 
that leads to another is called “sababi” or preparatory cause of the other. 153 
 
This point about a preceding act may still leave some confusion as to how to identify cases 
of indirect causation since there will always be events or actions preceding the most 
immediate cause. Fortunately, the similarity between Islamic law of delict on this issue 
with Scots and English law is useful for making the point clearer. This is in relation to the 
operation of the ‘but for’ test applicable in Scots and English law. This is with regard to the 
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distinction between direct and indirect causation. As will be further discussed below, the 
form of direct causation under Islamic law is properly captured in the Scots and English 
law requirement of causation in fact. Specifically, in Islamic law, direct causation (as 
distinct from indirect causation) only requires the positive establishment of the ‘but-for’ 
test with the additional layer of immediacy in the harm for which compensation is sought. 
Also in relation to indirect causation, in Islamic law, like in Scots and English law, the 
chain of causation must remain unbroken to establish the liability of the defender; an 
intervener’s action may act to negate liability. 
 
In some cases the harm may result from more than one cause. Some scholars hold the view 
that in such cases, the liability for delict will be fixed only on the party that directly caused 
the harm. 154 An example that is usually given in the literature is where A digs a well in the 
public highway and B prods C’s animal, thereby causing the animal to fall in to well, 
leading to the death of the animal. In the circumstances, B is responsible for the death of 
the animal and no liability rests with the person who dug the well. 155 On this view, the 
justification for the approach is the override that occurs in terms of the liability for the 
actual damage suffered by the claimant.  
 
It is relevant to note that there is a view of some Hanafi scholars that Ta’amud intention or 
deliberation is a requirement for establishing liability for indirectly caused harm.156 
However, this is contested on the basis that the concept of intent (Ta’amud) is foreign to 
the Islamic law of obligations. What the court examines where a delict is committed is 
whether unjustified harm has resulted from the conduct of the alleged defender. Similarly, 
in cases of alleged breach of contract, the court examines whether the contract was actually 
breached or not, rather than the intent of a party.157 Conversely, intent plays a significant 
and functional role in criminal law, as particularly evident in homicide cases through 
recognition and differentiation between murder and manslaughter.  Hence, it is the general 
principle for instance that Islamic Law in this area holds a person with diminished liability 
such as of unsound mind liable for delictual conduct.158 It is apt at this point to consider the 
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issue of vicarious liability as well as corporate liability especially since the study centres on 
delictual liability of the state which necessarily acts through its servants and agents.  
 
4.6 Vicarious Liability 
 
As stated earlier, the general rule on liability for delict is personal liability. However, the 
question is does Islamic law recognise what is analogous to vicarious liability and if it 
does, is this as exception to the basic rule? Some writers have suggested that it does.159 
They cite in reference an authenticated Hadith (sayings) of the Prophet: 
 
Everyone of you is a guardian and is responsible for his charge, the Imam 
(ruler) is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects, the man is a 
guardian in the affairs for his family and responsible for his charges, a 
woman is guardian of her husband’s house and responsible for her charge, 
and the servant is a guardian of his master’s property and is responsible for 
his charge.’160  
 
However, while it can be argued that Islamic law does recognise what is equivalent to 
vicarious liability -particularly in the context of the master-servant, employer-employee 
relationship -, it is very doubtful that this Hadith is the appropriate authority for that 
proposition. Rather, this Hadith should be understood as stipulating that the responsibility 
of the guardian mentioned in it is the duty to look after the welfare of those under his care 
and secure their rights. It does not mean an obligation to bear their delictual liability. 
According to a leading scholar of the science of Hadith, Imam Sharafadeen An-Nawawi, 
‘the guardian [in this Hadith] is the trustee and protector of the well-being of those he is 
responsible for. Therefore, each person entrusted with the care of anyone or anything is 
required to do so fairly, in order to safeguard their religious and worldly interest.’161 Where 
there is failure of the duty, then, there is room to attach liability to the respective 
‘guardian.’ Otherwise, there is no automatic liability for the conduct of the ward where the 
guardian has fulfilled his obligation as trustee.162  
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The expression ‘vicarious liability’ does not occur in the work of the classic Islamic jurists. 
However they recognise the liability for animals of the owner for harm caused by his 
animals and the liability of the master for harm caused by his servant.163 The latter at least 
may be thought of as a type of vicarious liability. In any event, although the general 
principle is not to bear the burdens of others, this is not interpreted so strictly as there is 
conventional vicarious liability as in the master and servant relationship. 
 
Importantly too, Islamic law allows an exception to personal liability for securing 
compensation in manslaughter cases. In manslaughter cases, Islamic law provides for 
payment of compensation in peaceful settlement of the crime to the victim’s heirs. This is 
known as the Diyah, blood money. The Qur’an states in this regard: ‘And whoever kills a 
believer by mistake, it is ordained that he should free a believing slave and pay blood- 
money to the deceased’s family unless they remit it freely.’164 The obligation of 
compensation may be difficult or even impossible to enforce where the offender has 
limited resources. This obligation is then extended to the ‘aqilah of the offender. The 
‘aqilah, refers to a person's kin, his relatives collectively. The ‘aqilah is required to 
contribute a portion of the Diyah in the bid to ensure compensation to the heirs of the 
deceased. It is relevant to note two points regarding the ‘aqilah. The first is how it 
embodies the adoption of a cultural practice which was adopted by Islam from Arab 
custom. The second is that only adult, male members of the ‘aqilah, who can afford to 
contribute are obligated to do so in making up the compensation.165 It is of interest to note 
that legitimation for the contemporary practice of Islamic insurance, Takaful, can be 
located in the mechanism of ‘aqilah and diyah.166 According to Manjoo: 
 
Takaful… is inspired from the ’aqilah and diyah systems whereby people of 
a given tribe would come to the financial rescue of one of its members 
should he face an unexpected liability such as paying for the blood money 
(diyah).167 
 
Moreover, the sources of Islamic law also provide in clear times for what is equivalent to 
vicarious liability for damage or injury caused by animals in certain circumstances. For 
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instance a Hadith states that ‘It is the duty of the owners of the property to keep and protect 
their property in the day time, while it is the duty of the owners of animals to keep them 
(from trespassing) at night. If any injury is committed by animals at night, its liability shall 
be borne by their owners.’168 Likewise, another Hadith states that ‘He who stationed an 
animal on one of the roads of the Muslims or in one of their markets and the animal injures 
somebody with its fore legs or hind legs is liable.’169 This principle came up for 
consideration by the General Court in N v B.170 The claimant claimed that a third party (a 
customer) rented a car from their car-rental enterprise. The client crashed the car into the 
defender’s camels at 7 pm as the animals were crossing a road. As a result, the car 
sustained damage estimated by the traffic-agency at thirty-three thousand Saudi Riyals as 
the depreciation value of the car following the accident. The traffic-agency decided that the 
responsibility for the incident fell exclusively on the defender. The defender accepted the 
liability. Since the defender agreed and accepted the claimant’s claim, the court ordered 
him to pay the depreciated value of the car.  
 
In another case, S v R171 the claimant claimed that fire broke out in the shop where he 
worked as a result of negligence on the part of workers at the defender’s establishment 
where they were welding an air-conditioner’s frame. A spark shot through a hole down to 
the basement of the shop, resulting in a fire that burnt the claimant’s entire body. The 
claimant demanded that the defender should be made to pay for his treatment in 
compliance with Islamic Law. In response, the defender stated that his establishment was 
not responsible for the fire and its cause, directly or indirectly.  
 
The court wrote to a hospital for consideration and clear definition of the injuries and 
disabilities sustained by the claimant, so expert injury valuations could be worked out. It 
was argued for the claimant that the defender was liable because the fire broke out in the 
course of the defender’s workers’ work-hours, and hence he is responsible for their 
actions.172  The claim was upheld. According to the court, one of the principles of Shar’iah 
is ‘gains carry losses’ or ‘profits offsets costs’. This means that the establishment’s owner 
is responsible for his workers’ actions as they carry out their duties just as he benefits from 
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their work financially. Therefore, he must put in place appropriate safety measures during 
the work so as to avoid all harm.173 
 
The court went further to state that the general interest of society requires that each 
establishment’s owner must be held responsible for such incidents as this arising from 
work undertaken by his worker or employees. This is the spirit and principle of Shar’iah 
which aims to protect people physically and financially. People’s lives would not be 
appropriately safeguarded unless wrong-doers are held to account for negligence 
occasioned in the course of executing a contract or other form of paid work. However, the 
court also stated that the defender has the right to sue the worker or workers whose neglect 
caused this accident and damage leading to loss he suffered from compensation paid out by 
his establishment.174 
 
4.7 Corporate Liability  
 
It is important to examine the operation of the general rule in the age of the corporation and 
the institution and powers of the state. Saudi Law grants the status of juristic persons to 
corporations in a similar way to western countries. The establishment and operation of 
various types of businesses and companies is provided for and regulated by the Saudi 
Companies Law.175 In the same way as in Scots and English corporation law, the Saudi 
Companies Law regards the acts of the employees of the corporation as that of the 
corporation. 176 Like in Scots and English law, the corporation is treated in the same way as 
a private individual and the act of the servants or employees in the course of their 
employment is attributed to the corporation unless the servants exceed their authority. This 
follows the classic formulation of what amounts to corporate liability in Islamic law.  
 
Although the term ‘corporate liability’ is not found explicitly by Islamic jurists, an 
equivalent concept was developed through which public bodies, and eventually 
corporations came to be seen as legal entities, with legal rights. The doctrine of dhimmah 
‘a presumed or imaginary repository that contains all the rights and obligations relating to a 
person’177 can refer to a human person or other entity associated with (i.e. maintained by) 
human persons. It was out of the necessity of public interests, al-Maslaha al-Mursalah, 
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that the public institutions like trusts and charities (waqf), orphanages, hospitals, mosques 
and treasuries (bait al mal) were seen to have an associated ‘dhimmah’ and therefore a 
legal status. As without this juristic personality ‘such entities will find immense obstacles 
in performing their rights and duties and become de facto redundant.’178 However, over 
time as these institutions grew, having such a juristic personality became the norm, e.g. 
through established waqf ministries in the case of trusts. 179  
 
According to the classic jurist, Ibn Qudammah, state officials represent the people as 
agents. The wrongdoing of the agent is borne by the principal being represented by the 
agent.180 In Islamic jurisprudence, a public officer is a representative of the nation or 
government in whatever he is tasked with. Carrying out his duties, within the boundaries of 
common good and public benefit, his actions are actually government actions. Hence, any 
wrong-doing, in such circumstances, are not his personal wrong. Any compensation 
incurred therefore is guaranteed by the government, and is payable from its treasury. This 
is because a public officer works for the good of society or the nation as a whole, and to 
achieve public benefit for all citizens. Thus his wrong is carried by them and so is any 
compensation. The leader is responsible for any public-duty actions of his subordinates that 
may cause harm or damage to any citizen. Compensation in such cases is guaranteed and is 
payable from the state treasury as stated in the previous chapter regarding the action of the 
Prophet as well some of his successors in relation to the wrongs committed by state 
officials like soldiers and tax-collectors. This is cited in proving the state’s liability for its 
public officers’ actions, since they are regarded as representatives of the Muslim public, 
and since an officer’s mistakes or wrongs will increase with his increased duties and 
actions. Indeed, the concept of corporate liability, it can be argued, is the basis for state 
liability for delict.  
 
4.8 Comparison between Saudi Law and Scots Law 
 
This section takes forward one of the objectives of this study, namely the comparison, 
where relevant, of aspects of Scots law and Saudi law.  The first part generally compares 
various issues around the key concepts relating to the scope of liability for delict between 
the two systems. The second focuses on the relevance of the difference between the key 
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concepts of Ta’ady and fault as elements of delict in the respective systems and the 
implications of each for liability. 
 
4.8.1 Scope of Liability in Saudi and Law and Scots Law- Some 
Remarks 
 
It has been stated above that the recognition of delictual liability in Islamic law stems 
largely from the declaration of the Prophet affirming the inviolability or respect for life, 
property, health and honour of every person. Interestingly, some scholars of Scots law have 
noted how these same principles are the very foundations and nature of delict in Scots law 
from its Roman origins in actio legis acquiliae and action injuriarium. 181  
 
Again, in broad terms, it can be said that the key constitutive elements of delict in Islamic 
Law, Ta’ady, Darar and Ifdah are similar to the essentials of delict as identified by 
scholars of Scots private law.182 At least the key elements in their essence can be said to 
approximate the concepts of breach of legal duty not to cause unjustified harm, harm and 
causation. However, differences of scope and application may result in sometimes 
substantial difference in the determination or otherwise, of liability for delict within the 
two systems of law.    
 
The discussion above on the concept of Ta’ady (which approximates to breach of legal 
duty in Scots Law not to cause unjustified harm) provides insight on how an otherwise 
similar basic concept may result in a wider or more limited liability in two different legal 
systems. In considerations of Ta’ady some acts which do not require any proof of 
individual fault (in the western sense) constitute the basis of liability. In other words, they 
are basically considered ‘wrongous’ in the sense of that word in the Scots law of delict.183 
However, while delict in Islamic law can be properly said to share this aspect of the 
commission of a wrong with Scots and English law, liability in Islamic law for delict is 
broader than in Scots and English law. A major difference in this regard as discussed above 
is how liability attaches to persons who lack full capacity.  
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There appears to be convergence between Islamic law and Scots and English law with 
regard to persons of full capacity. It does appear as if they will generally only be liable for 
actions over which they have control. There are exceptions to this in Islamic law, for 
example, a person of full capacity will be liable for damage caused while sleeping. 
However, most instances of liability appear to relate to ‘wrongful’ conduct of a type the 
liable person has chosen to engage in. Thus, while there is a different notion of legal 
responsibility operating with Islamic law having a wider notion of legal responsibility for 
delictual harm, there will often be similar outcomes in respect of liability. This is arguably 
so because not only will many situations which are actionable in negligence in Scotland or 
England also be actionable in Saudi Arabia, conceivably, most incidences of delictual 
liability will originate from the wrongful conduct of persons with full legal capacity. 
 
Another interesting issue for consideration is Ifdah and causation as elements of Saudi Law 
and Scots and English Law respectively.  Causation has two aspects in Scots and English 
law;184 factual or actual causation, and legal causation, also referred to as cause in law or 
remoteness of damage.185 Factual causation refers to the requirement to satisfy the ‘but for’ 
test. In cases where the damage in issue has resulted from multiple causes, the courts adopt 
the ‘but-for cause’ test to determine factual causation. In other words, the claimant is 
required to establish that ‘but for’ for the negligent act of the defender s/he would not have 
suffered the injury or harm for which compensation is sought. This is to ensure that the 
defender is held liable only for the harm (s) his/her action caused the claimant.186 It is the 
principle that the cause, the action of the defender, must be one that can be connected to 
the injury suffered by the claimant. As Weir stated, the principle may be regarded as quite 
straightforward. It involves ‘imagining a counterfactual’ situation. The question to be 
posed is basically whether the harm suffered by the claimant would still have occurred ‘if 
the defender behaved properly.’187 If the harm would have occurred, the defender is usually 
absolved at this stage. But this is not always the case.188 The standard of proof required is 
that of the balance of probabilities.189 Once factual causation is established, the courts 
proceed to examine legal causation. 
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 Legal causation also referred to as remoteness of damage, is the requirement that the 
claimant establishes that the damage which he suffered is sufficiently connected to the act 
or omission of the defendant as to result from it. In other words, the harm must not be one 
that is too remote a consequence of the defender’s wrongdoing.190 To achieve this, the 
claimant has to show that the damage suffered that which is a reasonably foreseeable result 
of the negligent conduct of the defender. Further, the ‘chain of causation’, the nexus 
between the negligent act and the harm must not have been broken, otherwise liability will 
not lie with the defender.191 As stated earlier, under Islamic law, there are two forms of 
causation; direct and indirect, compared to the two requirements in Scots and English law. 
However, it is suggested that the two requirements of causation in Scots and English law 
provide a useful frame for analysing the forms of causation or causal connection in Islamic 
law discussed below. 
 
It is suggested that the form of direct causation under Islamic law is properly captured in 
the Scots and English law requirement of causation in fact. In other words, direct causation 
only requires the positive establishment of the ‘but-for’ test with the additional layer of 
immediacy in the resulting damage. The key point to note in all cases of direct causation, is 
that not only is the act causing harm directly attributable (without intervention of anyone or 
anything else) to the defender, but also, the harm done is immediate. Looking at Scots and 
English law in this regard, the question of remoteness of damage is not at all in issue. The 
basis of liability here is that the impact of the direct act of the defender caused immediate 
harm. Once both are present and the resulting damage is in violation of the duty not to 
cause unjustified harm, liability attaches automatically.  
 
As stated earlier, recourse to Scots and English law requirements on causation can help in 
understanding the nature of indirect causation in Islamic law too. Like direct causation, it is 
required to satisfy the ‘but for’ test. As in Scots and English law, the court also goes further 
in the Islamic system to enquire whether there is a link between the ‘preparatory’ act and 
the damage that was suffered by the claimant. This is to establish whether the act in 
question was in breach of the duty not to cause unjustified harm. Specifically, the delay or 
time-lag between the defender’s act and the occurrence of harm raises uncertainty about 
the liability or otherwise of the defender. As a result, there is a semblance of an inquiry 
similar to that, even if not a total one, carried out under Scots and English law on legal 
causation; the remoteness of damage. This is because, like in Scots and English law, to 
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establish the liability of the defender, the chain of causation must be intact. Where the 
chain has been broken due to the act of an intervener, there may be no liability. 
 
Finally on the issue of causation, the justification under Islamic law for the liability of an 
intervener discussed above can be usefully compared with the position of the law under 
Scots and English law with similar results. If the facts of the example mentioned earlier on 
the act of a person (B) who prods another’s animal (C) into a well dug by A on the public 
highway are related to Scots and English law, it is possible to categorise this as an example 
of a break in the chain of causation. The intervention of B, namely by illegally causing the 
animal to fall into the well, effectively breaks the chain of causation. Thus there is room to 
suggest some congruence in the effect of the application of aspects of key concepts within 
the two legal systems despite the scope for divergence of results due to their differences. 
Fault is a very influential concept in considerations of various forms of delictual liability. It 
is relevant to now turn to a consideration of its place in Saudi Law of delict.  
 
4.8.2 Delict and Ideas of Fault: The Influence and Extent of its Role in 
Saudi Law 
 
The role of fault is a key issue in Scots and English law. It has also found its way into the 
Saudi Law of delict, even if notionally. Fault has been referred to by many Arab legal 
systems as Khata. It is important to examine the extent of its influence and relevance in 
Saudi Law in view of the references to it as well its implicit connection with the concept of 
negligence. The issue of Khata it will be argued has clouded judicial analysis of the 
concept of Ta’ady in contemporary adjudication in virtually all Arab countries with 
specific regard to delictual liability. The history and influence of the concept as well as its 
influence on the Arab Civil Codes and Saudi Law on delict will be considered below.  
 
4.8.2.1 The meaning of Khata in Arabic language and Islamic law 
 
Khata literarily means mistake192 and its literal opposite is ‘Amd ‘intentional.’ It is a 
fundamental principle of Islamic Law that acts of worship are judged by intent, something 
regarded as being entirely in the realm of the spiritual and determinable only by the 
Supreme Creator, Allah, for whom such acts must be sincerely directed. This is the case 
even where the physical manifestation of the intention is different to the observer. The 
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Prophet stated that ‘the reward of deeds depends upon the intention and every person will 
get the reward according to what s/he has intended’193 this position is restated in a number 
of places in the Qur’an. For instance, ‘there is no sin on you concerning that in which you 
made a mistake (Khatatum), except in regard to what your hearts deliberately intend 
(ta‘amadat qulubukum).’194  
 
It is from this juxtaposition of an intentional against an unintentional act that Islamic law 
jurists refer to and use the term Khata; a mistaken act without intention and thus, no 
liability (from the spiritual perspective). But there is another sense too in which the 
classical scholars used Khata, and this is to denote intention or absence of it in homicide 
cases. Where the mental state in a homicide is described as Khata, this is regarded as 
manslaughter. In other words, where there is a mistake or generally where an absence of 
intention to kill or cause death is inferable from the facts, the classical (and modern) 
scholars of Islamic law return a verdict of manslaughter. On the other hand, where it is 
determined that the facts disclose intention to kill or cause death, meaning there is no 
Khata, the verdict is murder. The supplanting of this word from the French influence (a 
point which will be returned to below), in fact gives a totally different doctrinal meaning to 
Khata as used in the Arab countries like Egypt that imported it into their civil codes. 
 
Beyond linguistic preferences however, there is the more fundamental issue of replacing 
the term Ta’ady with the term Khata as the conceptual basis of liability. It has led to 
complications in understanding the doctrinal basis of liability in Islamic law of delict. It is 
enough here to state that Khata is not one of the elements of the Islamic Law of delict both 
in its literal and technical meaning. It is curious that Khata, mistake, a recognised basis for 
‘no responsibility’ (from the spiritual perspective) came to be regarded as the fundamental 
basis of liability in delict (and contract) in those countries. In other words, the meaning 
placed on Khata in those codes has assumed a fundamentally different concept from what 
is understood by the use of the same term by Islamic law jurists. 
 
4.8.2.2 The use of Khata in many Arab Countries 
 
As stated earlier, fault as the essential basis of liability for delict has been adopted by the 
law of some Arab countries, most notably Egypt.195 The situation as regards the nature of 
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the breach of a legal norm is well captured by the statement of the position of relevant laws 
in many Arab countries today particularly where (as is commonly the case) civil liability 
has been codified. Such codes refer to Khata, fault, as an element of delictual liability. 
According to Amkhan, the ‘earlier codes’ of civil liability proceed on the view that ‘fault 
per se’ is an indispensable requirement for liability.196  
 
These codes, best represented by the Egyptian Civil Code, do not however define Khata. 
The duty of defining it has been left to legal writers and the courts. Legal writers have 
adopted the view that fault as conceived by those codes is ‘an abnormal conduct that a 
normal person would not follow’ if placed in the position of ‘the author of the damage.’ 
The courts in such jurisdictions, it has been noted, have also been known to adopt the same 
view. The hallmark of this position is that fault, ‘in its subjective manifestation,’ with only 
limited exceptions, is regarded as a prerequisite for establishing liability in delict.197   
 
The opposing view on the nature of liability as stated earlier is the objective theory. 
Amkhan states that this is found in ‘more recently enacted codes’ on civil liability in some 
Arab countries. Jordan is an example of this. For these codes ‘it is sufficient’ he notes, ‘for 
liability to arise, that an act or omission has caused the damage in question.’ Musleh-ud-
deen198 agrees with Amkhan that this is the classic position on the nature of delictual 
liability in classic Islamic Law.199 However, as it has been indicated above, the correct 
statement of the law appears to be that unjustified harm characterises delictual liability in 
Islamic law. It is on this interpretation that the objective view can be considered an 
accurate statement of the position of the law on this point.   
 
As Amkhan has rightly observed, the supplanting of certain terms has brought some 
confusion to the jurisprudence of the law of delict in Arab countries. It has led to the 
situation whereby the ‘Arabic legal literature’ on the nature of civil liability basically 
‘repeats the doctrinal discourse which exists among French writers.’200 This is the case 
with the supplanting in some cases of the term Khata for Ta’ady in the jurisprudence of the 
Board. Suffice it to say at this point that the Board’s use of the term can be considered 
redundant more than anything else when subjected to critical analysis as will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
                                                 
196
 Ibid.  
197
 Ibid. at 171-173. 
198
 Musleh-ud-deen note 1 supra at 53. 
199
 Amkhan note 37 supra at 173. 
200
 Ibid at 171. 
Ch 4 The Main Principles of Delict in Saudi Law 
 112
Amkhan’s observation is significant because it indicates the source of the apparent 
confusion in some of the Board’s judgements; the introduction of a foreign element into the 
jurisprudence of Islamic Law on civil liability as a whole due to historical factors. The 
supplanting is traceable to the training of the pioneer scholars of law and legal studies in 
some Arab countries by French teachers. Even more significant is the fact that these 
teachers collaborated with some of their best Arab students to codify the civil law of those 
countries as borne out by the process of codification of the Civil Code of Egypt.201 Vogel 
has made the important point that while some Muslim countries like Turkey, Syria, 
Lebanon and Jordan at one time or the other used the Majalla, a codification of Islamic 
civil laws for some period in their colonial history, Egypt did not. It rather adopted a civil 
code ‘inspired by the French civil code for its National Courts in 1883.’202 
 
With specific reference to Saudi Law, it is relevant to note the place of fault in 
considerations of delictual liability on two fronts; cases between private persons/bodies and 
those between individuals/private persons and the state/public authorities. The observations 
here relate mainly to the first category of cases. The second category, determined by the 
Board, is considered in the next chapter. First, it must be acknowledged (as some judges of 
the Shari’ah Court pointed out to the researcher),203 that claims of delictual liability 
between private persons are quite few and far between. Secondly, the cases which are 
determined by the General Courts are not reported. However, from the few available cases, 
and certainly from those considered in this chapter, it is apparent that the General Courts 
do not at all use or refer to the term Khata  as an element of delictual liability.   
 
While admittedly, the term Ta’ady itself does not appear in the cases, the General Courts, 
on close consideration of their reasoning in determining delictual liability do not limit the 
basis of the breach of a legal duty to fault, but rather generally investigate whether the 
conduct in issue amounts to breach of a duty not to cause unjustified harm; Ta’ady. Thus, 
unlike in most of decisions of the Board, as will be discussed later, it can be argued that 
Khata is alien both in notion and substance to the cases of delictual liability between 
private parties as decided by the General Courts. Furthermore, it has been advanced that 
the use of the term Khata can, and has actually led to some confusion in the jurisprudence 
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on delictual liability. The nature of the confusion that can arise will become apparent in the 
discussion of cases of lawfully caused but unjustified loss in the next chapter. 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to present an insight into the main principles of delict under 
Saudi law. Delictual liability as an aspect of civil liability is a fundamental feature of 
Islamic Law and has three elements Ta’ady, Darar and Ifdah each of which must be 
established to sustain a claim for liability. A crucial point that emerges from consideration 
of the main principles of Islamic law of delict is the complex nature of the concept of 
Ta’ady which is a principal element for establishing liability in this area of law. This 
complexity derives in part from the very nature of Islamic law as a religious one which 
integrates moral norms into legal duty. A direct result of this integration is the way it 
overrides the distinction in Scots and English law between acts that are considered 
voluntary or intentional and therefore attributable to an actor with those that would be 
considered non-voluntary and thus incapable of grounding liability.  
 
A related point which the foregoing discussion brings to mind is that all legal systems, and 
certainly, in the law of delict, choices are made between competing values. The Islamic 
legal system is no different in prioritising certain values over another. With specific regard 
to delict, the value of choice, it appears, is to ensure that unjustified harm, even where it 
emanates from those with diminished liability, must attract compensation. This is based on 
the notion of justice in Islamic law which emphasises an even-handed approach in 
achieving the objective of social harmony promoted as a cardinal feature of the Muslim 
society. Thus, just as those with diminished responsibility are entitled to compensation for 
harm, they are contra-wise liable for the unjustified harm resulting from their conduct. In 
addition, it is common to find that in cases where a crime is suspected to have been 
committed, the right to individual liberty is somewhat compromised with the detention 
pending or during trial based on a range of considerations despite the principle of a person 
being deemed innocent until proven guilty.  
 
On questions of liability, the investigation turns generally on whether the conduct of the 
defender has resulted in unjustified harm. From the discussion above it is clear that 
delictual liability in Islamic law is not restricted to fault as obtains in Scots and English 
law.  However, it is also interesting to note that most of the situations in which liability 
would be established in Scots and English law either on the basis of negligence or on the 
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basis of some intentional wrongs would also lead to liability in Saudi law. The result is 
often a finding that demonstrates the important place of fault because of the nature of a 
good number of the cases. However, as stated earlier, a finding of liability does not and 
need not always turn on a determination of fault at all. The difference between the two 
systems in this regard derives essentially from the wider reach of the concept of Ta’ady. 
 
With regard to the role of fault in the Islamic law of delict particularly in comparison with 
Scots and English law, the position is that the concept of Ta’ady takes its place and is 
wider than fault. In other words, what constitutes Ta’ady inasmuch as it represents the 
breach of a legal duty not to cause unjustified harm will in a good number of cases simply 
amount to an instance of fault under Scots and English law. However, it is critical that 
Ta’ady, and this is the point of departure from Scots and English law, is wider. It includes 
case in which liability would not be established in Scots and English law. This includes 
cases in which the delictual liability of persons of unsound mind and children will be 
upheld because their conduct, though not constituting fault because of their diminished 
responsibility (as would be upheld in Islamic criminal law for instance) does amount to 
causing unjustified harm. This is also the case sometimes even with persons of full 
capacity whose acts may have been involuntary or unconscious but whose conduct results 
in unjustified harm to the claimant. Examples have been given on this with regard to a 
sleeping person whose acts results in unjustified harm (loss).   
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Chapter Five: Delictual Liability of the State and the 
Decisions of the Board of Grievances 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
An important point that has emerged from the examination of the nature and basic elements 
of delictual liability in Islamic Law in the previous chapter is that delictual liability appears 
to be essentially victim-focused. There is considerable emphasis on the need to ensure 
compensation for unjustified harm, irrespective of what is considered ‘fault’ in the western 
perspective. In other words, there appears to be substantial emphasis on ensuring 
compensation for breach of a legal norm not to cause unjustified harm even in cases where 
ordinarily legal responsibility would not be attributed to the defender in a fault-based 
system.  
 
This chapter describes and analyses delictual liability of public authorities in Saudi law. It 
investigates the application of the concept and principles of delictual liability in Saudi 
Arabia law in claims made against public authorities. This is based on the analysis of a 
number of selected judicial decisions of the Board of Grievances and also draws on 
relevant references to Scots and English law as appropriate. The conceptual framework for 
the analysis that follows is derived from Scots and English law. It is important to note that 
this conceptual framework is different from that which has generally been used to explain 
non-contractual liability in Islamic law adjudicatory system as generally practiced and 
specifically, in the case of Saudi Arabia. However, it provides a useful tool for analysing 
and evaluating the law in Saudi Arabia. 
 
In discussing decisions of the Board of Grievances, an attempt has been made to analyse 
the extent to which decisions are consistent with the sources on delictual liability, and 
whether it is applying the same rules as are applied in disputes between citizens. As 
discussed in the last chapter, in theory, it is expected that if the Board is deciding cases 
consistently with the sources, it should apply the same rules to cases involving public 
bodies as are applied in disputes between citizens. With this in mind, wherever possible an 
attempt is made in the discussion of cases, to hypothesize whether the same outcome 
would have been achieved if an analogous dispute had arisen between private citizens. 
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The discussion below reveals that in comparison with Scots and English law, the state of 
the law on delictual liability in Saudi Arabia is at a relatively elementary stage. Thus most 
cases that have arisen in Saudi Arabia would be considered as straightforward examples of 
liability posing no great difficulties of analysis in Scots or English law, and there have not 
been equivalents of many of the types of claim that have been made in the UK, for 
example, claims against state child protection services arising from alleged negligent 
performance of statutory functions. However, the fast pace of economic development, the 
continued expansion of government provision of social welfare services and an increasing 
awareness of ordinary people in this age of globalisation is likely to generate more 
sophisticated types of delictual claims against the state. Thus there will be some 
engagement with possible cases that may arise in the future which the court would have to 
handle in terms of the principles of Islamic law, as required of them. 
 
A close look at the workload of the Board of Grievances reveals that claims for 
unintentional delict or more specifically, what would be considered claims for negligence 
in Scots or English law, dominate the cases brought against public authorities in Saudi 
Arabia. Although there are no reliable statistics, preliminary investigation shows that most 
of the claims are against local authorities in the discharge of their functions. As stated in 
chapter two, these functions include physical development and beautification of cities and 
towns, maintenance of public hygiene and promotion of general well-being. Others involve 
licensing, monitoring and regulation of businesses as well as constructing and maintaining 
public parks, gardens, public swimming pools and related amenities. Another line of cases 
that feature prominently in the case-load of the Board are those against security agents for 
alleged unlawful detention. 
 
The researcher recognises and acknowledges the apparent divergence in the historical and 
social context of the jurisdictions and the need for caution in applying his chosen approach, 
the model of Scots and English law.  Consequently, it is important to note from the onset 
that the categorisation provided in this regard by Scots and English law is strictly of 
comparative and analytical value. An important justification for this research that is at least 
implied throughout the study is the fact that the current practice and application of the 
Islamic law of delict in Saudi Arabia (and indeed other jurisdictions where Islamic law is 
central to the judicial system) lacks a means of systematic presentation. This thesis is 
therefore a significant attempt at reviewing, in a critical and systematic way, the current 
practice of the Board of Grievances in relation to its adjudication of cases involving 
delictual liability of public authorities in Saudi Arabia. 
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Recourse to the Scots and English model in the course of the foregoing analysis (and what 
follows) principally is to highlight the distinctive features of Islamic law and to provide a 
framework for systematic analysis of the Board’s decisions. However, it is important to 
identify a departure from the Scots and English model adopted here, in one important 
respect; this is in the area of so-called ‘lawfully caused harm’. In this regard, French law 
has been used as the comparator in this study, for the analysis of an important aspect of the 
Board’s decisions. The motivation for this stems from the argument that this particular area 
the French law relating to state liability for administrative or delictual harm is more highly 
developed.  
 
The chapter is divided into three major parts; the first part deals with the nature of delictual 
liability of public authorities. The second part examines the types of delictual liability of 
public authorities. Drawing on the first two parts, the third part considers whether Saudi 
law - based as it is on Islamic law - has been successful in dealing with the liability of 
public authorities and whether it can continue to be successful in future.  
 
5.2 Nature of Delictual Liability of Public Authorities  
 
Public authorities are also referred to as administrative authorities or statutory bodies.1 As 
stated in chapter three, the current position under Saudi Law accords with the definition of 
a public authority given by Booth and Squires as a ‘body whether or not created by statute, 
which exercise powers in the public interest.’2 Public authorities provide services for the 
public as agents of the state. Their employees in the course of performance of their duties 
may commit errors or faults, thereby causing damage to individuals.  
 
It was stated in the introduction that Scots and English law can provide a comparative 
template for the analysis of pubic authority liability in Saudi Arabia. The next section sets 
out the nature of the delictual liability of public authorities under Scots and English law - a 
considerably well-developed system - as a useful starting point to secure understanding of 
this issue. 
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5.2.1 Nature of Delictual Liability of Public Authorities under Scots and 
English Law 
 
To begin, one should understand that Scots and English law are not identical. Although, 
they often have the same result in terms of whether liability is imposed in particular fact- 
situations, there are cases where, although the outcome is the same, the doctrine has 
developed in a different way. There are also situations where the doctrine results in 
different outcome. Scots and English law historically took different approaches to 
categorisation. English law evolved as a series of separate torts. The area which today 
shows the greatest similarity is the law of negligence. In other areas comparing delict to the 
law of torts shows significant differences.3 
 
Public authorities under Scots and English law may be delictually liable for loss arising 
both intentional and unintentional conduct. Intentional delict arises from specific action 
that the doer knows can cause harm to the victim’s person or property. As a result, it is 
easier to establish liability for intentional delict. There are three classes of intentional delict 
namely, delicts relating to persons, delicts relating to property and the economic delicts. 
According to Thomson, the intentional delicts relating to persons include assault which 
protects the bodily integrity of an individual from non-consensual invasion, seduction and 
entrapment which deals with a form of assault that would ordinarily disclose consent but 
where consent was obtained fraudulently. Others are enticement, injuries to liberty which 
deals with unlawful detention, and finally harassment which could be verbal or by 
conduct.4 Intentional delict relating to property consists of delict of heritable (immovable) 
property referred to as trespass to land and delict relating to moveable property which deals 
with interference with moveable properties like vehicles and equipment, the delict of good 
will or passing off and the emerging delict of the duty not to disclose confidential 
information.5 The economic delicts include inducing breach of contract, conspiracy and 
fraud.6  
 
The categories of unintentional delict which are most relevant to public authorities are 
negligence, and breach of statutory duty. In some circumstances there may also be strict 
liability. Special rules apply in certain contexts, e.g. liability for animals, occupier’s 
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liability (i.e. arising from occupation of property). In this chapter, I will concentrate on 
negligence and breach of statutory duty. Fault is at the heart of liability in the law of delict 
in Scots and English law. It is a basic principle of the law of delict and it must always be 
kept in mind when considering the concept. Scots law uses the term ‘culpa’ to describe 
fault whether it is intentional or unintentional but careless conduct that causes harm to 
another.7  As Smith has noted, 
 
Culpa is the basis of all liability for patrimonial loss inflicted through the 
means of human conduct, or through the means of moveables or 
immoveables, for which the defender was responsible.8 
 
Writers as well as judges use the terms ‘culpa’ and ‘negligence’ inter-changeably. They 
generally mean the same thing, the breach of a duty of care which a defender is owed in the 
circumstances of a particular case.9 In order to succeed in a negligence claim, certain 
criteria must be fulfilled by the claimant. These include that the defender owes the claimant 
a duty of care; that this duty has been breached; the breach has caused damage or loss to 
the claimant; and the damage must not be too remote.10 
 
At first sight, the range of unintentional conduct that results in delict would appear quite 
wide. In order to overcome this problem, the law, through the introduction of certain 
principles, has limited the categories of people that can be recognised as suffering from the 
careless acts of another. The most important of these principles is the concept of the duty 
of care.11  The duty of care has been defined as: 
 
 The duty to avoid doing or omitting to do anything, the doing or omitting to 
do which may have as its reasonable and probable consequence injury to 
others, and the duty is owed to those to whom injury may reasonably and 
probably be anticipated if the duty is not observed.12 
 
 The basic statement of the duty of care is the proposition that it is only a person to whom 
the defender owes a duty of care who can sue in delict for harm which results from the 
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careless conduct of the defender.13 Thus, in delict, the existence of a duty of care is central 
to establishing fault. In other words, where there is no duty of care, an obligation to make 
reparation cannot be established though damage or injury has been caused unless the 
liability falls under strict liability. The court will use the test of a ‘reasonable man’ in 
assessing whether there is a duty of care. The test means any person in the position of the 
defender would reasonably foresee that a person in the position of the claimant would be 
affected by the acts or omissions of the defender. However, in applying this principle, the 
court will also be influenced by policy consideration as well as legal principle.14 
 
The current state of the law on the duty of care is generally agreed to have been set out in 
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman (Caparo).15 The House of Lords, in Caparo, introduced 
the tripartite test to limit the category of persons who can claim damages for harm done by 
another’s unintentional acts.16 The tripartite test requires, firstly, foreseeability, secondly, 
proximity of relationship, and finally, it must be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty 
of care in the circumstances.  
 
Breach of statutory duty is a distinct type of liability that arises from the breach of a duty 
created by a statute. The tort is viewed as arising under a statute by virtue of legislative 
intent.17 Under this tort, a claimant must prove four basic elements to sustain an action for 
liability against either a private person (or body) or public authority. The four elements 
have been stated by Howes to be as follows: 
 
(i) That he is one of the class of persons whom the relevant statute is intended to 
protect 
(ii) the duty was specifically imposed on the defender by the statute 
(iii) the duty was breached by the defender 
(iv) the breach of the defender caused the damage in issue.18 
 
There are several possible advantages in suing for breach of statutory duty rather than 
negligence although whether any of these apply depends on the terms of the statute. They 
include that the categories of persons to whom the duty is owed may be broader than the 
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categories who would be owed a duty of care at common law, and there may be no need to 
prove fault or the standard of performance required by the duty may be more exacting than 
the common law standard of due care. 
 
Although the general principle of delict under Scots and English law is ‘no liability without 
fault’ any rules imposing strict liability constitute exceptions.19 Strict liability has been 
defined as ‘forms of liability that do not depend upon proof of fault.’20 Under the concept 
of strict liability, the defender is still held liable for unforeseeable harm despite taking all 
necessary or reasonable care to avoid harm that can be foreseen. This is why liability is 
described as ‘strict.’21 
 
5.2.1.1 Liability of Public Authorities and the Equality and/or Distinctiveness Debate 
 
Generally, under Scots and English law, liability in delict or tort may be established for the 
acts or omissions of administrative authorities in the same way that individuals can be held 
liable for fault. In other words, public authorities and their employees are not exempted 
from civil liability. Employees of public authorities can thus be held liable for breach of the 
general duty of care as established in Donoghue v Stevenson22 and subsequent cases as well 
as other specific duties imposed on classes like occupiers and employers or other 
categories of people specifically provided for under statute.23 This means that private 
parties and public bodies are treated alike by the law of delict. However, since the 1970s 
there has been a debate amongst both judges and scholars in the UK as to whether (i) the 
principles of delictual liability applicable to public authorities are really the same as those 
applicable to private parties, and (ii) whether they ought to be the same.  
 
This is largely because of the tension within the notion of public delict. Delict as an area of 
law has been developed as an aspect of private law in the province of individuals inter se. 
Public authorities on the other hand, are necessarily neither individuals nor private persons. 
While they perform acts which are similar to and may thus result in harm which can be 
done by private persons, public authorities also carry out functions and exercise powers 
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which ‘have no clear analogue in the private sphere.’24 These include powers to make 
decisions to grant or withhold licences, confiscate property, detain people for security and 
related reasons, impose and collect levies, taxes and fines, award and distribute social 
benefits, etc. All of these can be carried out in a way that raises questions of damage or 
harm to individuals or groups. None of these are carried out by private persons.25 Thus, 
they have distinctive functions. Due to the peculiar nature of public authorities, there is 
some dispute as to whether it is appropriate to apply the same principles to public 
authorities as are applied to private persons for delictual liability. The traditional approach 
has been to apply the same principles to both. 26   
 
In recent decades the courts have sometimes seemed to be developing a different approach 
to public bodies, but with a lack of consistency, and this has led to lack of certainty on the 
position of the law on the matter. Academics are divided into three groups. Some consider 
that the private law principles are perfectly adequate to resolve disputes involving public 
bodies, while others claim that the ordinary principles of tort/delict are likely to give 
insufficient protection to public authorities and that special principles are required. Yet 
others hold the view that the ordinary principles of tort/delict give insufficient protection to 
individuals harmed by the actions of public authorities.27 
 
The first view advocates that public authority liability should be treated in the same way as 
private persons. This according to Cornford is based on ‘Dicey’s equality principle’ which 
he argues, has been ‘effectively’ abandoned by the courts except in relation to the issue of 
liability to pay compensation when dealing with delictual liability of public authorities.28 A 
leading proponent of this view was Stephen Bailey29 who has argued that ‘ordinary 
negligence principles’ were adequate for resolving the liability of public authorities once 
‘due regard’ is paid to their ‘special position.’30 Thus, on this view, while public authorities 
do perform functions which were clearly different from ordinary persons, this did not 
justify a restrictive application of torts law to them. If anything, accommodation can and 
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should be found for holding them liable for harm suffered by those who are negatively 
affected in their persons or property by their work.  
 
While proponents of this view concede the sometimes distinctive nature of the functions of 
public authorities, they maintain that the ordinary principles of torts like those of 
negligence for instance contain the required flexibility to maintain the necessary balance 
between the interest of the private claimant and defender public authority. In other words, 
the private tort approach provides mechanisms to protect the claimant’s right to 
compensation for harm while simultaneously taking due account of public authorities 
responsibility to act in the public interest. Thus the introduction of a ‘public law hurdle’ to 
be satisfied by claimants against public authorities, as will be discussed later, has been 
criticised by proponents of this view.31 
 
Bailey and Bowman have criticised the creation and operation of a ‘policy/operational’ 
dichotomy that seeks to impose barriers or restrict the opportunity for securing the liability 
of public authorities for tort in the same way as private persons through the general 
principles of tort.32 Brodie has condemned it as rendering the duty of care owed by public 
authorities ‘superfluous.’ Like Bowman and Bailey, he argues that the imposition of the 
private law position on the duty of care to public authorities is appropriate to achieve the 
same aim of maintaining high standards in service delivery. He emphasises that it is 
‘wholly appropriate to regard the imposition of a duty of care as a legitimate means of 
encouraging holders of powers under statute to exercise due care in deciding when and 
how to make use of them.’33  
 
Holding public authorities liable in torts in accordance with private law rules and practice 
means they are not only accountable, but they also may be obliged to review their practices 
through such challenges to ensure optimal performance. While courts may not view 
damages as the most appropriate remedy, there remains much support for the view that it is 
‘usually the best the law can do.’34 In light of public expectations that public authorities are 
established to serve and ‘protect’ them, there should be no question of the propriety of a 
further expectation that the latter would pay compensation where they fall short of that 
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duty in the same way.35 As with private persons, the liability of public authorities and the 
damages they ought to be mandated to pay for their delictual conduct are amenable to and 
should be subjected to private law. To do otherwise by considering their liability through a 
public law approach is not only unnecessary but undesirable, as it would lead to 
complications. 36 Arguably, such a conclusion is correct, the indecisiveness of the courts on 
which approach to adopt had created complexities and, to an extent, confusion. 
 
As has been indicated above, a second group of scholars hold the view that the ordinary 
principles of tort/delict are likely to give insufficient protection to public authorities and 
that special principles are required. A notable proponent of this view is Tony Weir. 
According to Weir, the ‘extension of government torts…have been bad not only for 
government but for the law of tort as well.’37 Two distinct currents drive the position 
adopted by Weir in his specific focus on torts law and the liability of public authorities in 
the United Kingdom. First is the ‘tension’ between the public and the private sector. 
Second is the ‘tension’ between central and the local government.38 However, as will 
become clear both appear to have the central feature of a concern about (unjustified) cost 
implications on government finances.  
 
On the tension between the public and private sector, Weir is concerned that in recent 
years, many governmental functions have been increasingly ceded to the private sector 
including the provision of health services and even the regulation of activities of the private 
sector. The expectation on the face of such increase is that the private sector will in this 
event bear an increased amount of tort claims arising from this shift since the private sector 
now functions in many more areas hitherto exclusively or largely the province of 
government. Yet, in many instances the structure of torts law, particularly, the operation of 
the concept of subrogation, has led to an increase, rather than a corresponding decrease in 
the liability of government for torts committed properly so to speak, under the watch or by 
the agency of private parties.39 As Weir stated:  
  
at present the law of subrogation and the law of contribution, both the 
products of so-called equity, operate, as equity so often does, against the 
public interest and the public purse, in cases where, if the question were put 
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properly, openly and directly, namely, “Should the authority have to pay 
this person, insurer or tortfeasor, for his economic loss due to the authority’s 
negligence?”  the answer would be an unequivocal “ No.” 40     
 
On the second ‘tension’ he notes that in contrast to former times when power struggle 
between the centre and the constitutive parts resulted in a victory of the centre, the centre 
has become relatively weak while more governmental functions have been ceded to the 
latter. Ironically, while Crown Immunity operates at least to reduce the liability of the 
centre, no such immunity is available to local authorities where most of the ‘action’ takes 
place. As he laments, the result is that ‘local government is much more important than 
central government. Local government may decide less, but it does more, and tort liability 
attaches to people who do rather than to people who decide.’41 To complicate matters, local 
governments are having to progressively reduce their staff while they have more areas, to 
supervise even if notionally, and ensure policy made from the centre is appropriately 
implemented again leading to wider exposure to claims in delict.   
 
Further, Weir makes a direct case against the appropriateness of treating public authority 
liability differently in light of the complex or volume of work they have to handle. He 
considers that the strenuous and, or, specialised nature of those functions indicate a 
restrictive rather than a liberal approach to imposing liability on public authorities 
performing them. The activities of public authorities not only attract claims, but also their 
business is ‘big’. In other words, the range of functions they must administer is 
exceedingly large. Thus, he notes for instance how ‘Birmingham Corporation was 
processing 20,000 requests per year, yet ‘when it got one wrong’, it ‘had to pay for it.’ 
Similarly, while ‘other people and bodies occupy land,’ local authorities do so more than 
any other. Despite their large-scale holdings, unlike others, local authorities ‘make so much 
of their land available for recreational purposes, with no power to exclude liability.’42  
 
In sum, the current developments in the law of torts (and delict) over-burden local 
authorities, at a time when a considerable part of governmental functions are being wholly 
or in part undertaken by private players. Maintaining the current level of development is 
not healthy. Further, Weir concludes that ‘the presence of local authorities as defendants 
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has been bad for the law of tort.’43 It is, however, relevant to note that Weir’s article was 
written in 1989 and the law has moved on since then. 
 
Some scholars hold a third view on the nature of the liability of public authorities for 
delict. This has arisen due to one of two reasons. The first is frustration with the reluctance 
of the courts to move away from the traditional approach of dealing with public authorities 
through the so called ‘Dicey’s equality principle’ discussed above. The other is scepticism 
about the capacity of torts to deal with the liability of public authorities. The view is that a 
distinct mechanism be developed for holding public authorities accountable for harm 
caused in the exercise of their powers and conduct of their duties. It is interesting to note 
that Bailey, as indicated earlier, was one of the strongest advocates of holding public 
authorities accountable through the first approach highlighted in the above paragraphs. He 
does however now seem to concur with this third view of developing or utilising a different 
approach to dealing with the liability of public authorities. Bailey aptly captures the first 
strand of this approach:  
 
 The story thus far does not show the common-law method of developing 
the law in a flattering light. Recurrent features of the case-law include… 
fundamental errors of analysis, the introduction of complex and ultimately 
unworkable sub-principles into the picture and a persistent confusion 
between public and private law principles.44 
 
The considerable resources allocated to litigation on the liability of public authorities both 
by claimants and the public authorities have largely gone to waste as the outcomes have 
‘commonly provided neither the remedy sought by the claimant nor sufficient clarity for 
the future.’45 While the case law has seen some positive development in dealing with the 
liability of public authorities, substantial confusion remains in the case law as to the proper 
approach to dealing with the liability of public authorities. To achieve coherence and 
certainty in this area of law, it has become more pressing to develop appropriate alternate 
mechanisms for compensation arising from the liability of public authorities for harm with 
the benefit of the case law on the matter. This would involve recognition of ‘extra-judicial 
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remedies’ on the part of the courts and the development of a more precise legislative 
regime for public authorities’ liability by Parliament. 46  
 
Perhaps a more formidable advocate of this view is Carol Harlow who represents the 
mainstream of the third approach. This group of scholars, the most prominent of whom is 
Patrick Attiyah, appear to harbour a strong aversion to many aspects of tort law in 
general.47 Attiyah for instance, criticised the ‘blame culture’ 48 which the system of tort law 
has been used to promote and sustain. He notes that in the recent past, the courts have 
progressively ‘stretched’ tort principles to accommodate and favour claims against public 
authorities wrongfully. ‘Individuals,’ he advocates, ‘must accept responsibility for their 
own problems.’49 He criticised what he considered an undue leaning of some judges 
towards ‘left-wing welfare culture of the 1960s.’50   
 
Harlow argues that it is inappropriate to seek to use tort law for what amounts to 
‘distributive justice.’ While tort is properly invoked for securing stopping of harm, it is 
quite wrong to seek to use it to achieve the redistribution of wealth or support the less 
privileged in society, yet this is what the current system of tort claims against public 
authorities does. The current state of the law on the liability of public authorities in the 
United Kingdom developed as result of the welfare-state system which saw the public, 
especially the less privileged social class, depending heavily on public authorities for 
housing, unemployment benefits and a wide range of social services including education 
and health.51 With the continuous and substantial reduction of these benefits, recourse is 
being made to tort law to fill the gap 
 
Within the shrinking boundaries of the welfare state, tort law was assuming 
a ‘last ditch function’ of filling gaps in declining welfare services. It had 
become machinery for distributive justice. Tort law was being asked to 
supply for the few what retreating public services were taking from the 
many.52   
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In short, the current regime of public authority liability in tort, developed against the 
backdrop of a ‘risk-averse,’ ‘paternalistic’ and ‘victim-oriented’ society. State functions 
came to be conducted in an atmosphere where all (possible) forms of risks  were to be 
anticipated and addressed as standard.53 In other words, government activities and 
regulatory functions were expected to create a ‘risk-free environment.’54 
 
Furthermore, Harlow advances the argument that while the Diceyan doctrine of equality 
has instinctive appeal, its application to tort law is inappropriate. Those who disregard the 
limits of the equality principle and insist on applying it to tort law must be prepared to face 
the problems that arise from such ‘sworn allegiance.’55 Tort law is inadequate and 
inappropriate for determining public authority liability through a functional analysis. 
According to Harlow, tort law has proven ‘uneconomic.’ ‘inefficient’ and ‘ineffective.’56 
Utilising tort law for dealing with public authority liability with its ‘individuated’57 nature 
should be curtailed. Tort law should be used as a last, rather than preferred option, and as 
an avenue for ‘corrective’58 rather than ‘distributive’ justice.  
 
In place of the continued expansion of tort law to deal with problems of state liability for 
which it is ill-suited, Harlow suggests the development of extra-judicial compensation to 
redress harm arising from state activity.59 To achieve this, a ‘concordat’ for a new system 
which upholds ‘collective responsibility and social solidarity’ should be produced through 
the cooperation of judges, policy-makers, academics and legislators. This will make for a 
less aggressive system than that posed by the present claims approach.60 
 
Certain common ground can be deduced from the three different positions analysed above. 
Perhaps the most obvious is recognition of the fact that public authorities can and do cause 
harm in the discharge of their duties even in the face of the divergence on the proper 
approach to addressing or dealing with this. Another, even if less obvious point of 
agreement is that some form of redress or deemed redress should be made to victims. 
Again, the divergence seems to rest on the appropriate limits or sometimes nature of such 
redress. The interaction of these two critical issues which form the points of departure of 
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each of the three views is clearly visible, some more prominently than others in the cases 
highlighted below.  
 
It is important to note that before the 1970s, the assumption was that public bodies and 
private parties were treated alike in tort/delict. In the 1970s and 1980s the courts appeared 
to take the view that public authorities needed to be treated differently in a series of cases. 
The next phase was the imposition of broad exemptions from liability on policy grounds. 
Then in the late 1990s, the House of Lords appeared to change its mind and reject these 
blanket immunities thus making it easier to establish a duty of care, but also setting a high 
threshold for establishing breach of duty. From around 2000s onwards, the courts appeared 
to explore a variety of ways of limiting the scope of liability by for instance finding a duty 
of care not established for lack of proximity, and the courts continue to use policy reasons 
to exclude a duty of care but in a more subtle way than before. Thus for example, by 
refusing to find a duty of care exists where that would undermine the main purpose for 
which statutory powers had been conferred.61 
 
Furthermore, in dealing with the question of negligence liability of public authorities, the 
courts are faced with the problem of the interaction of public law with private law. 
Precisely, they have to determine whether a public body, created usually under or 
performing functions created by statues, should be held liable for negligence. According to 
Booth and Squires, the dilemma is:  
 
Should the courts preclude public authorities from being held liable in 
negligence because the claimants have failed to satisfy what are known as 
public law ‘hurdles’ or ‘filters?62  
    
 The core of the hurdle is that before a claim can be brought, the claimant must show that 
the action of the public authority is unlawful at public law. To achieve this, the claimant 
must demonstrate that the action of the public authority is irrational and thus not covered 
by the scope of the discretionary powers of the public authority. In other words, what the 
courts have set up is the question of justiciability of the claim, the justiciability or what the 
Law Commission has referred to as the ultra vires test.63   
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‘Justiciability’ has been defined as the ‘institutional competence of the courts to decide a 
case.’64 In order to determine whether to proceed with a claim in tort (or other legal claims 
for that matter), the court will examine whether the matter is one over which it has power 
to determine. It is a preliminary issue. Basically, where the case relates to ‘policy’ or the 
manner in which resources are allocated, the courts will generally decline jurisdiction.65 
 
 In earlier cases, like Dorset Yatch Co. Ltd. V Home Office,66 Anns & Ors v Merton London 
Borough Council67 and X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,68 the courts strictly 
applied the public law hurdle or the justiciability test on the question of liability of public 
authorities. This meant that unless a public authority was acting illegally, ‘irrationally,’ at 
public law, a claim in negligence could not be sustained against it.69   
 
There are two aspects the courts will consider on the issue of justiciability as it relates to 
the negligence of public authorities. The first is with regard to whether the claim is within 
the technical competence of judges to deal with since there are a number of bodies like 
regulatory ones that could be in a better position to handle such claims. In particular cases 
it may be that such other bodies are better suited to handle such claims in which case it is 
preferable to decline jurisdiction and have those bodies handle the complaint. 
 
 The second relates to the concern that the courts in taking on certain claims may be 
interfering with the democratic process though technically, the issues arising from the 
claim may be within the competence of the courts. In order to resolve these concerns, the 
courts have developed certain tests on the issue of justiciability of negligence claims 
against public authorities. The tests have themselves not been free from problems in their 
application to specific facts.70  
 
 The foregoing attitude of the courts in recent times as to the issue of justiciability is well 
reflected in the decision of the House of Lords in X v Bedfordshire County Council.71 Lord 
Wilkinson stated: 
    
                                                 
64
 Booth and Squires note 2 supra at 33. 
65
 Ibid. at 29.  
66
 [1970] AC 1004 HL. This case is regarded as the beginning point of the present focus of the courts on 
justiciability as it relates to negligence of public authorities see Booth and Squires note 2 supra at 31.  
67
 [1978] AC 728, HL. 
68
 (1995) 2AC 633. 
69
 Booth and Squires note 2 supra at 13. 
70
 Ibid. at 30-31. 
71
 X v Bedfordshire note 68 supra. 
Ch 5 Delictual Liability of the State and the Case Law 
 131
 Where Parliament has conferred a statutory discretion on a public authority, 
it is for that authority, not for the court to exercise the discretion: nothing 
which the authority does within the ambit of the discretion can be actionable 
at common law if the decision complained of falls outside the statutory 
discretion, it can (but not necessarily will) give rise to common law 
liability…a common law duty of care in relation to the taking of decisions 
involving policy matters cannot exist…a common law duty of care would be 
inconsistent with, or have a tendency to discourage, the due performance by 
the local authority of its statutory duties.72  
 
 He went further to state that where the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion 
relate to matters of policy, the court cannot adjudicate on such matters. Nor can they reach 
the conclusion that the decision was made outside the parameters of the statutory 
discretion. This is because the statutory framework prescribing the duties of the public 
authority will be relevant to the determination of the justiciability or otherwise of the 
claim.73 On the first aspect, the courts have stated certain kinds of issues which cannot be 
effectively resolved through judicial intervention. These include security measures taken 
by the Home Office in relation to the safe custody of prisoners,74 and also a highway 
authority’s handling of road infrastructure.75  
 
The second aspect as noted earlier, relates to the place of courts in a democratic society. In 
this respect, the central issue is the view that unelected judges should not, even where it 
can be taken that they technically have jurisdiction, substitute their opinions for that of 
elected representatives of the people, since this would amount to interfering with the public 
will. Such decisions are regarded as ‘political,’ and unsuitable for judges to make.76 
According to Booth and Squires, ‘the primary concern is that…It is the legislature and not 
the courts that ought to decide questions of policy involving utilitarian calculations of the 
public good and resource allocation.’77 Suffice it to say that it is only after there is a 
positive determination of the issue of justiciability that the matter proceeds to trial.  
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The public law hurdle has been quite problematic in its operation in this area of the law and 
the courts have had considerable difficulty with it for some time.78 It is only when this is 
resolved positively that the court will then proceed to examine whether a duty of care is 
owed the claimant by the public authority. However, from the 1990s, there has been a 
noticeable movement away by the courts from the ‘public-law hurdle’ in the determination 
of the liability of public authorities for negligence. Two cases in particular have been noted 
for establishing this new trend; Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council79 and Phelps v 
Hillingdon London Borough Council.80 The decisions of the House of Lords in the two 
cases have been credited with the view that the public law hurdle as set up in the earlier 
cases, particularly Dorset, Anns v Merton and X v Bedfordshire is not appropriate for 
determining the liability of public authorities in negligence.  
 
 After considering justiciability, the court assesses whether there exists a duty of care. 
Where a duty of care can be shown and falls into an established category of liability, the 
court will impose a duty of care. If the claim is ‘novel’ then the courts consider whether to 
impose a duty of care according to the Caparo test. Claims may be defeated at any of the 
three stages of the Caparo test. In considering the application of the third limb of the 
Caparo test, the courts are likely to look at public policy considerations.81 
     
With reference to public policy, Booth and Squires have pointed out that policy arguments 
to limit the liability of public authorities operate somewhat like a ‘menu’82 from which 
courts choose options they prefer in the determination of claims against public authorities. 
Despite this, they suggest that it is still possible to distil two types of policy arguments in 
the practice of the courts on this point; ‘consequential’ and ‘separation of powers 
rationales.’83  
One type of consequential policy argument appears to be that identified by Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis that the claim in issue may be better borne by another person or 
body rather than the public authority since paying compensation may require diversion of 
substantial resources away from general public services or lead to an increase in taxation.84 
This is commonly the case where insurance can take care of the damages suffered as the 
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court held in Stovin v Wise.85 Lord Hoffman delivered the decision of the majority in which 
he agreed that some of the arguments against liability for omissions do not apply to public 
bodies like a highway authority. However, he maintained that there are important reasons 
why the distinction requires the two should be treated differently by the courts.86  
 
Their Lordships felt that it would cause a distortion in the budget of local authorities to 
impose a duty of care on them as highway authority for failure to exercise a power, even if 
such failure is ‘due to irrationality.’ It would also impact negatively on their overall 
services to their constituents. According to Lord Hoffman: 
This would distort the priorities of local authorities, which would be bound 
to try to play safe by increasing their spending on road improvements rather 
than risk enormous liabilities for personal accidents. They will spend less on 
education and social services. I think that it is important, before extending 
the duty of care owed by public authorities to consider the cost to their 
community of the defensive measures which they are likely to take in order 
to avoid liability.87 
Lord Hoffman further noted that the denial of liability by the local authority does not leave 
the claimant unprotected. There was compulsory insurance to provide compensation for 
victims.88 
 
The views expressed by Lord Steyn in Gorringe (by her litigation friend June Elizabeth 
Todd) (FC) v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council89 provide another instance of the 
consequential policy argument, the ‘floodgates’ argument. The case centred mainly on the 
breach of statutory duty by a public authority. Lord Steyn identified the dilemma the courts 
face on the matter in this way: 
On the one hand the courts must not contribute to the creation of a society 
bent on litigation, which is premised on the illusion that for every 
misfortune there is a remedy. On the other hand, there are cases where the 
courts must recognise on principled grounds the compelling demands of 
corrective justice or what has been called “the rule of public policy which 
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has first claim on the loyalty of the law; that wrongs should be remedied.”90 
 Another dimension of the consequential policy argument for the limited immunity for 
delicts granted to administrative authorities is the need to protect them from being 
disturbed by many cases that may be largely without merit. Allowing many cases that can 
fall in this category to be brought against public authorities can lead to the huge waste of 
time and money in the pursuit of their defence.91  
 
 The separation of powers argument is directed at protecting the policy-making powers of 
public authorities which ordinarily should not be subjected to judicial review for the proper 
functioning of such authorities.92 This is to ensure that the democratic will of the people 
declared through their representatives in Parliament are not frustrated or ‘undermined by 
the imposition of liability on a public authority.’93 In the discharge of their functions, 
public authorities cause loss to individuals through their actions or omissions to act. In 
some cases the issue is straightforward, as where the public authority is under a statutory 
duty to act in a particular manner or otherwise. While performing their duties, public 
authorities can sometimes affect the interests of particular groups in the general public 
interest, it would result in undue interference to allow an unlimited class of actions against 
them in the exercise of their powers.94 Unless there is a clear statement in a law made by 
Parliament according a right of action to a specified class, it would be contrary to the intent 
of Parliament for the courts to impose liability on the public authority.95   
 
 In other instances, it may be difficult to determine how to deal with situations where the 
public authority has neglected to act due to what could be considered as sound political 
reasons. This may be the lack of resources or the priority to be accorded to allocation of 
scarce resources for instance. There is thus an important issue of whether the case in 
question is justiciable before the courts.96 This is particularly the case because the courts 
may not be in the right position to determine the proper allocation of resources or direction 
of policy, at least in the context of a democratic state.97  
Additionally, there are specific legal issues that have been raised about the distinctive 
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character of administrative liability. One of the legal reasons for restricting liability of 
public authorities was articulated by the House of Lords in X v Bedfordshire County 
Council98 which was heard by the House of Lords as part of five appeals all dealing with 
claims for negligence and some involving claims for breach of statutory duty. The 
principle, according to the House of Lords is that where statutory discretion was conferred 
on a public authority, nothing done by the authority within the ambit of the discretion was 
actionable at common law. However, where a decision complained of was so unreasonable 
that it fell outside the statutory discretion, it could give rise to common law liability.  
X v Bedfordshire concerned allegations that a local authority had failed to take children 
into care despite evidence of neglect and abuse by their parents. In this case, the House of 
Lords stated that when local authorities perform statutory functions, a common law duty of 
care might arise. Any claimant basing his claim on a careless exercise of a statutory duty 
had to show the existence of circumstances giving rise to a duty of care under common 
law. The courts will not impose a common law duty if it was inconsistent with, or had a 
tendency to discourage, the due performance of a statutory duty.99 Another important 
consideration in extending or restricting the liability of public authorities is whether it 
appears there would be no other remedy for breach of statutory duty as lord Wilkinson 
stated: 
 If there were no other remedy for maladministration of the statutory system 
for the protection of children, it would provide substantial argument for 
imposing a duty of care.100 
 
Another legal reason that has been raised for limiting the liability of public authorities is 
that the law may provide certain immunity from the principles of common law liability in 
tort. This would appear to be the case where the issue turns on liability in nuisance or it is 
consonant with the principle in Rylands v Fletcher.101 In that case, the House of Lords 
established the principle that where the owner of land, without wilfulness or negligence, 
uses his land in the ordinary manner of its use, though mischief should thereby be 
occasioned to his neighbour, he will not be liable for damages. On the other hand, if he 
brings upon his land anything which would not naturally come upon it, and which is in 
itself dangerous, and may become mischievous if not kept under proper control, though in 
                                                 
98
 X v Bedfordshire note 68 supra. 
99
 Ibid. at 730-740.  
100
 Ibid. at 751. 
101
 LR 3 HL 330 (1868). 
Ch 5 Delictual Liability of the State and the Case Law 
 136
so doing he may act without personal wilfulness or negligence, he will be liable in damages 
for any mischief thereby occasioned. Thus, the presumption is that an activity that is 
provided for by law when conducted negligently will give rise to liability.102  
 
In order to establish the breach of statutory duty against a public authority, the courts 
construe the statute to determine whether it was the intention of parliament to confer a right 
of action on any class of individuals. It further determines whether the claimant belongs in 
that class. The effect of this approach, it has been noted, is that it limits the number of 
possible claims that can be brought against public authorities in the performance of their 
duties103 which are regarded as been done in the general public interest.104 Another 
implication of the approach of the courts is that it leaves the court with wide powers to 
declare what the intention of Parliament (which is usually not a straightforward matter to 
determine), is in making the relevant statute. This leads to the result that the principles 
becomes difficult to predict what the finding of the court will be on the existence or 
otherwise of the liability of public authorities for the tort in any given case.105   
   
 In actions for breach of statutory duty by public authorities, the claimant is usually entitled 
under English law to injunction, mandamus or a declaration106 and in some cases, 
damages.107 However, a claim for damages will succeed only if the claimant can show that 
s/he is also owed a common law duty of care by the public authority or there are provisions 
of a relevant statute that provides specifically for damages.108 The courts approach the 
determination of the question of damages, again, from finding out the intention of 
Parliament on the issue as only a few statutes contains any reference to civil liability.109 
This was confirmed by Lord Browne Wilkinson in X v Bedfordshire.110 Though the torts of 
negligence and breach of statutory duty are separate, with respect to public authorities, they 
commonly come up for consideration together.  
 
All of the foregoing and related issues concerning the liability of public authorities, given 
their (sometimes contested) distinctive character, have led to divergence of opinions on the 
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appropriate approach to deal with their liability in delict. With this comparative insight 
which will be explained later in section four, it is appropriate to return to the nature of the 
liability of public authorities in Saudi law and the work of the Board of Grievances. 
 
 
5.2.2 Nature of Delictual Liability of Public Authorities under Saudi Law 
 
 
As indicated in the discussion on the Board of Grievances, the liability of public authorities 
is recognised and enforced in Islamic Law. Under the Islamic political system (as in 
others), public authorities are required to act on the authority of the state and are thus 
bound by the principles that bind the state. One of the assumed foundational principles of 
the Islamic social system is the need to maintain what has been referred to as ‘equipoise’ in 
society.111 The concept requires that every segment of society be dealt with in a manner 
that achieves justice equitably. This aspect of Islamic law no doubt constitutes a challenge 
given the dynamic nature of social experience where the context of the society inevitably 
plays a role in conceptions of what is just or equitable. Based on this fundamental 
principle, it has been argued that in the area of delict, the public interest may not be 
allowed to trump or override individual interest but rather, they are to be treated equally. 
Musleh-ud-deen states in this regard:  
 
 The peculiarity of Islamic Law is that it has absolute standards of 
justice…It cannot move towards more stress upon social interest and cast 
liability upon someone deemed better able to bear it.112   
 
On this view, the individual as well as the collective or the community are to be equally 
protected.113 As a general rule, all individuals, private, public or group are required to bear 
the same level of responsibility for their delictual acts. This may be considered a literalist 
view, an attempt to keep to a strict construction of the sources, which is the most basic 
function of any adjudicatory process. In this regard, it is relevant to note that the general 
tenor of the law with respect to delict is that considerations of public-policy which play a 
prominent role in common law, have not played such a role in the Islamic legal system 
particularly as operated in Saudi Arabia.  
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It is not entirely clear what have been the determinative factors of the liability of public 
authorities in Saudi Arabia. As stated in chapter three, the jurisdiction of the Board, in 
accordance with Article 48 of the Basic Law provides that: 
 
The courts shall apply to cases before them the provisions of Islamic 
Shari‘ah, as indicated by the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and whatever laws not 
in conflict with the Qur’an and the Sunnah which the authorities may 
promulgate. 114 
 
 The law conceivably gives wide latitude for development in this area in particular and 
legislative development in the country generally. The clause providing for the judiciary to 
enforce laws not in conflict with the sources is a codification of a fundamental principle of 
Islamic jurisprudence, namely that whatever is not prohibited is allowed. On this basis, it 
has been argued that this principle of Islamic law makes the legal system dynamic and 
adaptive to social change as a necessary aspect of its claim to be intended for all times and 
situations.115  
 
 A study of the cases dealt with by the Board suggests it has wide latitude in the exercise of 
its judicial powers with the central objective of achieving justice in accordance with Article 
48 of the Basic Law. An important indication of the Board’s interpretation of the nature of 
its powers is provided by the views expressed in a relatively old appeal decision in the 
context of the life of the Board. In X v Ministry of Health,116 it declared that balancing 
public and private interests is a ‘delicate’ issue which must be handled with ‘precision.’ 
This case was in fact decided before the Board was constituted into an independent judicial 
body117 but is worth further consideration.  
 
The defender rented a property from X for a certain term and before the expiration of the 
term, X notified the defender that he did not wish to renew the lease. The defender did not 
respond to his correspondence and overstayed the term. The claimant then filed a suit 
claiming rent for the overstayed period in accordance with the operative market value 
which was higher than the contractual rent. The defender refused to pay the ‘market value’ 
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rent insisting on the amount in the contractual rent. The Board held that the defender was 
entitled to some reasonable time to vacate the property following the expiration of the term 
and awarded the claimant the same rents for that period. It went further however, in 
holding that the defender was liable to pay the market value-rents for the period from the 
end of the ‘reasonable time’ until its actual vacation of the property.   
 
The defender appealed the decision to the appellate court of the Board.  The central issue 
on appeal was the argument for the defender that the Board was wrong to have determined 
a ‘reasonable time’ in the manner it did, as this amounted to creating new contractual terms 
for the parties. This, it was argued is ultra vires the court. The course open to the court was 
either to determine the old contract or order its renewal on the same terms neither of which 
it did.  
 
However, the court upheld the judgement. It held that the defender should have to consider 
that the contract was terminated at the end of its agreed period, at the request of the 
claimant. It went further to iterate that success of administrative justice in its delicate task 
depends on wisdom and knowledge of the pre-requisites of good-governance and on 
achieving harmony and consistency between public authority and care for individuals and 
their legal rights. The lower court, it noted, had sought to reconcile public interest 
considerations and the requirements of good-governance. This includes the need to ensure 
the functioning of public services and facilities - as run by the Ministry - without 
interruption, to meet the needs of the general public, and the care for private interests of the 
claimant, which require that he receives a fair and adequate payment for the use of his 
property rented out to the Ministry, without prejudice or harm to his rights.118  
 
Interestingly too, the Board went on to declare that a public authority should bear vicarious 
liability for damage arising from the misconduct of its employees in the course of their 
employment. Rather than seeking, as in this case, to deflect liability, it ought to take 
recourse to administrative procedures to discipline those involved. It pointed out that the 
State in assigning a mandate to an employee, has concern for the greater good of society. 
Hence, an employee should exercise care and due-diligence in carrying out assigned duties 
in order to achieve public good. S/he should also work in a way that does not adversely 
affect those interests that are the objective of the task or job. If an employee - through 
error, negligence or default at work - causes damage to public interest, such as burdening 
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the State Treasury with unwarranted expenditures; or if the default caused losses or 
damage to those dealing with the public authority, the employee ought to bear the 
responsibility of such. Consequently, it is up to the state (in a case such as this), if it so 
wishes, to reclaim its costs from the person who caused it, since it was his/her conduct  
which led to the expenditure from the public purse in the event that the conduct is 
unjustified.119 
  
The significance of X v Ministry of Health cannot be overemphasised. According to the 
Board, in order to attain success in the difficult task of maintaining balance, the judges 
must exercise wisdom that comes from proper appreciation of the intricacies of 
administration and governance, which are distinct from private interactions between 
individuals.120 The reference by the Board to the need for the balancing of a ‘delicate’ 
situation is important. It is indicative of the recognition by the Board of the need to 
maintain an approach that takes into account, the ‘equipoise’ suggested by Musle-hu-deen 
which apparently - at least in the experience of a well-developed legal system such as that 
of the United Kingdom - is a rather problematic process. 
 
Of further significance, the Board noted that in dealing with cases where there is no clear 
legal rule governing the subject of the dispute on which it is to deliver a verdict, the court 
has the authority to devise a suitable solution in harmony with the facts of the dispute and 
the circumstances leading to it. It further stated that the judges should seek a compromise 
between disputing parties in such a way as to bring justice without being restricted by legal 
rules or regulations which were intended to organise individual relations only.121 In other 
words, the Board prioritises achieving justice over formalism or black-letter law. 
According to the Board this is required ‘…to provide harmony and coordination between 
the interests of the public authorities and the rights of individual’.122  
 
It remains unclear how well the courts have reconciled this challenge. This is however a 
task that is important because reconciling both interests prevents injustice and fosters peace 
in society. Commenting on this decision, Roslan has noted that the Board has the powers to 
devise its own legal rules to deliver a verdict on disputes over which it has jurisdiction and 
for which there is no text in Shari’ah, regulations or tradition.123  
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A further noteworthy, aspect of the Board’s decision is the assertion that the defender was 
entitled to a ‘reasonable time’ to vacate the property and for which it was also liable only 
for the contractual rent. This clearly, as a judge of the General Court of Al-Madinah who 
preferred to be anonymous explains,124 deviates from the position in law on such contracts 
between private parties. In such cases (which are determined by the Shari’ah courts), the 
defender will not be granted such ‘reasonable time’ and will be liable for the prevailing 
economic rent rather than the contractual rent. In this way, this decision appears to suggest 
that the liability of public authorities may be treated distinctively. At least, this was the 
tenor of the Board’s decision.  
 
X case reflects the recognition and importance of public interest in the jurisprudence of the 
Board. However, the jurisprudence of the Board is significantly different from Scots and 
English law on the treatment of public interest in the way it seeks, as mentioned earlier, to 
achieve a delicate but concrete balance between the public interest and the right of the 
individual to be compensated for unjustified harm.  
 
A few years after this decision, a Royal Order125 was passed establishing a Unified Code 
for Governmental Contract for Renting Property to Ministries or any public authority. 
Article 2 of the legislation stipulates that such contracts will be renewed for the same 
period as the original lease or less according to the agreement of the two parties in a new 
contract. The owner of the property has a duty to inform the public authority (tenant) 90 
days before the expiration of the contract if s/he does not wish to renew the contract. 
Otherwise, the tenant has the right to stay in the property till the period required after such 
expiration but not exceeding 90 days from that date. This Royal Order does not, however, 
address the circumstances of the X case in which the tenant remained despite the owner 
having given the full contractual period of notice. 
 
The decision in the X case is however primarily concerned with contractual liability, and 
the extension of the above arguments to the case of delictual liability is an open question. 
Despite the decision in X, it is contended in this chapter that the subsequent cases decided 
by the Board continues to support the view that the liability of public authorities in delict 
remains similar to that of private individuals. In other words, the jurisprudence of the 
Board on the issue has remained the same as the classic Islamic law position which can be 
regarded as the ‘literalist view’. It is now relevant to examine the decisions of the Board 
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with regard to delictual liability of public authorities through a categorisation adopted from 
Scots and English law as mentioned above.  
 
5.3 The Board of Grievances and Delictual Liability of the State 
 
Broadly speaking, Islamic law seems to have an uncomplicated scheme of liability in 
which the key concept is indemnity for unjustified harm that is caused by breaching the 
legal duty not to cause harm. The application of this basic principle, as the discussion of  
the last chapter has shown, covers both intentional and unintentional harm (as those 
concepts are explained in Scots and English law)126 though it is not explicitly stated in 
either the classical literature or even in a contemporary system like that of Saudi Arabia. 
The fact that there is no distinction seems to be quite an important issue in Islamic law and 
it seems that particularly with relation to unintentional delict, the basis of liability might be 
broader than in many western legal systems. Though some hold the view, as stated earlier, 
that intention is required either under civil liability in Islamic law generally127 or in the 
case of indirect causation specifically.128 
 
Obviously all systems punish intentional wrongdoing but for unintentional harm under 
Islamic law, the scope of liability seems to go further. Thus it includes persons of unsound 
mind and children, ordinarily subjects with diminished liability. Individual rights against 
unjustified harm are protected irrespective of the circumstances of the nature of the 
conduct of the violator and the basic principle remains the same without regard to whether 
the breach of duty not to cause unjustified harm results from an intentional act or through 
fault or negligence.129 In both cases of intentional and unintentional harm, once the harm is 
unjustified in law, liability is considered to be established and compensation is due.  
 
5.3.1 Intentional Delict 
 
Intentional delict is fairly straightforward. Similar to the Scots and English position, the 
decisions of the Board strongly suggests that this is delictual liability resulting from 
specific action that the doer knows can cause harm to the victim’s person or property. 
Common examples are assault, trespass to land and deprivation of liberty arising from 
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cases of unlawful detention.130 Thus, it is again easier to establish this form of delict as 
compared with unintentional delict.  
 
In relation to public authorities, what comes to mind is conduct authorised by statute which 
would otherwise constitute intentional delict and would, therefore, be unlawful. Where the 
conduct causing harm is authorised by statute such as the exercise of police powers, Ta’ady 
is not established. This is the case even where such implementation is by way of preventive 
acts which are deemed legal and the operation of the law infringes on or indeed, limits the 
scope of the exercise of individual rights. In this case the implementation of the law 
constitutes the ‘right’ or ‘legal permissibility’ to cause the harm. In Y v Hael Police131 the 
Board of Grievances reaffirmed the principle of the lawfulness of a harmful act which is 
occasioned by the implementation of the law. It dismissed a claim of unlawful detention 
for over five years on a charge of murder. During this time, the claimant had been tried but 
not found guilty by the Shari’ah Court. The trial had involved appeals to the highest court 
with criminal jurisdiction in the country. He claimed that he suffered psychological harm 
and financial loss as a result of the detention. The Board held that the defender had acted 
within its powers and in accordance with the relevant regulations which required detention 
on charges for murder until final determination of the case.132  
 
Another example involving a municipality is R v Municipality of Dammam.133 The 
claimant claimed that he obtained an official license from the defender to open a grocery 
store. He then equipped, stocked and opened the store. Several years later, he was surprised 
to receive a written warning from the defender demanding that he must close the grocery 
store within two days. The defender subsequently sealed up the store on expiration of the 
notice period. The claimant demanded compensation for loss of earnings and the products 
that were destroyed in the process.  
 
The defender claimed it had issued the claimant a temporary license which had expired. 
The defender informed the claimant that it would not complete the procedures for issuing a 
permanent license since the shop was a source of nuisance, annoyance and harm to the 
neighbours. A warning was issued to him to empty the grocery store of all foodstuffs 
within two days, and since that date was followed by a weekend, the claimant had a grace 
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period of four days. He was warned that, if he did not empty the store, he would bear all 
consequential losses in the event the said store was closed. The Board upheld the defence. 
It held that the closure was legal and the defender was excluded from liability on the facts 
and dismissed all the claims.134  
 
 In deciding cases of unlawful detention, where a public body exceeded its power, the 
Board refers extensively to relevant statutory provisions requiring due process135 in the 
detention of persons. The most common statutory provision the Board refers to is Article 
(36) of the Basic law of Governance which states that: 
  
The State shall provide security to all its citizens and residents. A person’s 
actions may not be restricted, nor may he be detained or imprisoned, except 
under the provisions of the Law.  
 
The Board refers to Article 36 in virtually all cases of alleged unlawful detention as a 
starting point. But it also considers other statutory provisions as well to determine whether 
the breach of a statute has occasioned liability on the part of a public authority in such 
matters. Thus, in N v Ministry of the Interior136 the Board observed that: 
          
putting people in prison means restricting and taking their personal freedom 
away and these are the rights Islamic Law principles and regulations of the 
State  came to preserve and not to deny. 137 
 
Furthermore, after construing various constitutional provisions and relevant legislation 
which in substance secured the right to liberty, it held that since the defender did not follow 
due process with regard to the claimant but instead detained the claimant for all of this 
(alleged) period, its conduct amounted to Khata because it was in breach of the relevant 
law. That Khata caused the claimant harm resulted in restricting his freedom and depriving 
him of running his business and caring for his family.138 It is interesting to note in this 
regard that the deputy-head of the Saudi Arabia Human Rights Commission while 
submitting the country’s human rights report to the UN Human Rights Commission 
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recently, declared that the government has paid out about 100 million Riyals139 as 
compensation to formerly detained terror-suspects who were found to be innocent at the 
end of 2008.140  
 
The Board adopted a similar line of reasoning in other cases of wrongful detention. In I v 
Hael Police141 the claimant, a judgement-debtor was detained for eight months by the Hael 
Police on the complaint of the judgement-creditor for failing to pay the judgement-debt. 
The defender also seized his monthly salaries for the repayment of the debt even though 
the Province of Hael, which is responsible for enforcing such judgements had directed that 
he pay half his monthly salaries until the debt is repaid in full. The claimant claimed that he 
suffered substantial psychological harm and financial loss as a result of the detention. He 
demanded compensation from the defender for this. The defender’s position was that Hael 
Police had detained the claimant because he had failed to carry out the terms of the 
judgement against him. Following his arrest the claimant had alleged he was insolvent but 
his claim was dismissed by the Shari’ah Court of Hael Province. The defender claimed it 
acted in accordance with relevant laws and requested that the claim be dismissed. 
 
In line with its earlier judgement in N v Ministry of the Interior, the Board held that putting 
people in prison means restricting and taking away their personal freedom and these are 
rights guaranteed by Islamic Law principles and regulations of the State. It referred to 
Article 36 of the Basic law of Governance mentioned above as well as Article 7 (3) of the 
Provinces Law which provides that ‘the Governor of each province shall assume the 
administration of the province according to the general policy of the State and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Provinces Law and other laws and regulations.’ The 
law further provides that the Governor has to guarantee rights and freedom of individuals, 
refrain from any action affecting such rights and freedom ‘except within the limits 
provided by the Shari’ah and regulations.’ 
 
According to the Board, putting an individual in prison serves one of two functions; either 
as a punishment applied after a final judicial decision has been taken; or as an interim 
measure for custodial purposes to allow further investigation and prosecution. A basic 
principle in Islamic law, according to the Board, is that individuals are entitled to the right 
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to their liberty and their freedom is not to be restricted. In other words, freedom of 
individuals comes first. Preventive detention is considered an exception to be used only 
when necessary. Individuals are not to be deprived of their rights under any reason except 
with the authority of law and for specified periods. According to the Board, this position is 
further reaffirmed by Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Law which provides that: 
  
 No person shall be arrested, searched, detained, or imprisoned except in 
cases specified by the law. Detention or imprisonment shall be carried out 
only in the places designated for such purposes and shall be for the period 
prescribed by the competent authority. A person under arrest shall not be 
subjected to any bodily or moral harm. Similarly, he shall not be subjected 
to any torture or degrading treatment. 
 
The Board went further to state that the law also stipulated the cases, under which an 
individual can be detained, one of these cases being detaining a judgement-debtor. Article 
230 of the Shari’ah Courts Law of Procedure142 provides that if a judgement-debtor refuses 
execution of the judgment against him for a reason other than insolvency, and it is 
impossible to execute on his property, the judgment-creditor may request the detention of 
the judgment-debtor by filing a petition with the competent administrative governor. The 
Governor shall then order the detention of the judgement-debtor for a maximum of ten 
days. Where the judgment-debtor persists in refusing execution after that period, such 
judgement-debtor shall be referred to the court having jurisdiction over his place of 
residence to consider whether to continue his detention or to release him according to the 
prescriptions of the Shari’ah. In addition, Article 231 of the law further provides that: 
  
If refusal of execution of judgment is by reason of insolvency, the judgment 
debtor shall be referred to the court that had issued the judgment for the 
determination of whether or not he is insolvent. 
 
 The Board held that the defender failed to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of 
the relevant legislation mentioned above, but rather detained the claimant without any 
judicial determination authorising the detention. Therefore, the action of the defender was 
in violation of law, causing harm to the claimant by restricting his liberty and from 
working at his job and looking after his family. These have resulted in psychological 
                                                 
142
 Royal Decree No. 21/M (2000). 
Ch 5 Delictual Liability of the State and the Case Law 
 147
suffering and humiliation of the claimant. Therefore, the elements of liability have been 
established in this case. This decision, according to the Board, derives from the established 
jurisprudential and judicial principle that when the Khata of the administration causes harm 
to any individual, the victim deserves compensation to repair the material and immaterial 
harm suffered. In other words, the defender had acted recklessly with regard to the 
claimant. It was liable for illegal detention since it acted without complying with statutory 
requirements on the matter. The Board awarded damages to the claimant for the whole 
period of his unlawful detention taking into account his loss of earnings. 
 
The foregoing cases appear to have been determined principally on the basis that the 
defenders were in deliberate breach of due-process. It is of interest to consider the possible 
outcome in instances where the defender claims to have acted under an honest mistake. 
The claim of honest mistake was an issue in H v Saudi Airlines.143 The defender, a public 
corporation, entered into a contract for the hire of one of its jets to a person with the same 
names as the claimant. The said individual had failed to pay for the hire. The defender 
obtained the national identity number of the person with the name in question from the 
Immigration Department. Under the impression that these were the particulars of its 
absconded debtor, the defender then sent the particulars to the Ministry of the Interior 
seeking recovery of the debt under the powers conferred by law on the Ministry for the 
recovery of public debts. Subsequently, the account of the claimant was frozen and his 
salary was sequestrated in payment for the debt. On the claimant’s petition, the account 
was unfrozen after it was discovered that he was not in fact the debtor in question. The 
claimant brought this action for compensation for material and immaterial harm arising 
from the freezing of his account. This included the claim that he and his family suffered 
financial difficulties during the period of the freezing of his accounts and sequestration of 
his salary. The defender blamed the Immigration Department for the mistake.  
 
The Board requested that the claimant prove the harm he claimed, and that he provide the 
statement of his account for the period in question. The relevant documents requested also 
included the medical records for the psychological illness he claimed. He did not provide 
this or any other documents. The Board declared that failure to provide the proof of 
damage was fatal to the claim and dismissed the case. The judgment itself was silent on the 
defence of honest mistake made by the defender. However, it had requested proof of 
damage from the claimant which implied that it was prepared to award damage for the 
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claims on being satisfied of the occurrence of unjustified harm.  
 
It is noteworthy that this case is different in one important way from the detention cases 
since it does not involve a security agent as a defender. It would have been more 
interesting to have a security agency like the Immigration Department for instance (which 
arguably should have been a defender on the facts) as a defender in the case. In the absence 
of a directly relevant case or one of precedent, it is not clear what the approach of the court 
would be were the claimant to provide evidence of damage.  
 
It would appear from the cases above that where intentional delict is concerned, the Board 
is willing to award damages. This is, however, only the case when the public body has 
exceeded its statutory powers. Provided the public body has acted within its statutory 
powers, there is no ground for liability. Such cases, therefore, certainly appear to be clear 
and relatively straight-forward. It would even appear that the Board is willing to award 
damages in cases where there has been an honest mistake. This would be the correct 
approach because the public body has not acted diligently and has caused unjustified harm 
to the claimant.  
 
5.3.2 Unintentional Delict 
 
This section begins with a brief discussion of the three categories of unintentional delict 
which are most likely to form the basis of claims against public authorities in as much as 
they are identifiable in the cases determined by the Board. This categorisation has been 
borrowed from Scots and English law, and Islamic law has not hitherto been explained in 
terms of these categories. However, this approach is appropriate for three reasons. First, 
although the Board’s rules of practice as well as substantive principles of Islamic law do 
not appear to require such categorisation as a condition for sustaining claims in delict, 
neither do they seem to prohibit it or be inconsistent with it . Secondly, such categorisation 
affords clarity of discussion and, in some cases as shown in the discussion that follows, the 
court does expressly refer to Taqsir, negligence or al-Masuliyah al-Taqsirriyah which 
means delictual liability at a conceptual level or put simply, negligence in specific 
contexts. Thirdly, it is envisaged that with further development of this aspect of law in 
Saudi Arabia, categorisation of unintentional delict can assist in mapping out the specific 
approach of the courts to appropriate forms and facilitate a more predictable outcome of 
cases that come before the Board for decision. This has multiple advantages for various 
stakeholders (including academics), the general public and public authorities. These 
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include providing a clear structure for the subject which will help judges to understand this 
area of law better, assist academic analysis and facilitate learning by students. 
 
Claims for unintentional delict dominate the cases brought against public authorities in 
Saudi Arabia. Again, like the cases brought in the Scots and English courts, claims brought 
before the Board of Grievances for unintentional delict deriving from the conduct of public 
authorities can be presented under three headings corresponding to three causes of action in 
Scots and English law: 
 
I. Negligence (Fault) 
II. Breach of Statutory Duty 
III. Lawfully caused but unjustified loss. 
 
However, the Board does not explicitly categorise cases in these terms. In practice, the 
court does not dwell on whether the delict claim is derived from negligence, breach of 
statutory duty or strict liability though it is possible to allocate the cases decided by it to the 
foregoing categories. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the Board’s emphasis appears 
to be on the need to ensure compensation for unjustified harm rather than technicalities of 
categorisation that may result in shutting out legitimate claims for compensation for 
unjustified harm. In other words, it makes no significant difference what form delict takes. 
Unlike English law in this area which historically developed from a system of mandatory 
adoption of a form of action as a procedural requirement,144 the claimant is not required to, 
and in practice, hardly ever presents a case under a particular heading in order to sustain 
the claim. There is thus a unified approach to the matter and such claims are compositely 
regarded as claims in delict. What is crucial is to determine the existence of breach of a 
duty not to harm others. This appears to be in keeping with a key principle of Islamic law 
and its conception of justice which require a straightforward application of law devoid of 
as much technicality as possible.  
 
Given that Islamic law is supposed to operate on the basis that the same rules for 
determining liability apply to public bodies and private persons alike, it would be 
beneficial to make comparison between the adjudication of delictual liability claims 
between private persons and claims by private persons against the state. However, it is 
rather difficult to do this because delictual liability claims against individuals or private 
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persons/bodies are rare in Saudi Arabia, as indicated in chapter four. The situation is 
complicated by the absence of a case reporting system in the General Courts which handle 
such claims. However, wherever possible, when discussing cases in the following sections, 
an attempt will be made to hypothesize whether the same outcome would have been 
achieved if an analogous dispute had arisen between private individuals or bodies. 
 
 
5.3.2.1 Negligence  
 
Commenting on ‘negligence’ as an aspect of unintentional delict, Zoubi, states that it is the 
occurrence of damage as a result of falling short of an objective standard or lack of due 
diligence in carrying out a specific act. According to him ‘unintentional ta’adi ‘is 
accomplished with the occurrence of the damage when the damage was the result of 
neglecting to do what should have been done, or where the person has acted without 
observing the precautions which he should have observed.’145 Before proceeding with an 
analysis of the Board’s jurisprudence in this area of delict, one crucial matter will be 
examined. This is the issue of Khata which has been partly considered in the last chapter. 
The Board often refers to the term Khata, meaning fault when referring to the requirement 
of Ta’ady as an element in the cases.  However, as was sought to make clear earlier, this is 
essentially a product of history more than anything else. Indeed, as highlighted in the 
chapter, there appears to be a general confusion in the civil-code system of virtually all 
Arab countries on this point.  
 
As has been indicated above and will become obvious in the analysis that follows on a 
number of cases, the Board does in fact refer sometimes to what is properly called Ta’ady 
in the sense of breach of duty not to cause unjustified harm generally rather than fault in 
the technical sense as understood under a western system like Scots and English law. As a 
result, several decisions can be found today which take a similar approach in earlier cases 
sometimes stating either Khata or Ta’ady as an element of delict. For instance, in X v 
Ministry of Information and Culture146 the Board stated that in order to succeed in his 
claim, the claimant was required to establish the existence of the elements of ‘delictual 
liability, namely Khata, harm and causal link.’147  
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Saudi Arabia aspires to follow the classic Islamic law position on delictual liability. Thus, 
it is logical to expect that unjustified harm will constitute the key element of liability for 
delict because as stated earlier, this represents the classic Islamic law position. 
Interestingly, an analysis of the decisions shows there is some confusion on this important 
issue. The courts appear to have been struggling with the issue of what constitutes the basis 
of liability. Even an informed observer of the Saudi legal system may find this rather 
strange considering that the apparently preference of the system is for the classic Islamic 
thought.  
 
There is reason to suppose that the confusion has mainly historical rather than theoretical 
roots. A historical excursion into the founding of the Board makes this clear. Article 2 of 
the Law of the Board of Grievances 1982 (the previous law) provided for ‘an adequate 
number of technical and administrative employees’ to be attached to the Board to facilitate 
the discharge of the Board’s functions. As both Al-Hudaithy148 and Al-Jerba have noted, 
under this provision and before it, the Board in its early years, lacking in much required 
expertise and experience, recruited a number of foreign legal advisers especially from 
Egypt. These advisers served as consultants who provided legal opinions on questions of 
law referred to them for their views by the members of the Board. Though they acted in an 
advisory capacity, their opinions substantially and frequently found their way into, or even 
formed the judgements of, the Board in many cases.149 Through these rather potent though 
informal means, the jurisprudence from countries with a civil code influenced by western 
concepts like dolus and culpa as in the case of Egypt thus found their way into the 
judgements of judges otherwise trained in classical Islamic law.150 
 
The correct statement of the law was made by the Board in a recent (2008) case, M and N v 
Ministry of Health.151 On the issue of Khata, it clearly stated the position thus 
 
Islamic jurists say the core of liability for delict is the occurrence of harm 
regardless of Khata. It is for this reason that liability can be established 
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from the actions of the under-aged or mentally imbalanced even though they 
do not have legal responsibility in Islamic Law.152 
 
The Board in this case used the word Khata in its proper sense. In fact the Board went on 
to make the position even clearer when it stated further that: 
 
 Islamic jurists also impose liability on a party whose direct act causes harm 
even where such harm is not intended as long as the occurrence of harm 
results from such act.153  
 
It is suggested that the somewhat confused statement of the position in the cases by the 
Board is traceable to its mainly Egyptian sources. However, it is interesting to note that one 
of Egypt’s most distinguished modern jurists, ‘Abdul Al-Razzaq Ahmad Al-Sanhuri, a 
renowned authority on reformation of law in Arab countries in the 20th century, comments 
negatively on the fact that matters of civil liability are dealt with by the Egyptian approach 
(as is also the case in many Arab countries). Al-Sanhuri affirmed that the requirement of 
Khata as an element of liability for delict is not necessary because it is not only difficult to 
prove, but more importantly, in his view, intent is not required in Islamic Law of delict. 
‘Compensation,’ for delict, Al-Sanhuri points out, ‘is compulsory without the necessity of 
proving fault.’154 
 
 It is relevant to note however that despite the redundancy of the term, the use of Khata in 
place of the more comprehensive and appropriate term, Ta’ady, persists in the 
jurisprudence of the Board. The contention here is that the Board has, for both historical 
and other reasons discussed later, been confused in the application of this key term in its 
jurisprudence. Beyond the confusion in terminology, the more objectionable aspect of this 
is the possibility in future for the substance of Khata to be substituted for the wider concept 
of Ta’ady, thereby leading to a substantive change in the content of the law which the 
Board is required to follow. The later discussion on the cases of lawfully caused but 
unjustified harm further buttresses the point that the Board’s current confusing use of 
Khata is essentially a case of mis-labelling.   
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There are many cases in which the Board has found liability established which would be 
classified as ‘negligence’ in Scotland or England. These are reflected in decisions of the 
Board across a spectrum of activities and service provisions. These include education, 
highways, health and public safety, and welfare and social services. 
 
a) Education Cases 
 
As discussed in chapter two and in accordance with Article 30 of the Basic law, the 
government of Saudi Arabia has put in place a system of public education that provides 
formal and vocational education and training from pre-primary through tertiary and 
university education. Thus, it is not surprising that a number of education related cases 
have come for resolution before the Board. 
 
In A v Ministry of Education155 the claimant claimed that the defender had failed to carry 
out its duties towards the Special Education Academy (the Academy) in Riyadh, an 
institution for children with learning disabilities. He stated that his son, who was dumb, 
studied in this academy. One day, after his son returned from school, he noticed that the 
boy seemed very drowsy, listless and imbalanced in his walk. On entering the house his 
son threw himself in his mother’s lap and grasped her hand. He held out his left hand and 
started crying and was visibly in immense pain. There was a noticeable impression of an 
injection in his left hand. He further stated that the Academy further violated the minor’s 
rights when it presented a picture of his son for public display at a workshop titled  ‘How 
to Deal with the Autistic Child’ held at the Medical Centre Hospital in Riyadh without 
parental consent. The claimant was very worried and wrote a number of letters to the 
coordinator of the Academy to explain what happened to his son, but the coordinator did 
not respond. The claimant then lodged a complaint with the Director of Special Education 
in the Ministry of Education whose office he believed had supervisory authority over the 
academy. Despite the repeated calls and successive letters, there was still no response to his 
complaints from that office. In the meantime, his son developed a hatred for studying in the 
Academy. Further, the claimant stated that he had to take leave from his work and move 
his whole family in order to enable his son to obtain access to the special education 
facilities that were available only in Riyadh. His moving to Riyadh caused him further 
expense. He demanded compensation for his son and the family’s sufferings from the 
Ministry of Education for the damage they had suffered for failing to carry out its duties. 
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The defender maintained that it had observed all the required legal procedures when the 
claimant submitted his complaint and denied liability.  
 
The Board dismissed the claim. According to the Board, it is an established judicial rule 
that to award compensation for al-Masuliyah al-Taqsirriyah, (which here referred to 
negligence liability as it does in specific contexts as mentioned above under the discussion 
on unintentional delict), the harm requiring compensation must be certain and capable of 
being linked to the conduct of the defender. The occurrence of the harm that is caused to 
the victim must be a direct result of the conduct of the defender. If the harm is uncertain or 
is not as a result of the defender’s action, the claim for compensation is not valid. The 
Board held that since the claimant’s claim for compensation depended on the ministry’s 
Taqsir, negligence, in not following up its duties and taking the legal steps against the 
school in which his son studies, this negligence - assuming that it happened- is not a direct 
reason for the damage. The school is not part of the Ministry. It is a private school and the 
supervisory power of the ministry over it does not make the ministry liable for its conduct. 
If the claimant claims that the malpractice of the school employees caused damage to him, 
the claim should be against the school and its owners, not against the ministry. In other 
words, the Ministry is the wrong party to have been sued because it cannot be held liable 
for causing the alleged harm. The Board however urged the Ministry to seriously follow up 
on the activities of special schools like the one in question to ensure they properly carry out 
their function of training and teaching children with special challenges who are in dire need 
of special education.  
 
A number of points require comment regarding this decision. First, it does appear that the 
decision of the Board could easily have gone in favour of the claimant if the school in issue 
was a public one because public schools are run directly by the Ministry so that acts of 
staff in public schools are treated as acts of the Ministry. The Board it appears takes the 
view that in the absence of explicit provisions stipulating a specific duty, it would be 
unreasonable to impose liability on a public authority, even though the performance of 
such a duty may be desirable. Thus, in the case where a traffic accident occurred because 
of straying camels from an illegal market, the Board held the municipal authorities which 
had a duty inter alia to ‘maintain the area’s good health, comfort and safety’ liable for the 
accident.156  
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The second issue of interest is the fact that though the Board did not attach liability to the 
defender on the facts, it urged the defender to ensure closer supervision of the privately 
owned schools of the type in issue. In another case, M v Ministry of Education157 the Board 
similarly dismissed a claim for Taqsir, negligence against the defender but went on to 
advise it to take appropriate measures to forestall the occurrence of the incidence (use of 
narcotics in schools) complained against by the claimant. The point that needs to be made 
is that the Board, as Al-Jarbou rightly notes, in contrast with the French Conseil d ‘Etat 
and the Egyptian Majlis al-Dawlah, does not have an advisory jurisdiction.158 Neither the 
Basic Law nor the Law of the Board grants it such jurisdiction. Hence, this prompts a 
question as to the source of this advisory turn in these decisions. It does appear again that 
this is a product of the historical factors surrounding the establishment of the Board with 
the introduction of some foreign elements from French law by Egyptian experts, as this 
notion of providing advisory opinions is one of the functions of  the Egyptian Majlis al-
Dawlah.159 
 
An even more interesting issue is the fact that the Board did not make a finding on whether 
the issues complained of amounted to Ta’ady on the part of the school as a substantive 
matter, beyond its tentative statement on it, that is. Perhaps a substantive consideration 
albeit that it held the school was the appropriate party to defend the claim, would have led 
to a different finding. The Board may have found that the conduct of the school amounted 
to conduct in which the current defender failed in the obligation of supervision given that 
the school ostensibly operates on licence granted by the defender. The central issue in the 
determination or otherwise of its liability for the conduct of such licensees would be an 
investigation of its adequate or inadequate supervision of them. This, it is submitted with 
respect, ought to be the approach rather than the assertion that the public authority cannot 
be liable even where such negligent conduct emanates from the licensee of the public 
authority. There is also the other issue raised by the defender as to the appropriate public 
authority responsible for the supervision of such institutions.  
 
Had a case been raised by a parent/guardian of a child against the private school itself, as 
opposed to the Ministry, the outcome may well have been different. This is because the 
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School was itself directly responsible for the conduct complained about which resulted in 
the claimed unjustified harm. Had the school not given the child an injection and used a 
photograph of him in training courses without consent then such harm would not have 
occurred. The unjustified harm is, therefore, clearly linked to the conduct of the school (the 
defender) and since these would be the acts of the staff of the school, it is likely that the 
court would have held the defender liable.  
 
The facts of M v Ministry of Education160 in contrast with A v Ministry of Education 
involved a public school.  The claimant claimed that the principal of the public secondary 
school where D - his son - studied accused D of dealing in hard drugs. The principal’s 
accusation was then spread among students, teachers, the supervision centre and education 
management staff. However, the Government’s Narcotics Office cleared D of any 
involvement with hard drugs in response to the Principal’s correspondence with it. Despite 
this, two weeks later, the school authorities deducted 15 marks from D’s Conduct-Grades. 
The defender accepted this action despite having also received the letter from the Narcotics 
Office on the issue. The claimant’s several complaints to the defender on the matter were 
rejected as baseless. He demanded the Board investigates the defender’s officials, and 
indentify everyone who had been negligent in the handling of his complaints. He also 
demanded compensation for defamation of his son’s character.  
 
At the trial, the defender presented some documents which proved the son’s wrongdoing. It 
argued that the claimant’s case for compensation ought to be dismissed. It maintained that 
the defender’s son had been warned in accordance with regulations about several acts of 
misconduct and his parents notified accordingly. He was then penalised when he failed to 
correct his behaviour. The defender affirmed that its actions were in accordance with 
relevant regulations.  
  
The Board dismissed the claim because the facts did not disclose Khata on the part of the 
defender. From the known facts, the defender was entitled to pass on evidence to the 
Narcotics Office against the student with regard to the discovery of substances suspected to 
be hard drugs. This it had done. It condemned the acts of misconduct of the student which 
were not befitting a student. It however, urged the defender to initiate measures to prevent 
or reduce to the minimum, opportunity for students to engage in such gross misconduct as 
had been established against the son of the claimant. On the demand for investigation and 
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accountability of the defender’s officials, the Board held that it lacks jurisdiction to make 
such orders. 
The decision of the Board in this case appears to be based on the position that while the 
school clearly falls within the supervisory jurisdiction of the defender, the facts do not 
disclose Ta’ady. The decision here would appear to satisfy the test set by the Board in A v 
Ministry of Education on the need to establish a clear case of conduct causing harm on the 
part of the defender to ground a claim in negligence.  
 
It is suggested that if this case had involved a private school, as opposed to a public school, 
the outcome would have been the same. That is to say that the school would not have been 
found to have acted negligently. This is on the basis that an investigation was undertaken 
which revealed criminal conduct on the part of the student concerned. The school acted in 
an appropriate manner in order to address serious issues of suspected drug abuse. Indeed, 
failure to take any action in a case of this kind may have resulted in negligence on the part 
of the school, public or private.  
 
b) Highways 
 
With the increase in road network and better facilities for road transportation in Saudi 
Arabia in recent times, coupled with a considerable increase in the number of vehicles, 
there has been a marked increase in the number of highways cases decided by the Board on 
the liability of the state for delict. In I v Municipality of Al-Madinah161 the claimant alleged 
that his car was damaged in a collision with a pile of asphalt left on the road by the 
defender without any warning signs or barriers to close off that part of the road which was 
under maintenance to traffic. The claimant demanded compensation for the damage done 
to his car. The defender claimed that they had placed re-direction signs and closed the road 
off to traffic as road-repair work was carried out, and thus the accident was the sole 
responsibility of the driver. The Board summoned witnesses from the traffic wardens and 
officers who attended the scene of the accident at the time. Those confirmed that, at the 
time of the accident, the road was not closed and that there had been no warning or re-
direction signs, from the start of the repair project works to the spot where the accident 
took place. The Board found the defender negligent for failing to put up re-direction or 
warning signs to highlight the works area on the road and awarded compensation to the 
claimant on the facts.  
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A case brought before the General Court which had a similar set of circumstances but was 
against a private company is G v Saudi Telecommunication Company.162 The claimant 
alleged that the defender was liable for a traffic accident in which he and his family 
suffered injuries and damage to his vehicle. He argued that such damage was a result of the 
Taqsir negligence of the defender. This is because the defender was responsible for a 
hazard on the road, in the form of a raised manhole, which had not been levelled nor 
clearly marked as a road hazard. The general court referred to the Traffic Agency accident 
report which stated that the 75% of the responsibility for the accident was attributable to 
the company. This was because it had failed to either level the manhole with the road or 
warn drivers of the oncoming hazard through signs. The General Court held the defender 
liable for 75% of the accident and awarded damages to the claimant. The court also upheld 
the attribution of 25% of the liability for the accident on claimant because he ought on the 
facts, to have exercised caution in the circumstances. The road was well-lit and the hazard 
was at the entrance of a road-services station; with fuel station and some shops. In F v 
Saudi Telecommunication Company163 another case involving the same defender, the 
claimant was awarded damages for the damage to his car as a result of an accident caused 
by the defender failing to cover a manhole for which it was responsible. These cases 
demonstrate how in the context of road accidents the same principles of delict under 
Islamic law have been applied to both public and private bodies by the Board and the 
General Court for delictual liability supporting the view argued in this study generally.  
 
The Board also granted the claim for negligence on similar facts in T v Municipality of Al-
Qaseem.164 The claimant claimed that he had an accident with his car as a result of an 
artificial hump constructed by the defender on a curved and downhill road with no warning 
signs to alert motorists. The accident obliged him to sell off the car very cheaply following 
the evaluation of three different car dealers. The claimant demanded compensation for 
economic loss arising from the sale of the car as a consequence of the accident. The 
defender argued that the hump was legal in terms of its conditions and location. The cause 
of the accident, which occurred at night, was excessive speed on the part of claimant.  
 
The Board held that elements of delictual liability namely Khata, harm and causal link 
were established in this case. It was proven from the accident report by the Traffic Agency 
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that the defender was in negligence. The accident report confirmed the Khata of the 
defender to be 50% because the hump was not compliant with the legal specification for 
humps in addition to the absence of signs to warn drivers of its existence and location. It 
emerged that the defender had been informed by the Traffic Agency twice before the 
occurrence of the accident, about the failure of compliance of the hump with legal 
specifications. The Board in this case affirmed the basic principle that the defender was 
liable for harm resulting from its failure to place necessary road-signs where relevant, in 
this case, to warn the driver of a hump, worse still, one constructed in violation of standard 
legal specifications and conventions for such structures. Therefore, it must be liable in part 
for the accident. 
 
 It does appear that the Board has a fairly straight-forward approach to the determination of 
traffic accident cases. This is because the Board relies heavily on relevant expert evidence 
relating to the circumstances of accidents. Indeed, it does appear that the approach of the 
Board in cases of this nature is to set the applicable standard as compliance with relevant 
legal regulations. In this line of cases, the Board investigates whether there was compliance 
with applicable legal standards. Failure of compliance with legal standards or relevant 
regulations generally leads to liability on the part of the defender public authority.   
 
The Board, in a recent decision, also seems to recognize a freak or rare incident which 
causes damage as an extraneous cause. In R v Ministry of Transport165 the claimant was 
travelling with his family in his car along a mountain route when a rock suddenly fell on 
his car. On impact, the rock smashed the windscreen killing one of his sons and severely 
injuring the other. The incident traumatised his family and left the car seriously damaged. 
He demanded compensation for all the damage which he attributed to the negligence of the 
defender in carrying out the duty of maintaining the road for users. The defender submitted 
a report which was prepared by the police after the accident in which it was stated that the 
claimant and his wife had expressed their satisfaction that the rock-fall was an accident and 
they had no desire to proceed against any one in respect of it. The defender further argued 
that it had exercised the required care to maintain and monitor the road. The Board 
dismissed the claim based on the fact that the defender exercised due care by placing 
warning signs indicating the road hazards. It also provided maintenance of the road. It went 
further to hold that as the falling of the rock was a freak and rare incident, and the claimant 
had dropped his private right (to seek compensation) for the accident, the claim had to fail. 
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The Board appears to have suggested, albeit in passing, that rare occurrences of this nature 
even where there is at least a remote, but real, possibility of its occurrence, will not be 
ground for liability against the potential defender. On relatively similar facts to this case is 
the earlier decision of the Board in S v Municipality of Damaam.166 The claimant claimed 
that a date palm fell on his car causing damage to it. He traced the accident to a tree 
infection which eats away at the root of the date palm, and to the failure of the defender to 
maintain and treat the tree. He demanded compensation for repairing the car. The defender 
stated that the falling of the palm tree was an act of God and not negligence from it. It 
added that the nature of the infection was not easy to recognise. The Board held that the 
defender was in Taqsir, negligence of not treating the diseased tree which led to the 
accident. According to the Board, the defender ought to regularly monitor and maintain 
what is under its responsibility but the defender was in Khata on not treating the deceased 
tree. In other words, there is a duty of regular inspection not only a duty of action when the 
problem has become obvious. The Board awarded the assessed difference between the 
value of the car before and after the accident. It is arguable that with a little more diligence, 
the relevant public authorities would have identified and prevented the harm caused to the 
road users involved. The condition of the tree could be diagnosed from scientific 
observation, of the forestry services. 
 
It is suggested that had circumstances of the S v Municipality of Damaam case arisen in a 
private setting, such as the grounds of a hotel, the decision would have been the same. This 
would be on the basis that it is possible to detect disease in the trees and to take 
preventative measures. Liability would only arise where the hotel owners or owners of 
such premises fail to take such preventative measures. A firm basis for this in classic 
Islamic law is the principle of al-Taharuz and As-Salamah, social harmony which as 
described in chapter four requires individuals, groups and institutions to conduct their 
affairs (and business) in a manner consistent with the safety, rights and privileges of others. 
Put in the context of Scots law, it is reasonably foreseeable that if the trees are not 
maintained they might fall and cause injury or loss to guests or staff. 
 
c) Health and Public Safety 
 
There have been a number of claims against public authorities for conduct allegedly 
resulting in unjustified harm in relation to health and public safety. These commonly arose 
in the circumstances of the use or enjoyment of public facilities, particularly beautification 
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projects and leisure facilities provided by public authorities, especially by local authorities. 
In S v Al-Madinah Municipality167 the claimant claimed that his 3 year old son fell into an 
artificial waterfall constructed by the defender. The boy was submerged in dirty water for a 
while before being rescued by some people around at the time. The incident was reported 
to the Civil Defence Corps. The boy suffered serious brain damage and paralysis on a side 
of his body as a result of the accident. The claimant claimed that the height of the fence of 
the artificial waterfall fell short of general standards of safety for such structures. The 
claimant demanded compensation for the harm suffered by his son as a result of the 
defender’s negligence in failing to put in place necessary safety measures while 
constructing the waterfall. The case for the defence was that the waterfall was constructed 
in furtherance of its duty to beautify the city and the construction was in accordance with 
required safety standards. The accident was rather due to the family’s negligence. Thus, the 
claim ought to be dismissed.  
 
The Board directed the Civil Defence Corps to provide it with a detailed report about the 
waterfall. The report indicated that their waterfall was poorly maintained and lacked 
adequate warning signs around it. It emerged also that the defender had been advised on 
several occasions by the Civil Defence Corps of the need to take necessary safety measures 
when constructing such waterfalls and fountains without positive action on the part of the 
latter. The Board sought and obtained a medical report from the hospital which treated the 
son of the claimant following the incident. The report confirmed the claims of the claimant 
regarding the effects of the accident on the boy.  
 
The Board upheld the claim of the claimant. The facts disclosed clear Taqsir, negligence 
on the part of the defender in the construction and maintenance of the waterfall and 
fountain. In particular, the Board stated that the occurrence of two previous accidents 
within four years at the waterfall and the failure to act on the advice of the Civil Defence 
following each incident was clear evidence of Taqsir, negligence on the part of the 
defender. While it recognised the value of such waterfalls, it emphasised the need to secure 
and maintain them properly in the public interest. In all events, such safety and 
maintenance measures should not detract in any way from the value of such facilities. The 
defender was obliged to pay compensation to the boy for the loss of his physical and 
mental capacities. 
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In reaching its decision in D v Al-Madinah Municipality168, the Board made an interesting 
comment. It explicitly referred to S v Al-Madinah Municipality stating that similar facts 
justified their judgment in the current case. This reference is important given the general 
reluctance in the courts of Saudi Arabia to accord precedent a status similar to that it enjoys 
within the common law system in particular. The facts and decision of the Board in the 
earlier case of S v Al-Madinah Municipality are indeed quite similar to D v Al-Madinah 
Municipality.  
 
In this case the claimant claimed that his son drowned in a fountain in a public park due to 
failure of the defender to take necessary safety measures while constructing the fountain. 
The defender stated that the accident was due to the family’s negligence. The Civil 
Defence Corps (Emergency Rescue Services) report provided at the instance of the Board 
confirmed the absence of barriers that should prevent pedestrians from falling into the 
fountain. Its report referred to the fountain as a ‘potential graveyard’ for children.  
 
The claim was upheld by the Board. According to the Board, the facts revealed that the 
defender neglected its duty with regard to the construction of the fountain. It noted that the 
fountain had in fact been constructed in breach of health and safety advice issued by the 
Civil Defence to the defender on the structure. As a result, the defender is to be held liable 
for causing death of the child by drowning due to the failure to provide necessary safety 
measures required by law around the fountain.  
 
The position in private law appears to be the same in cases of this nature. In this regard, it 
is relevant that a judge from the General Court of Al-Madinah, in the course of a research 
visit by this researcher to the court, recalled a case decided by another judge who has since 
been promoted to the Appellate Court. In that case the claimant’s child was injured after 
falling into a hole dug on the road by a private contractor in the course of construction 
works along a major road. The defender was held liable for failure to take appropriate 
safety measures. In this case, like earlier ones discussed, the General Court applied the 
same general principle of delict in Islamic law in a case involving a private body just as the 
Board did on similar facts with public authorities.169 Here again, it is germane to note that 
the principles of Al-Taharuz and As-Salamah earlier mentioned applies to impose the duty 
on the defender to be mindful of the safety of others in the conduct of his/her affairs. 
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d) Welfare and Social Services 
 
The Board has also had to deal with a growing number of cases around the provision of 
welfare and maintenance of social services. This is not in the least surprising given the 
declared commitment of the Saudi state to welfarism as state policy. Articles 27, 30 and 31 
of the Basic Law stipulate the obligation of the state to provide public education, care of 
public health, guarantee the right of the citizen in emergencies, sickness, disability, and old 
age. They similarly provide for social security system.  
 
In a recent case, M and N v Ministry of Health170 the claimants stated that they had spent 
around 12 years asking the Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Interior and the Eastern 
Province to search for their son. He had been kidnapped from his mother at his birth in a 
public hospital. The baby had gone missing after a lady dressed as a nurse requested to take 
him away for vaccination in another part of the hospital. The claimants were highly 
traumatised by the incident. They demanded that defender take serious responsibility for 
looking for their son whether he was alive or dead. They also demanded compensation for 
the trauma they had suffered from the situation.  
 
The defender denied it had not taken the case of the missing baby seriously and detailed the 
efforts made to recover the baby. It had cooperated fully with the security agencies on the 
matter. The defender claimed it was still awaiting the results of the investigations being 
carried out by the security agencies since the case was criminal in nature. Thus, the 
defender demanded that the case be dismissed because it is as much a victim of loss of the 
claimants as the claimants themselves.  
 
The Board noted that normally cases had to be brought within five years of the incident 
alleged to have given rise to liability. In this case, the case was brought after twelve years 
by the admission of the claimants, but the Board noted that Article 4 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Proceedings of the Board, which is relevant to the point, also makes 
provisions for exceptional circumstances. It provides that a case can still be accepted by the 
Board if the claimant has a legitimate excuse for any delay in bringing the proceedings but 
this must be proved beforehand. In this case the incident was the kidnapping of the baby 
twelve years ago. However, since the defender admitted that the search has been going on, 
the period of time is counted from the date of knowing the baby’s fate. Thus, time is frozen 
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in the present since the baby’s fate remains unknown and the five year rule can only apply 
from when the circumstances of the baby have been determined.  
 
 The Board continued that Islamic Law prohibits harming others or inflicting on them any 
form of injury. The defender is obligated to remove the harm and restore the victim to 
his/her normal situation if possible or compensate for any loss suffered by the victim or 
both. This is apart from any punishment due for a criminal act. The Board noted that the 
fact that the missing baby was kidnapped inside the hospital was not in dispute, and it was 
the hospital management’s responsibility to keep this baby and all the patients safe. Where 
the baby is missing from the hospital, this is evidence of the Taqsir, negligence of the 
hospital in performing its duty as a result of which this incident had occurred. If the 
hospital had observed its duty properly felons would not have had the opportunity to 
commit this crime. Since the core of liability in Islamic law for delict and compensation for 
it is the occurrence of (unjustified) harm as stated earlier, and the occurrence of harm to the 
claimants in this case is a result of the negligence of the hospital, there is an obligation on 
the hospital to compensate the claimants. The Board stated that: 
 
 in cases where a party that directly commits harm does so in conjunction 
with another who took an indirect part in causing the harm, then the liability 
will be on the former. The latter will ordinarily not be liable except in 
certain special cases. 171  
 
According to the Board, such ‘special cases’ include where the former acted under duress. 
Another is where the direct act (causing harm) is a progression of the initial causal act. 
Another category of such ‘special cases,’ it is said, is where it is impossible to fix liability 
on the direct defender because his/her identity is unknown for example.172 Based on this 
last exception, the Board held the defender liable for Taqsir (literally ‘falling short of 
required standard’), negligence. In rejecting the argument of the defender, the Board 
emphasised that the specific incidence of the baby going missing and the harm resulting 
from that to the parents, the claimants, necessitates compensation. For the Board, the fact 
that the baby had still not been found after such a long period as well as the mystery 
surrounding the perpetrator of the act (whether an employee or not of the defender) does 
not affect this position. Since the negligence of the hospital had been established and such 
negligence caused the occurrence of harm to the claimants, the Board held that the latter 
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had the right to demand compensation. The Board awarded the sum of SR. 200,000 
(equivalent to 40,000 UK pound sterling) to console the baby’s parents for their missing 
baby and to compensate for the psychological trauma and material loss they had suffered.   
 
The classic jurist, Ibn Rajab, offers some insight on the situation here which on the face of 
it, appears to involve ‘multi’ causes. According to him, ‘if the direct source of causation 
does not involve Ta’ady then there is no liability on its part and liability will be based on 
indirect source of causation (who is in Ta’ady). However, if the direct source of causation 
involves Ta’ady, then both sources of causation will be liable.’173 The first part of the 
proposition is clear enough, the direct cause here would refer to a person becoming 
involved, whose intervention did not break the chain of causation. This is best understood 
in the context of the ‘instinctive’ intervener as decided for instance in the case of Scott v 
Shepherd.174 In that case, the defender threw an explosive firework in a crowd. It landed in 
front of D who threw immediately picked it and threw it away. It then landed in front of H 
who did the same and it landed in front of and injured the claimant. The court held the 
defender liable on the premise that the intervening acts of D and H did not add ‘new force’ 
to the initial act of the defender. In other words, they had not broken the chain of causation 
as their reactions were instinctive, and the initial unlawful act of the defender was the cause 
of the injury to the claimant.  
 
However, it is suggested that the latter proposition of Ibn Rajab is to be interpreted to mean 
that the indirect source of harm will be held liable along with the direct only where the 
chain of causation has not been broken by novus actus interveniens. In other words, this 
will be the case where intervention (the most recent cause in time), the direct cause, is 
itself unjustified, but it also operates in a manner that does not alter the delictual conduct of 
the indirect cause. The decision in M and N v Ministry of Health can then be justified on 
the grounds, as the Board held, of its negligence which could foreseeably result in harm. 
Thus even if the direct source of harm were to be later indentified, a successful action 
could arguably be maintained against the two albeit on different grounds. In any event, the 
Board had emphasised that this was a special case which constitutes an exception to the 
general rule in the event that the direct source could not be traced. 
 
Finally, it is relevant to consider what the General Courts would do given the foregoing 
facts when a private defender was involved. There is reason to suggest here again that if 
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the same circumstances arose in a private hospital, the outcome would have been the same. 
This is because the child being missing is clear evidence of the negligence of the hospital. 
Had the hospital acted diligently, the child would not have gone missing, irrespective of 
whether the person responsible was a member of staff or an outsider that is responsible. 
The private hospital, like the public one has the similar duty to secure the safety of its 
users; patients and visitors based on the principles of al-Taharuz and As-Salamah and 
would not be excused from it any more (or less) than its public counterpart. 
 
5.3.2.2 Breach of Statutory Duty 
 
As discussed earlier, the significance of the action for breach of statutory duty in Scots and 
English law is that the alleged delict arises from breach of a duty created by a statute. The 
breach is determined by consideration of the legislative intent. The question basically in 
such cases is whether the alleged conduct runs contrary to the intention of the legislature 
on the issue in question with respect to that public authority. Thus, the advantage it has 
over the action in negligence is that there is no need to prove fault or in some cases, the 
statute provides for a higher standard of care to be observed. The conditions required for a 
successful action of breach of statutory duty as stated above are first, whether the claimant 
belongs to the category of persons the statute is intended to protect, second, whether the 
duty was specifically imposed on the defender by the statue and third, the duty was 
breached by the defender. Finally, it has to be established that the said breach of duty 
caused the alleged damage. 
 
Breach of statutory duty has to do with the role of the state and the extent of state 
involvement with the society. Although current governance in the Saudi state involves 
extensive interaction with the society, this is more recent than the United Kingdom where 
special powers and special duties were given to the public bodies hundreds of years ago as 
a result of industrialisation. Saudi Arabia had not gone through the process of 
industrialisation until recently and lacked a strong central government since it was 
previously a traditionally tribal society.  Indeed, the current structures of governance have 
only been (and continue to be) developed in the last four or so decades. This has followed 
on the discovery of oil in the country and the considerable wealth that has flowed from 
that.  
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The result of the country’s oil wealth has been the rapid transformation of a society which 
was essentially pastoral (in some cases, nomadic) into a modernised and developing 
country. The challenges of meeting the desire for social and infrastructural development 
and establishing the relevant state institutions for conducting the affairs of governance have 
been considerable. Many of the institutions, desirable as they may be, are essentially not 
grounded in the social experience of the people and inevitably gaps emerge which are 
either not contemplated or inadequately addressed. Thus the state-society relations are 
severely tested and the work of public authorities, also in the context of poorly developed 
civil-society structures, can be unduly problematic quite unlike what prevails in a country 
like the United Kingdom.  
 
The gap between the capacity of the state to provide certain infrastructural and social 
services and the ability of the citizenry to engage appropriately with such provisions 
inevitably leads to difficulties on both sides. Thus, analysis of the work and liability of 
public authorities in Saudi Arabia in the contemporary period can be daunting given the 
state of development of law and social capital. Social capital according to Sander and 
Lowney is ‘those voluntary means and processes developed within civil society which 
promote development for the collective whole.’175 In the context of Saudi Arabia, the 
relevant civil society networks that assist the process of societal engagement with 
governance, as earlier alluded to, are few and very much in their infancy. 
 
Notwithstanding the circumstances briefly described above, as has been mentioned in 
chapter two, the principles of Islamic law including al-Maslaha al-Mursalah are designed 
to make it possible to lay down laws or regulations in order to meet new situations and 
developments. Such legislation may define the powers and duties of public authorities. It is 
the construction of such legislation and where there have been breaches of them that can 
lead to claims of breach of statutory duty by public authorities. Currently, several 
regulations, resolutions and orders have been issued by the government of Saudi Arabia to 
organize the affairs of state and various matters affecting its citizens. Considerable effort 
has been made to ensure that they are in accordance with Shari’ah. Of specific relevance in 
this aspect of the research are the types of legislation that impose duties on certain public 
authorities.  
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In one case,176 the law relating to immigration procedures for foreign domestic servants 
provides that:  
 
After completing passport processing, Customs must hand female domestic 
workers over to their employers or sponsors, and contact employers who 
fail to attend to receive their workers. If an employer or his legal 
representative fails to attend to formally receive his workers, twelve hours 
after the arrival of the flight, Customs and Passport Department must move 
the domestic workers concerned over to the Domestic Workers Welfare 
Office, of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs which should contact 
the employer. 
 
According to the Board, the defender, the Immigration Department failed to comply with 
this regulation. It did find out that the said maid (who escaped) was not with the group of 
domestic workers who were transferred from the passengers’ arrival hall. Thus, the 
defender failed to ensure the movement of the domestic worker to the Domestic Workers 
Welfare office as prescribed by law. This failure resulted in the loss of the costs incurred in 
bringing the domestic worker into Saudi Arabia. The Board held that the defender was in 
Khata and was liable in damages to the claimant.  
 
Similarly, in Q v Municipality of Riyadh177 the claimant stated that while driving on the 
road, a camel suddenly got in his way, causing an accident in which his car was damaged. 
He pointed out that the scene of the crash was close to the camel market which was under 
the control of the municipality. The claimant requested that the defender should be made to 
pay him compensation for damage to his car. The defender’s position that this was an 
unauthorised market was rejected by the Board. The Board found that there was a failure 
on the part of defender in ensuring the safety of lives and property within its territory in 
contravention of Article 5 of the Municipal Law which provides that: 
 
The municipality shall perform all work relating to the organization, repair 
and beautification of its regional territory, and shall maintain the area’s 
good health, comfort and safety; and in so doing it can take all necessary 
measures. 
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In contrast to this, the court would seem to be prepared to recognise wide latitude to the 
exercise of power (which goes with discretion as against just duty) by security forces. The 
facts and decision in the recent case of O v Directorate for General Security178 are relevant 
on this point. The claimant stated that his tractor was burnt down by arsonists in an area 
under the control and monitoring of the defender. He alleged the incident was a result of 
the Taqsir, negligence of the defender and claimed compensation for the value of the 
tractor. The defender argued that it had taken all appropriate measures when it received 
information about the incident. The Board held that the defender had taken all necessary 
steps on the issue. Importantly, it dismissed as unreasonable, the ground that the defender 
was liable based on its duty to secure the specific area where the incident occurred. It 
stated that the security agencies had the duty to secure the whole of the country and not just 
the area where there was unrest. However, this does not mean that the defender will be 
liable for all criminal acts of theft or loss or damage to property done by others. Rather, 
what is required of the security agencies is badhl al-‘inaayah al-mu’tadah, the deployment 
of regular (or customary) measures to prevent crimes, apprehend and bring criminals to 
justice. This standard, it further held, had been met and there was no Khata on the part of 
the defender.179   
 
In general, cases of breach of statutory duty, unlike cases of allegedly exceeding statutory 
powers remain few and far between in Saudi Arabia. Recently however, the Board had to 
decide a number of claims from several members of the public on a property development 
scheme. H v Ministry of Commerce180 is a fairly representative case on this incident. The 
claimant stated that a real estate agency announced the launch of real estate shares in mass 
media. Advertisements included references to a letter of authorisation by the Ministry of 
Commerce for the launch of this sale issued by the Ministry. The claimant participated in 
the share-holding project according to the said project’s contract, bond and certificate, 
trusting the authorisation by the Ministry of Commerce for its launch. The claimant then 
found out that the share-holding project was related to a non-existent piece of land. The 
real state agency’s owner who launched the project had disappeared after receiving the 
shareholders’ funds, and that he was actually not the owner of the land. He claimed that the 
action of the defender was in violation of the regulations guiding the process.181 The 
claimant brought this case demanding compensation on the basis that the defender 
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breached the law by granting such authorisation to the real estate agent without verifying 
the ownership of the land as required by law. 
 
The defender argued that all its actions regarding the scheme were taken in compliance 
with the relevant laws. The instrument the claimant referred to with regard to monitoring of 
real estate share-holding schemes does not stipulate that the agency launching the scheme 
must be the owner of the land. What was required by Article 1 of the Ministerial 
Resolution was that the land for which the share-holding scheme is launched must be 
owned by a valid legal instrument that meets the necessary legal conditions.182  
 
The Board dismissed the claim. It held that the relevant legislation did not require that the 
real estate agent must own the land. The amendment requiring the real estate agent to own 
the land was only made after the defender had acted on the law as it was at the time in 
granting authorisation to the real estate agent involved in the case. Thus there is no ground 
to sustain the allegation of breach of statutory duty leading to the claimant’s loss.183 
 
Curiously however, in deciding J v Ministry of Commerce,184 a similar claim based on the 
same incident, another judicial panel of the Board held that the default on part of the 
defender that the claimant alleges – even if proven - cannot be the direct cause of the 
alleged damage and for which compensation is demanded. It stated that from a 
jurisprudential point of view, there must be a direct causal link between the alleged damage 
and the act that caused the alleged damage. In other words, the damage must be a direct 
result of the act itself. The act of licensing the Real Estate Company is not the act that 
caused the damage of the claimant. If the Ministry’s work is not the direct cause of the 
damage to be compensated for, the causal link between the conduct of the Ministry and the 
damage is not established. Therefore, the Ministry cannot be held responsible for such 
damage. Rather than leaving the issue in this case in the way it dealt with H v Ministry of 
Commerce as a case where there has been no breach of statutory duty, the court made what 
is at best an obiter suggesting causation was also in issue here.  
 
This aspect of the decision, specifically that the action of the Ministry, even if taken under 
the new law would not make it liable is a failure to come to terms with the nature of 
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statutory duty of public authorities as specified. Where, as in the new law, the Ministry 
grants authorisation to a real estate agent without compliance with the relevant statute 
leading to loss by subscribers, that would constitute a breach of the duty imposed on it by 
statute for which it would be liable to a claimant in respect of such consequential loss. The 
public would be entitled (unlike the ambiguous position, under the old provisions) to 
assume that the relevant government agency had acted in compliance with law in granting 
such authorisation in the first place.  
 
It is argued here that the correct approach on the facts would be to determine whether or 
not the act of the relevant public authority was carried out in violation of statutory 
provisions in the first place and whether this constituted an independent and/or continuing 
source of the consequential damage suffered by the claimant. Otherwise, it would mean 
regulatory authorities are allowed to conduct their functions without compliance with 
relevant statute and yet be free from responsibility for any consequential losses suffered by 
end-users of the services or products for which they have certified their providers.  
 
In view of this, it can be argued that any breach of statutory duty that causes unjustified 
loss can lead to liability in Saudi Arabia on the part of the public authority. In comparative 
terms, however, breach of statutory duty potentially has a wider reach under Saudi law than 
under Scots and English. It is sufficient that the general requirements for liability (Ta’ady, 
Darar, Ifdah) have been established and there is no separate requirement, as there is in 
Scots and English law to prove that the claimant is within the classes of persons whom the 
relevant statute is intended to protect.185 Indeed in X v Bedfordshire County Council186 
mentioned above, the House of Lords held that breach of a statutory duty did not 
automatically give rise to any private law cause of action. Yet such a right might arise 
where, on its true construction, the statute imposed a duty for the protection of a limited 
class of the public and there was a clear parliamentary intention to confer a private right of 
action for such breach, on members of the relevant class.  
 
According to the Law Lords, there is no general rule for ascertaining whether a statute 
conferred such a right of action. The absence of a remedy for breach and a clear intention 
to protect the limited class, are indications that a private right of action existed. Even the 
existence of some other remedy was not necessarily decisive to preclude the existence of a 
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private right.187 The House of Lords was clearly faced with the prospect of extending the 
liability of public authorities in this case, a prospect which it resisted. This was the 
recognition of a novel category of liability of public authorities, namely liability for the 
mistreatment of children for whom they had statutory powers to protect. 
 
It is interesting to consider how the Board would address a case of a similar claim under a 
similar statutory scheme should it arise in the future, particularly given its responsibility to 
apply the principles of Islamic law of delict. Would a public authority be held responsible 
for any failure to act and protect the best interests of the children? In view of the principles 
of Islamic law of delict, the Board would more likely than not, decide the case differently 
from the House of Lords. This is because, as stated above, any breach of statutory duty that 
causes unjustified harm could attach liability on the part of the public authority unless of 
course the court declares such duty inconsistent with the Shari’ah in which case the issue 
goes back to the constitutionality of the relevant statute in the first place. This is 
specifically when a public body had a duty rather power which the latter would lead to a 
different result. Any neglected child clearly suffers unjustified harm by the conduct of the 
prospective public authorities failing to protect their interests where there has been clear 
evidence of mistreatment. Had the prospective public authority taken appropriate steps to 
protect the interests of the child based on the available evidence, the child would not have 
suffered the unjustified harm. The existence of the unjustified harm and the failure of the 
public authority to act on an issue within its statutory remit would have grounded liability 
on the part of that public authority under Islamic law of delict in the same way that such 
liability would have attached to a private person under similar facts.  
 
From the foregoing, it appears liability for breach of statutory duty is wider in Saudi law 
than in the UK. This may be due to the fact that the legal concept remains in its infancy and 
has yet to evolve as it has in the UK. Under Saudi law, in order to establish a breach of 
statutory duty the key component regarding the intention of the legislature is not currently 
closely scrutinised. Importantly, in cases involving the security services, the Board has 
shied away from imposing duty but has preferred, instead, to consider statutory powers. 
This is because the security services have a wide degree of discretion in respect of carrying 
out their responsibilities which public bodies, in other settings, will not have. 
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5.3.2.3 Responsabilite Sans Faute: ‘Lawfully’ Caused but Unjustified Loss 
 
The focus in this part of the chapter is on liability arising specifically in the context of the 
nature of the functions of public authorities. In carrying out their assigned duties and 
exercise of their powers, they may in the ordinary course of events cause loss, sometimes 
of a serious nature, to individual members of the public. These are activities of public 
authorities which cause damage to an individual or (a few) individual members of the 
public but which are intrinsically ‘not unlawful in a public law sense.’188 The loss or harm 
occasioned by such legally sanctioned activities (and this would include administrative 
decisions) would not normally lead to liability in Scots or English law under the principles 
of negligence or breach of statutory duty. In Scots and English law, liability without fault 
(strict liability) is confined to a limited range of situations and does not help a claimant 
where the conduct causing the loss has been authorised by statute as it often will be in 
cases brought against public authorities. Specifically, in the case of some statutory powers 
exercised for the public benefit it is likely that a few individuals will suffer special loss. 
Their loss is a consequence of attempts to improve public welfare. They are, therefore, 
bearing a burden in the public interest.  
 
In his study on state liability in tort, Fairgrieve regretted the difficulty of comparing this 
area of law which he refers to as ‘lawfully caused loss,’ in English and French law. This is 
due to the different conceptions of the concept of faute, fault in both systems of law.189 The 
attitude of the UK courts on this issue is substantially conditioned by the reasonableness 
test. As Booth and Squires have noted:  
 
…to establish liability for the tort of negligence it must generally be shown 
that the defendant has acted unreasonably. If a claimant is exposed to the 
risk of harm by the activities of a public authority, but the authority was not 
acting carelessly, the authority will ordinarily not be held liable pursuant to 
UK tort law.190 
 
The result of this approach is that only very few claims can be maintained against public 
authorities under the type of situations envisaged here. Two notable underlying factors can 
be identified for the preferred approach of the courts on this matter. They both go to the 
root of the dilemma the courts have faced in dealing with public authority liability. The 
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first lies in maintaining a necessary balance between the pull of ‘two competing impulses,’ 
namely the need to prevent a ‘floodgate’ of litigation molesting public authorities and 
impeding the performance of their function on the one hand, and ensuring compensation 
for deserving victims of ‘serious failures’ of public authorities, on the other hand.191  
 
The second lies in the fact that courts are obliged to protect the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the UK legal systems. This indeed may subsume (at least in an implied way) 
the first. As actual or deemed creations of the parliament, public authorities in the Scots 
and English legal system are to be given the latitude to carry out the duties and exercise the 
powers granted to them by parliament without hindrance as a key expression of the 
doctrine.192 As Booth and Squires have further noted, this is not the case in some other 
legal systems.193   
  
By contrast, in French administrative law the concept of faute has been given a wider 
interpretation and French administrative law has also developed a concept of responsibility 
based on risk. As a result, the French administrative courts may award compensation in a 
range of situations where the administration’s actions would not count as fault in Scots of 
English law. It therefore provides an appropriate frame of reference for investigating 
Islamic law constructions of public authority liability in relation to cases of the nature 
described above. This may be due in part to what has been identified as the likely historical 
link between the two. It will be recalled that some scholars have made the point that Diwan 
al-Madhalim is akin to the French Conseil d’etat.194 Indeed, there is more than a passing 
connection between the Islamic and French legal systems in the past and present in some 
respects.195  
 
Aside from the historical factor, the Board appears to have accorded considerable 
recognition to what can be referred to as ‘lawfully caused loss’, much in the French sense 
of responsabilitie sans faute but which it is preferred to refer to in this study as ‘lawfully 
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caused but unjustified loss.’196 Even more relevantly, the Board has directly referred to the 
concept of al-mas’uliyah ‘ala asas al-makhatir, ‘risk-based liability’ and mabda musawah 
al-afrad amam al-takaleef al-‘aamah, ‘egalite devant les charges publiques’ both of which 
have been identified as the two distinct (though sometimes conflated) principles 
constituting responsabilitie sans faute.197 The foregoing brief exposition is the basis for the 
adoption of the frame of French law for the following analysis of this aspect of the Board’s 
work.                                                                                                                                                                               
 
The Board has demonstrated a readiness to award compensation for lawfully caused but 
unjustified harm to individuals across virtually the entire spectrum of government 
activities, particularly those of a nature that involve potentially dangerous activities. Thus a 
number of decisions around individual loss arise from activities such as infrastructural 
development, provisions of social services like water and fire-fighting.  
 
Expectedly, the Board has been guided by certain considerations in coming to a decision 
on this line of cases. A useful way to commence an analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
Board in its determination of lawfully caused but unjustified loss is to interrogate whether 
Islamic law forms its basis. This is important in view of the implication of the finding on 
that for the jurisdiction of the Board since it is required to determine cases on the basis of 
Islamic law. The approach here will be to examine the Board’s own cases for answers to 
these two questions. 
 
The Board has clearly stated the recognition in Islamic law of lawfully caused harm in 
many of the cases. In an old case, Z & 29 Ors v Municipality of Riyadh198 the municipality 
constructed a multiple-floor parking in a residential area. The residents of the area brought 
this action complaining about the project alleging that it blocked their access to some 
streets leading to the main road and violated their privacy as users of the park had virtual 
complete view of their compounds. The building also blocked off the sun and the air and 
separated their homes from the commercial centre which led to depreciation of the value of 
their properties. They complained to the defender who did not respond. They made a claim 
to the Board and demanded compensation for their loss. The defender argued that the 
parking was far away from the homes of the claimants and it agreed to erect screens to 
address the complaint of privacy.  
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The Board granted compensation to the claimants on the basis of the Islamic law principle 
that ‘(unjustified) harm must be removed’ in accordance with the Hadith ‘la darara wa la 
dirara.’ According to the Board:  
 
… it is unfair to leave an individual or a group to bear the damage caused by 
lawful administrative activities when the damage exceeds a certain level and 
it is proven the individual did not commit any Khata or contribute in the 
harm emanating from the administration’s activities.199 
 
Recently, the Board reaffirmed this view in T v Municipality of Makkah.200 The claimant 
alleged that he owned a plot of land and the defender did some asphalting works in the area 
where his land was located. As a result, the street which the land looks out onto was raised. 
This resulted in the destruction of the front-view section of the fence, damage to the gate 
and the electricity meter, and covering over asphalt work the claimant had done before. 
The defender also filled and covered over the water well which had been in the land. The 
claimant demanded full compensation for all the damage to his land. 
 
The Board upheld his claim. It stated that it had no doubt the objective of the defender was 
to achieve public good and to benefit a great number of citizens by easing their travelling 
on even, paved roads though where the action, which is in the public interest negatively 
affects the private interests of some individuals. According to the Board, this is what the 
public authority is expected to do. The Board further held that the damage done to the 
claimant as a result of the defender’s work were not the result of Khata. However, since 
there is established damage arising directly because of the defender’s conduct 
compensation is due because  
 
there is another kind of compensation based on more comprehensive and 
expansive foundations – although it is rare and less than that which 
depends on Khata. This is the principle of equality amongst people 
regarding public expenses.201 
 
The Board went on to explain that this means that if a public authority took an action for 
the public good and caused damage to an individual, it is not fair for that person to bear the 
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cost alone. The individual ought to be compensated for such damage. This, it reiterated, is 
based on the saying of the prophet ‘There should be neither causing of harm nor 
reciprocation of harm.’ The principle of ‘removing harm’ declares the importance of 
removing harm, because it is a form of injustice, and hence it is forbidden in Islamic law 
(Shar’iah). Such injustice should be prevented from taking place, and if it does, it should 
be removed.  
 
There are other cases that make the same point and direct attention to the distinctive nature 
of this line of cases. The Board stated in S v Civil Defence Corps202 that al-mas’uliyah ‘ala 
asas al-makhatir ‘risk-based liability’ requires only establishing the (unjustified) harm and 
the causal connection between the harm and activity of the public authority. The property 
adjacent to the claimant’s caught fire. In accessing it, the defender (the fire-fighting 
division of it) had to pass its hose and related equipment over the claimant’s mud-built 
house. In the process, the house of the claimant was damaged and actually collapsed. He 
demanded compensation for the loss of his house. The defender stated that during the 
process of extinguishing the fire, the house on fire which was a semi-detached property 
with that of the claimant, collapsed. This led to the subsequent collapse of the claimant’s 
house. It was only carrying out its duty without intent to cause damage or injury. 
 
The Board found for the claimant despite holding that the incident was not due to Khata of 
the defender. It stated that the conduct of the defender in the fire incident was lawful but 
the harm occasioned by it to the property of the claimant was unjustified thereby 
necessitating compensation. This is in line with the Islamic principle that (unjustified) 
harm must be removed.203 Thus it can be concluded that Islamic law does recognise 
lawfully caused but unjustified harm. ‘Lawful’ in the sense that there is a valid power or 
duty granted to the public authority to act in carrying out the activity leading to the harm 
but unjustified (even in the absence of negligence) because it causes harm to an individual 
or group and prejudices their interest in a special way. 
 
Similarly, in B v Municipality of Abha204 the Board stated that:  
 
  The defender is obligated to remove such harm and compensate the 
claimant for the loss he suffered as a result of this work which was not 
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aimed at benefiting him alone but the public at large. It is not fair for him to 
bear the cost and the harm or damage alone. The cost must be distributed 
on all those who benefited from this work by the defender. This derives from 
the comprehensive ‘root’ principle of ‘necessity of the removal of the harm’ 
which forms one of the principles which Islamic jurisprudence depends on.  
 
The Board went further to note that its judgment is ultimately based on the principle of 
‘removal of harm’, regardless of Khata, on the defender’s part. The reference in this case 
and in the earlier ones as well as others on the absence of Khata is of interest. It has been 
noted above as well as in the last chapter that references by the Board to Khata were 
redundant in as much as they were intended to refer to the more comprehensive concept of 
Ta’ady. The statement of the Board in this line of cases that there is no Khata while it went 
on to affirm the presence of unjustified harm is clear reference to Ta’ady. Otherwise, there 
would be no basis for the finding of liability in each of the cases discussed here on the part 
of the lawful acts of the various public authorities which have been impugned here. In 
other words, it is only the concept of Ta’ady as against Khata that captures the basis of 
liability of the defenders in this line of cases.     
 
A number of interesting parameters have been developed by the Board in its adjudication 
of this line of cases. First is the requirement of substantiality of the harm or the loss 
occasioned by the lawful conduct in issue. These decisions refer to the need for not just the 
occurrence of harm, but harm that is ‘substantial’ or a ‘certain level’ or ‘abnormal’ 
‘excessive’ and so on. Interestingly, none of these alternative terms is defined in the 
judgements where they occurred. In B v Municipality of Abha the claimant claimed that 
when the defender constructed roads in the area covering the claimant’s land, the level of 
the road ended up being over 4 meters lower than the level of his land. This, in turn, due to 
its inaccessibility, led to depreciation in the value of his land by approximately 25% from 
its original value. The claimant demanded compensation for the damage or levelling out of 
his land to the level of the road. The defender argued that the claimant does not merit 
compensation because his land is located in a mountainous area with slopes and heights. 
The harm occasioned is of such a nature that the ordinary person should bear it in order to 
achieve the public interest.  
 
In upholding the claim, the Board held that the damage (or harm) was substantial.  It stated 
that what happened to the claimant’s land exceeds the limit of ordinary harm or damage 
which should be borne by the individual as a result of public works. It represents a severe 
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case of harm which should be removed and compensated for. Indeed in a subsequent case 
Al-Jerba reported that the Board stated: 
 
The review [appeal] committee would like to highlight one of the accepted 
rules relating to liability of the administration in the process of carrying out 
public services or projects, in the interest of the public, there is an obligation 
on the part of individuals involved to bear some of the burden of any 
insubstantial damage that they may suffer as a result of carrying out such 
services provided that the burden is not of such grave consequences that it is 
beyond the individuals’ capacity to bear. 205  
 
As Al-Jerba has rightly noted, it can be deduced from this statement that the Board 
distinguishes between substantial and insubstantial damage which may result from a legal 
act of the administration but the questions remains as to ‘substantial’ and ‘insubstantial’ 
damage and whether it differs from case to case and from individual to individual.206 
 
While the reference to the need to remove harm is in order, it is argued that reference to 
‘substantial’ harm, does appear to be redundant. The framing of the issue by the Board in 
this way is unsatisfactory.  In the event that the Board (as its judgements state) is of the 
considered opinion that the basic principle of Islamic law of delict on the need to remove 
unjustified harm is applicable to this distinct category of cases then there should be no 
requirement of ‘substantial’ damage. This is because embedded in the application of the 
principle is the need to determine that an individual in any given case has suffered 
disproportionate harm on behalf of the public in order to be entitled to compensation. The 
Board will find it difficult to ground this in Islamic law with the emphasis on compensation 
for unjustified harm. Indeed, it has completely abstained from any attempt to define or set 
such a standard. 
 
This leads on to the related issue of the actual value accorded to the principle of 
substantiality in the Board’s decision in the lawfully but unjustified loss cases. The weight 
of the ‘substantiality’ requirement remains rather unclear. Remarkably, in none of the cases 
has the Board determined the element was missing to warrant depriving the claimant 
compensation. One would have expected that given the disproportionality test of the 
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responsabilitie sans faute principle it referred to, at least a few of the cases would have 
fallen short of the ‘standard.’ The very absence of this determination of disproportionality 
in the decisions of the Board strongly supports the argument that the idea of risk-based 
liability was not in fact imported from French law as such, but simply the terminology as 
stated earlier. What has happened in reality is that both the Islamic and French systems 
share a risk-based liability for delict which have independently developed within both 
systems in their application. 
 
It appears that Saudi law generally recognises the need for compensation in any instance of 
official acquisition of or interference with private property. This view is implicit in Saudi 
law generally and is made clear in a major legislation, the Law of Dispossession and for 
the Public Good and Temporary Property Acquisition (Acquisition Law).207 Article 1 of 
the Acquisition Law provides that:   
 
 Ministries, governmental authorities and other institutions which represent 
public authorities have the right to acquire properties for the public good in 
return for a fair compensation. 
 
This is only after the public authority has exhausted available opportunities to refrain from 
interfering with private property rights in delivering a project for public benefit. Further, 
Article 7 of the law states that where a public authority intends to acquire a property for 
public purposes, it shall cause to be established an independent, broad-based committee of 
experts to determine appropriate compensation for the proposed acquisition. Interestingly, 
such a committee must also be formed for similar compensation purpose where a property 
is not to be acquired but where it may be negatively affected or harmed, by a proposed 
public project. Equally important is the provision of Article 20 of the Acquisition Law 
which states that: 
 
It is permitted to temporarily acquire properties for fair compensation that is 
not below commercial value as determined by the committee referred to in 
Article 7 in cases of emergency, natural disaster, epidemic and similar 
situations, or for the implementation of urgent public-interest projects which 
require such temporary acquisition. 
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Thus, the law recognises the need for compensation for temporary dispossession of 
property for public purpose even where this arises as a matter of emergency or natural 
disaster, matters arising outside of the control, design or will of the public authority. 
Further to this, Article 23 of the Acquisition Law mandates compensation for any harm 
that may be caused to property temporarily acquired pursuant to Article 20. Finally, Article 
24 confers on an aggrieved party a right to appeal the decision of any committee or public 
authorities concerned with the Acquisition Law to the Board of Grievances. Equally 
important is the provision of Article 18 of the Basic Law that:  
 
The State shall guarantee private property and its inviolability. No one shall 
be deprived of his property except for the public interest, provided that the 
owner be fairly compensated.  
 
In view of the foregoing provisions, it is something of a surprise to find suggestions of the 
existence of a theory of ‘substantial or insubstantial damage’ regarding the unjustified 
harm occasioned by public authorities in the decisions of the Board. The Board in these 
cases suggests that where a public authority has acted in a manner that causes harm to an 
individual while acting within its powers for the delivery of a project for public benefit or 
in the public interest, the claimant must show substantial damage to sustain a claim.  
 
5.4 Saudi Law and Delictual Liability of the State - An Assessment  
 
As Faigrieve has noted, the area of the liability of public liability authorities remains one 
which all legal systems are struggling with. This derives from the notorious fact of the 
complex nature of different aspects of law that combine in determinations of the issue on 
one hand, and the ever-expanding and complex nature of governmental activity on the 
other.208 The difficulty in making appropriate and just decisions regarding claims on 
liability of the state (in western legal systems at least) has been how to ‘balance the desire 
to provide redress for the victims of administrative wrongdoing with the need to take 
account of the public service frame work within which the defendants are operating.’209 Put 
in another way, the dilemma has been the desire to compensate individuals for harm done 
by public bodies and the desire not to intervene in the legitimate work of public authorities.   
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This part briefly considers how or whether these two concerns have operated in the 
considerations of the liability of public authorities for delict under Saudi law. It attempts to 
consider whether Saudi law - based as it is on Islamic law - has been successful in dealing 
with the liability of public authorities and whether it can continue to be successful in this 
endeavour in the future. In proceeding, it is important to state that the discussion that 
follows is rather tentative and in recognition of the limitations of the context. By way of 
recapitulation, it is relevant to recall that the reason for adopting the Scots and English law 
framework for analysing the work of the Board of Grievances (which is at the heart of this 
study) is because the former has a better developed and experienced system on the issue of 
delictual liability of the state.  
 
In contrast to the UK experience, it is evident from the foregoing analysis that many of the 
cases handled by the Board have been fairly straightforward. The Board has not 
encountered anything like the variety of situations that have been encountered in the UK 
courts. The Board has been far less troubled by the complexities of government that arise 
in the modern regulatory welfare state as experienced in the UK. As a result, there is far 
less material on which evaluations of success (or otherwise) in dealing with the liability of 
public authorities can be made than in the case of the UK jurisdictions. The types of 
situations in cases like X v Bedfordshire and Barrett v Phelps have not arisen in or been 
dealt with by the courts in Saudi Arabia.This circumstance necessitates some measure of 
speculation about how the Board of Grievances would deal with types of case that have not 
yet arisen but which may arise in the course of time given the expanding and sometimes 
changing nature and scope of governmental activities and state regulation of the private 
sector.  
 
In general, the approach of the Board appears to lean very much in the direction of 
imposing liability on public authorities in the same way as private persons. However, there 
is at least one area where the nature of the duty created by statute is construed in a manner 
that may not attract liability to the public authority, even where harm has arguably arisen 
under the public authority’s watch. In other words, Ta’ady is not easily established where a 
duty to act exists.  This is in the area of security. It is important in this regard to note that 
there is no private sector equivalent of this sector of the public service. The decision in O v 
Directorate for General Security discussed above suggests that the standard required for 
performance of a duty that goes with power, and by necessary implication, discretion on 
how to perform the duty (for example, policing) is a liberal one. This is ostensibly so in 
recognition of the immense challenges such public authorities as the security agencies for 
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example, face and the limited resources at their disposal at any time for performing their 
statutory duties. In a sense then, this is at least one important area of public authority 
liability that appears to be influenced to some extent by some form of public policy.  
 
One of the positions in the UK scholarly and judicial debate is that public and private 
bodies are to be treated alike, in other words, the Diceyan principle referred to earlier. This, 
it has been stated directly aligns with the Islamic law position on delictual liability of 
public authorities. UK experience suggests that this is a viable approach to public authority 
liability. Particular arguments would include, for example, that the ‘public law hurdle’ has 
proved unworkable so the courts have dropped it. However, the main principles of delictual 
liability in Islamic law as previously discussed in chapter four and above here, is wider in 
scope than the Scots and English position. The Islamic position encompasses different 
kinds of claims that will not be accepted under Scots and English law. An important 
example in this regard relate to the French law principle of responsabilite sans faute 
(which has a basis in Islamic law though the terminology was imported into the Board’s 
decision through the influence of Egyptian advisers as discussed earlier).  
 
The recognition of this last type of action has an important implication for considerations 
of public authority liability given its explicit recognition that public authorities are 
different from individuals in their nature. Saudi law admits the need to address public 
authority liability as ‘distinctive’ to the extent that it is difficult if not impossible to find 
equivalence in private law for treatment of public authority liability. However, Islamic law 
generally subjects the consideration of such liability to the equality principle inasmuch as 
that refers to securing compensation for unjustified harm based on the foundational 
principle of la darara wa la dirara, there should be neither causing of harm nor 
reciprocation of harm. In effect, there is a closer affinity between Islamic law and French 
law than between it and Scots and English law on this score even though its shares in some 
way, an attribute from both sides. 
 
A possible consequence of a liberal approach to recognition of public authority liability 
that has encouraged a restrained approach from the UK courts is the possibility of a flood 
of litigation against public authorities and the possible fallouts of this. It is relevant to take 
this issue on board in relation to the considerations of public authority liability for delict 
under Saudi law. So far, the docket of the Board on this line of cases appear to be quite 
manageable and the nature of the claims, basic and straightforward. However, it is not clear 
that things would not change in the future both as regards the number and complexity of 
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possible claims given the increasing awareness of the people of the possibility of 
challenging government actions or conduct leading to harm.  
 
It is suggested that these possibilities ought not to change the existing foundational 
principles on delictual liability of the state from what they ordinarily are now. It is in fact 
difficult to envisage that a radical change in the current principles will developed by the 
courts or argued by academics. Rather, it is posited that there are existing mechanisms in 
Islamic jurisprudence that will serve to maintain the much desired balance in ensuring that 
the legitimate aims of public authorities are achieved while individuals who suffer 
unjustified harm are duly compensated.  
 
A relevant jurisprudential tool in this regard is the principle of al-maslaha al-mursalah 
discussed in chapter two. As earlier stated, this principle acts as a ‘key turner’ that moulds 
application and interpretation of Islamic law to serve the public welfare and interest to 
ensure the betterment of life and faith in Muslim societies over time and place. The 
mechanism is an important tool in judicial interpretation that facilitates the flexibility of 
Islamic law. In this way, the considerations of issues like opening the floodgate of 
litigation against public authorities, effect of imposing liability on the treasury, possibility 
of defensive governance and even separation of powers concerns can and hopefully, would 
be urged on or taken into consideration by the court in deserving cases without a radical 
deviation from the foundational principles of Islamic law on state liability. 
 
One important reason for the foregoing view is the compensation regime applied by the 
Board. The approach of the Board to the award of compensation which has generally been 
(sometimes, as will be discussed, too rigidly) in accordance with the principle that damage 
should be clearly proven and compensated for without a view to profit. It is logical to argue 
that it is more equitable to the individual and society that the former be compensated in a 
manner that redresses harm done to him/her by the state without unduly prejudicing the 
state. This, in the Islamic view, stands a firmer chance of securing social harmony and 
peace, a fundamental objective of the Shari’ah, than otherwise.   
 
Moreover, the argument of the danger of encouraging defensive administration through (a 
wider) recognition of public authority liability for delict can be relatively weak when 
considered closely. Indeed, it can be argued that a legal paradigm of equality before the 
law as advocated under Islamic law largely takes care of this concern. Under this paradigm, 
the defensive behaviour problem is not limited to public bodies but an issue for everybody, 
Ch 5 Delictual Liability of the State and the Case Law 
 185
public or private. Consider medical negligence which troubles doctors in their work for 
instance. This is an issue which may negatively impact on their willingness to take risks in 
treating their patients. It is not clear that it impacts so negatively on their overall service 
delivery. Indeed, it is logical to assume that in such ‘risk-situations,’ the patient is usually 
keen to take the risk (s) in cases of required medical treatment. No doubt, few cases may 
eventually result as a consequence of such risk-situations but overall, such cases will be in 
the minority. A similar argument can be made in the case of public authorities. Their 
implementation of one policy or the other may involve some risk which can attract 
litigation but in the normal run of things, they do not.   
 
The threat of litigation acting as a justification not to undertake assigned or delegated 
responsibility can be regarded as illogical and inhibits socio-economic progress. Private 
bodies are also subject to litigation but in taking the risks associated with being proactive 
also benefit from great profit. An example of this may be the research and development 
undertaken by pharmaceutical companies. Where the risk is taken, a discovery may be 
made that will, in turn, benefit the public as well as increase profits. However, if it did not 
take the risk, because of a fear of litigation, there would be no further developments. 
Although there is a risk of litigation, as happen in cases involving thalidomide babies 
through use of the drug thalidomide,210 other developments may have resulted in no 
litigation at all. In the interests of social progress, it would, therefore, appear better to have 
a system where there is equality between public and private bodies in determinations of 
their delictual conduct. 
 
Finally, consideration has been given to the French law notion of responsabilitie sans 
faute; the notion of ‘lawfully’ caused, but unjustified loss. As demonstrated through 
analysis of some decisions of the Board, this is recognised under Islamic law of delict. 
While UK law does not at present recognise responsabilite sans faute as a general 
principle, some scholars have suggested that the time may not be far off when this may 
change. According to Booth and Squires, in certain circumstances, ‘the UK courts may be 
prepared to move in the direction of imposing liability on public authorities even where 
those authorities have not been negligent.’211 They went further to state that there are 
certainly a good number of cases where it is desirable for a public authority to take risks in 
the discharge of its duties but where it is inequitable to allow those who suffer harm as a 
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result of such activities to be left without compensation. However, providing compensation 
in all such cases 
 
constitute a substantial departure for UK law to take, and would effectively 
see a move away from fault being at the centre of the tort of negligence. It 
seems unlikely, as commentators have noted that a shift in UK law will 
occur in the foreseeable future. It nevertheless remains an interesting avenue 
for potential future development, and one towards which at least the King 
and Dennis cases suggest that UK courts may not be wholly antagonistic.212 
 
While this may be far from the minds of proponents of this view, it is argued that this 
prospect, and the current position of the law on ‘lawfully’ caused but unjustified harm 
under French law with regard to the liability of public authorities, supports the view that 
the principles of Islamic law of delict are relevant to and can be applied in this 
contemporary period beneficially as advocated in this study. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The examination of the delictual liability of public authorities under Scots and English law 
presents a rather complicated picture. It is not a straight forward matter to present a clear-
cut position on the attitude of the courts to the issue of when and under what circumstances 
the courts will find liability against a public authority. The law has been evolving. At 
times, the courts appear to expand the boundaries of liability. But at other times they 
appear to contract them.   
 
Legal and policy considerations play an important role in the judicial consideration of 
delict in general and as they relate to public or administrative authorities in particular. It is 
evident that public authorities face serious challenges in the discharge of their duties. In 
order to mitigate some of the difficulties that may arise from a broad imposition of the duty 
of care on public authorities, the courts developed the concept of the ‘Public Law Hurdle’ 
but this appears to have had limited application subsequently.  
   
Due essentially to policy considerations, the courts have been torn in different directions on 
whether to extend or limit the liability of public authorities. This has led to uncertainties in 
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the position of the law on the liability of public authorities and the courts seem to have 
adopted an ‘incremental’ approach which requires a lot of case-by-case analysis to 
determine the law in this important area of the law. However, this approach, as rightly 
noted by the Law Commission recently, and a host of commentators, has led to 
uncertainties.213 
 
The traditional position of the law on the liability of the state under Islamic law has been 
that the same foundational principles of delict in Islamic Law could apply both to 
individuals and public authorities without distinction. Glimpses into the cases broadly 
suggest that the Board is striving to apply the principles of Islamic law of delict in a 
consistent manner. However, it is evident that the Board has become confused in respect of 
its use of legal principles, in particular with reference to Khata and Ta’ady. A formal 
theoretical and analytical framework similar to that which exist in western legal systems, 
need to be developed. Judges should be trained adequately in the law schools and 
continuing education programmes introduced along such theoretical and analytic 
framework. This is in order to ensure that they are able to consistently apply general 
principles of Islamic law to current, and in particular, future, and presumably, more 
complex cases of delictual liability. 
 
A striking aspect of the discussion of the line of cases dealing with what is in French law 
referred to as ‘lawfully caused loss’ is the readiness of the Board to insist on compensation 
across a broad spectrum of loss occasioned by the lawful exercise of power and conduct of 
the duties of public authorities. It has been sought to show that a number of factors account 
for the tolerant approach of the Board to cases of this type. The first is the historical roots 
of the Board of Grievances. As stated earlier, the Board has a long historical pedigree in 
the Islamic system dating back to the very first two decades of the Islamic state. At an 
institutional level, it declined and disappeared about the 14th century along with other 
institutions of the Islamic state following the conquest of many Muslim lands by the west 
to resurface in post-colonial era in parts of the Muslim world like Egypt in a modified 
form, Majlis Dawla and in theory, was inaugurated under the office of the King by the 
modern founder of the Saudi state. This gap in institutional practice and the intervening 
incidence of colonialism has led to interpolation in the jurisprudence of an institution like 
the Board which declares fidelity to a different socio-legal system. The result is not always 
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negative. However, it is sometimes unproductive as argued with regards to the reference to 
the principle of risk-based liability by the Board.   
 
Underlying the creation of the Board in Saudi Arabia as earlier discussed, is an expression 
of an integral approach to organising the affairs of state along the lines of the classic 
Islamic system. That system in theory and practice emphasised as a principle of law, 
equality before the law. This extended to the person of the King. It envisages a state 
(government) under law, the Shar’iah with supremacy attributed not to any of the branches 
of government or the people, but rather God. The notion of justice is similarly built on this 
principle and thus it is easy to see how the institutions of state are deemed not be created at 
least, technically, and derive their legitimacy from their subordination to the higher 
authority of the Shar’iah. Both the governed and the government are under law in the 
literal and metaphoric sense of the law. Thus, the judiciary as an arbiter is not constrained 
in declaring governmental action, lawfully intended for the public benefit but which causes 
harm to an individual as unjustified and deserving of compensation.   
 
Having considered the Board’s decisions under different categories of cases involving 
public sector liability, including, for example, health, highways, education and others, it 
has become clear that the Board is attempting to apply consistently the principles of 
Islamic law of delict. However, there are some instances of unexplained deviation. This is 
understandable given the possibilities of error in judgement which is a criticism levelled at 
judges in virtually every legal system at some point or the other. Such errors may be more 
common within a legal system like the Saudi, which had traditionally not been known to 
subscribe to a system of law reports or following precedents though there is an indication 
this is slowly changing.  
 
Finally, an important aspect of this study is the claim that the liability of both public 
authorities and private individuals or bodies is, and should remain the same under Islamic 
law. The (few) cases available from the General Courts, a good number of which have 
been referred to in the discussion above, provide support for that important claim of this 
study. It is at least fairly clear that the Board generally applies the same principles of 
delictual liability of private individuals to public authorities. However, it is important to 
investigate this theme further through an examination of its practice of awarding damages. 
This is pursued in the next chapter. 
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Chapter six: Damage and Compensation: The Board of 
Grievances and Redress for Delictual Liability of the State 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Compensation is at the heart of considerations of delictual liability in Islamic law as it is in 
Scots and English law.1 This chapter examines assessment of damages and award of 
compensation by the Board of Grievances for delictual liability of the state in Saudi 
Arabia. The need for compensation when unjustified harm is established against a 
defender, as stated in chapter four, is the most basic principle derived by jurists from the 
well known Hadith which forms the foundation of delict in Islamic law: ‘there should be 
neither causing of harm nor reciprocation of harm.’ It is the centrality of this emphasis on 
compensation that informs the discussion in this chapter.    
 
The discussion of selected cases in the previous chapter has suggested that the Board will 
determine the liability of public authorities using the same principles that apply to private 
individuals. One important point that has emerged in this study thus far is the broad scope 
of delictual liability of the state under Saudi Law. In this circumstance, the compensation 
regime- principles and practice- of the courts involved in determining such liability is a 
very important aspect of the work of the judicial body vested with jurisdiction on state 
liability for delict. This will involve an examination of the rules that the Board may apply 
as well considering how consistently such rules are applied. Consideration will also be 
given to how the Board has applied such rules in respect of differing forms of injury, 
including personal injury, damage to property, ‘economic loss’ and immaterial damage. 
The focus will also be on the Board’s approach to the assessment of the categories of harm 
and appropriate compensation for them.  
 
The chapter proceeds in this way. The first part examines the nature and relevance of 
compensation under Saudi Law. While part two focuses on the types of damage regarded 
by the Board as harm for establishing a right to compensation, part three discusses 
assessment and award of damages. Some issues relating to assessment of damages are 
considered in this part and the final section concludes the chapter.   
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6.2 Compensation for Delictual Liability  
 
Compensation practice is important not only as the final product of the process of litigation 
but also because of its wider implications for the rule of law within the legal system. The 
rule of law admittedly is a much contested concept2 but what is of relevance here is the 
important role played by the courts as a refuge for the citizen in the determination of 
his/her rights against the state particularly in modern times. There is common agreement 
across various legal systems that the rule of law, particularly the role of the judiciary in 
securing justice and thereby fostering peace in society and at least discouraging resort to 
self-help, is a very important one.3  
 
In civil claims where compensation is a very important type of relief granted by the courts, 
the practice of any court on it will have implications for court users and the case is no 
different in Saudi Arabia. The rule of law dimension is better appreciated in the light of the 
direct and indirect impact that compensation practice has on the litigants in the process. 
From the perspective of claimants for instance, there is the issue of confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial system as an arbiter between the state and the individual. From the 
perspective of the state, there are the fiscal implications; impact on the public treasury 
apart from policy concerns regarding the functioning and discharge of the duties of public 
authorities.   
 
The determination of liability for delict is essentially with a view to ensure compensation 
in established cases of harm. In a system which recognises a relatively wide scope of 
liability, the compensation regime is of more than passing significance. As Fairgrieve has 
noted:   
 
A system which  conceives fault widely will be of reduced utility for the 
victims of wrongdoing if the categories of compensable loss are unduly 
restricted or the methods of measuring damages are unrealistic.4 
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This observation with specific reference to French administrative law is important. It is 
argued that Saudi law, in view of the theory of Islamic law and practice of the Board of 
Grievances on damages, considered below is directed at avoiding these weaknesses. 
 
6.2.1 Nature and Relevance of Compensation under Saudi Law 
 
There are different basic principles guiding compensation for delict in Islamic law 
depending on the nature of the injury or loss involved. In property damage claims as well 
as economic loss, the basic principle in Islamic law of delict is that the claimant is entitled 
to restitution, whenever possible.5 It was narrated the Prophet has declared that ‘the hand is 
in debt for what it has taken until it is returned.’6 Hence, if a person who usurped money or 
property of another returns the money or property in full and in the same state as it was 
originally, the person is acquitted of responsibility. If money and property could not be 
returned due to destruction or damage of a nature that renders them useless, money or 
property similar to the original must be handed over. 
 
There is a consensus among Islamic jurists that if things lend themselves to restitution in 
kind, compensation should be awarded ‘like for like.’ This is because a similar item will 
invariably resemble the lost or damaged item more closely than any monetary value, for 
being similar to the said item in looks, content and purpose.7 In other words, the money 
and property had a specific value and the same value must be restored or compensation 
paid in lieu. Scholars agree that if a damaged or destroyed item could be weighed or 
measured, it should be returned like for like. Resorting to compensation by value should 
only be allowed when no similar items are available. This is based on the Hadith ‘A 
container for a container, and food for food.’8 This is expressed as mithlun bi mithli, ‘like 
for like’. This principle, on the face of it, sounds simple and logical enough. However, as 
will be seen in the discussion below, in a developing system, this important classic 
principle can be challenging in application. 
 
Moreover, when assessing damages, the value of the damaged or destroyed item before any 
said damage occurred should be considered. Such assessment should be confirmed by 
specialized trustworthy experts. In his book Al-Mughni, the renowned scholar Ibn 
Qudammah says, with regard to estimating the value of similar items: ‘Its evaluation 
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should be referred to competent experts’9 by looking at what physical damage actually 
happened. The use of experts will be discussed below. As for potential damage, only if it is 
certain to happen, it should be regarded as actual fact. By contrast, potential profit, that is 
any profit which has not yet been realised, is not recognised and thus not compensated for 
in the award of damages. This is because Islamic law regard such a determination as 
speculation. In other words, there is no certainty as to its occurrence or amount. The idea of 
compensation is to replace the value that has been lost, and potential profit that has not 
been realised or established.10  
 
The general rule in matters of compensation is to redress the damage in kind, by repairing 
damaged items, as much as possible such as building up a damaged wall, or returning 
usurped property, as long as it remained intact. Failing that, compensation in value must be 
ordered.11 In other words, the Islamic position on compensation is to have the victim 
restored to the position s/he would have been if the harm had not occurred, precisely the 
same as the notion of restituto in integrum in common law if this is at all possible. 
 
There is a developed body of work on the scheme for assessment of liability, punishment 
and compensation for physical or personal injury claims in Islamic law.12 This is based on 
the fact that the sources have prescribed the relevant regime for punishment and 
compensation in this aspect of Islamic law.13 It is now relevant to discuss the types of 
damage regarded by the Board in cases involving public authorities as harm for 
establishing a right to compensation. 
 
6.3 Types of Damage that Count as Harm for the Purposes of 
Establishing a Right to Compensation for Injury 
 
The dimensions of harm have been considered in a number of cases by the Board. It serves 
to examine some, though not all, of them for an understanding of the categories of harm 
specifically as they relate to the liability of public authorities. As mentioned in chapter 
four, the forms of harm under Islamic Law can be categorised into two categories, material 
and immaterial harm. Material harm includes personal injury, damage to property and 
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economic loss. Immaterial harm, as discussed in chapter four and later in this chapter, is 
somewhat problematic. This is because while there is basic agreement that Islamic law 
recognises immaterial harm, there is some divergence of opinion on the appropriate 
approach for addressing it. While some are of the view that it should be dealt with as a 
matter of criminal liability, others view it as one that is at least, also delictual. The 
reluctance to recognise immaterial damage as delictual in nature is located in the view that 
it is impossible to quantify the extent or nature of reputation for instance in order to 
determine or measure the harm done to it. However, as suggested in chapter four, the 
preferred view is that immaterial harm does constitute harm and ought to attract 
compensation once reasonably proved. 
 
6.3.1 Material Harm and the Position of the Board 
 
In line with the general rule, damages will be awarded for certain injuries. Such injuries 
include: personal injuries (including, inter alia, death and permanent impairment; pain and 
suffering, analogous to solatium in Scots law); 14 damage to property, and economic loss 
(both pure and derivative). Decisions of the Board in respect of awarding damages under 
each of these categories will be discussed below.  
 
6.3.1.1 Personal Injury Cases 
 
Physical or personal injury claims are usually straightforward. Such cases may fall into one 
of three categories, death, permanent impairment and pain and suffering as a result of 
physical injury. In respect of cases involving death, D v Al-Madinah Municipality15, 
mentioned in the previous chapter, may be referred to. The claim for compensation for the 
death of the claimant’s son due to the negligence of the defender in constructing a public 
fountain was upheld by the Board.  
 
S v Al-Madinah Municipality16 represents a case concerned with permanent impairment.  
The son of the claimant was seriously injured leading to various permanent impairments as 
a result of falling into a waterfall constructed by the defender. The Board stated that the 
defender was obliged to observe necessary precautions in constructing the waterfall. The 
defender was in breach of its duty not to cause unjustified harm to people in its valid 
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attempt to beautify the city. It is relevant to note, as mentioned in chapter four, that the law 
allows compensation to the relatives of persons killed by wrongful acts. 
 
Similarly the Board has recognised pain and suffering as a result of physical injury, as a 
head of loss. In C v Ministry of the Interior,17 the court awarded the claimant compensation 
for suffering a physical and verbal attack from one of the defender’s operatives at a 
security check-point. Amongst the reasons given by the court for its award of 
compensation was that the claimant suffered great harm and damage, not only physical - 
the beating - but also moral - public humiliation. The court stated that its decision was 
based on an incident in which the Prophet awarded compensation to a Jew who was 
frightened by Umar, one of his companions. The Prophet said: ‘This is for the fright of 
Umar’. According to the Board, obviously, fright is moral damage turned physical as 
reflected on the Jew’s face. The Board also noted that Ibn Hazm said: ‘A barber cutting the 
hair of the Caliph Umar bin Al-Khattab was frightened by Umar for some reason. Seeing 
signs of the barber’s fright, Umar said: ‘I did not mean that. But I will compensate you for 
it’, and gave him forty Dirhams which by the standards of the time, was a very handsome 
amount.18 The Board is therefore justifying its decision with reference to recognition of 
immaterial harm in the Islamic legal system even though the examples given did not result 
from physical injury. The award of damages in these cases will be discussed below.  
 
6.3.1.2 Damage to Property 
 
As highlighted above, the general rule of compensation where damage to property is 
concerned is to redress the damage as far as possible. In other words, the Islamic position 
on compensation is to have the victim restored to the position s/he would have been if the 
harm had not occurred, precisely the same as envisaged in the principle of restituto in 
integrum in common law. This approach has however been changed with regard to car 
accidents in the Shari’ah courts in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The origin of the substitution of compensation by making restitution in kind for 
compensation in value by the Shari’ah courts can be traced to a circular issued by the 
Ministry of Justice in 1998. Some judges noted that the principle of restituto in integrum 
when interpreted as requiring restoring old cars (in accident cases) to their previous 
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position (through repair) did not achieve justice. This is because the cost of repairing an old 
car may far exceed its value prior to the damage. These judges were of the opinion that 
such cars should be valued by a reliable committee and the depreciation in the value be 
given as compensation. A Committee from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
Interior (responsible for traffic control) established to look into the matter agreed with this 
approach. It had found that this approach was supported by the views expressed by a 
former Chief Judge of Saudi Arabia when a judge consulted him on the issue in 1967. The 
Ministry of Justice then circulated the opinion to courts adjudicating such cases with the 
caveat that it will be left to the discretion of the court to make a judgement in accordance 
with article 49 of the Basic Law.19 It will be recalled in this regard that this is the approach 
adopted by the General Courts in cases between private individuals. This is exemplified by 
the decision of the General Court in N v B20 discussed in chapter four where the court 
ordered payment of the depreciated value of claimant’s car in an accident caused by the 
defender’s camels.  
 
The decisions of the Board suggests the Board has completely moved away from the 
application of restitution in kind to compensation in value as a rule rather than the 
exception as envisaged by classic Islamic jurists and even the circular mentioned above. 
Thus, the Board has developed a practice of awarding damages based on depreciation 
virtually as a rule, ignoring the possibility of restitution (through repair for instance) 
without consideration that the cost of restitution may be different from compensation in 
value. Rather, it simply ascertains and awards the depreciation value as a measure of 
restitutio in intergrum, an approach which appears to have also been adopted by the 
Shari’ah courts in relation to car accident cases.  
 
In Q v Municipality of Riyadh21 discussed in chapter five, the court accepted evidence on 
the depreciated value of the car and awarded damages for the accident accordingly. This 
case appears to be based on the opinion of the chief judge mentioned above and the 
practice of the Shar’iah court. 
 
The Board has applied this approach in several cases involving car accidents as a result of 
                                                 
19
 Circular No. 1128/T/13 of 10/11/1418 (1998) Ministry of Justice at 272-273. Article 49 of the Basic Law 
provides that ‘subject to the provisions of Article 53 herein (regarding the Board of Grievances), the courts 
shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate all disputes and crimes’. However, it would appear that the Ministry is in 
fact referring to Article 46 which states that ‘the judiciary shall be an independent authority. There shall be 
no power over judges in their judicial function other than the power of the Islamic Shari‘ah.’  
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 (2005) Case No 151/33 Mudawanah Al-Ahkam Al-Qadhaiyyah (1st ed Ministry of Justice 2007) 106.  
21
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the conduct of public bodies. For instance, in I v Municipality of Al-Madinah22 (discussed 
in chapter five), the Board held the defender liable in delict for failing to put up re-
direction or warning signs to highlight the works area on the road and awarded 
compensation to the claimant on the facts.  The Board also granted the claim for delict on 
similar facts in T v Municipality of Al-Qaseem.23 In both cases, the Board awarded 
damages based on experts’ accessed depreciation in the value of the cars. 
 
It is important to note that the opinion highlighted above and circulated to courts applied 
specifically to cases where there has been damage to old cars only. It was developed to 
ensure that restitution; the ‘like for like’ rule is not undermined. In other words, the judges 
of the Shari’ah court were concerned that restitution in this line of cases lead to injustice 
against the defender. This is because in practice, when restitution is ordered which require 
repairing the damaged old car, the cost of restoration is usually over and above the value of 
the car prior to the accident. This, it was considered amounted to an injustice against the 
defender who will be required to pay more than the value of the car if it had not been 
damaged in an accident. This is because profit, as earlier stated is not an objective of 
Islamic law of delict.  
 
An attempt to deviate from this approach of compensation in value for property claims was 
invalidated by the Appeal Chambers of the Board. In one case, T v Municipality of 
Makkah24 the claimant filed a lawsuit against the Municipality demanding reconstruction 
of a fence that had been demolished by the defender. The first instance court upheld the 
claim. However, the Appeal Chamber, while upholding the finding of liability, struck 
down the reconstruction order. It stated the court has no authority to oblige the defender to 
act in a certain manner. What is required is for the defender to pay monetary compensation 
sufficient to cover the cost of restoring the damaged property to the extent that the court 
considered appropriate to achieve justice in the matter.  
 
While the decision of the court of first instance appears to have complied with the general 
principle requiring restitution, the decision of the Appeal Court clearly preferred an award 
of monetary compensation over restitution. The decision of the Appeal Court in this case 
appears to be applying a different rule for public bodies contrary to the idea that the law is 
the same for all.  There is not the underlying justification that there is in the road traffic 
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cases. The basis for this position as stated by the court is the need to be wary of interfering 
with the functioning of administrative authorities; public bodies. In western legal 
terminology, this can be described as need to defer to the political branch; the separation of 
powers argument. In light of this, it is relevant to further comment on the practice of the 
Board in its compensation practice in this regard.  
 
In adopting the approach of compensation for value in property cases generally, the Board 
has expressed justification in the need to respect the principle of separation of powers. 
Beyond this however, it is suggested that a wholesale adoption of this approach may work 
both positively or otherwise when considered from not just the administrative but also 
fiscal perspective. Importantly, while it is true that the cost of repairing an old car, as noted 
by some judges, may far exceed the value of the car prior to the damage, simultaneously an 
award of monetary compensation where restitution is possible may conflict with the no-
profit principle (discussed further below). In T v Municipality of Al-Qaseem, for example, 
the claimant’s car was evaluated by three accident repair garages. The first garage valued 
the car before the accident at SR85,000 and after at only SR42,500, the difference being 
SR42,500. The second garage valued the same car before the accident as worth SR88,000 
and after at SR48.000, the difference being SR40,000. The third valuation before the 
accident was SR92, 000 and after at SR60,000 with the difference being only SR32,000. 
The question then arises as to how much compensation the claimant would be entitled to.  
 
According to the Board, the claimant deserves the depreciation in the value of his car but 
the difficulty is the fact that the valuations vary. Therefore, the Board takes the average of 
the three different valuations amounting to approximately SR38,167. In this case, as the 
claimant was held to be 50% liable for the accident following a Traffic Agency accident 
report, he was awarded only half of this amount. Given, then, that the claimant is awarded 
the average difference in price before and after the incident, it is possible, if the claimant 
subsequently sells the car for the highest valuation that s/he will have profited. Equally, if 
s/he is only able to sell the car for the lowest valuation, s/he will then have made a loss. 
Although the sale of the car is a future and contingent event, it remains relevant because it 
shows the difficulty in using an average valuation and how it is possible to go against the 
no-profit principle under the Islamic law of delict through the Board’s approach.  Further, 
the claimant may repair the car at the lowest possible expense but will have profited from 
the award of compensation.  
 
With regard to compensation for the depreciation in value of property as a result of public 
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works undertaken by public bodies, such as construction of a road or a bridge, the Board is 
obliged to follow provisions of a statute on this issue. Royal Order No. 2203725 defines the 
basis for compensation regarding affected properties as a result of public projects. It states 
that: 
 
 Compensation must be granted for damage caused to property as a result of 
public projects carried out; that can be achieved by estimating the value of 
the property before and after the damage, and the difference is considered 
the value of the damage, which should be paid to the property owner as 
reparation for the damage caused to his property.  
 
This Royal Order applies to cases where public works have led to depreciation in the value 
of property. Compensation is awarded under the Royal Order precisely because restitution 
is not possible. The Royal Order, it is submitted, correctly applies the principles of 
compensation in lieu where restitution is not possible or, as in cases involving public 
authorities, not desirable in the general public interest.  
 
In sum, in view of the varying possibilities which also may arise on a case by case basis, it 
would appear a better approach for the Board not to adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, 
whereby the assessed depreciation in the value of an item is always calculated and 
awarded, as it does currently to damage to property claims. It is suggested rather that it 
may serve the public interest better, at least from a fiscal perspective, to decide on the 
specific facts based first on the fact that Islamic law is flexible enough to accommodate 
this. In some cases it may be that restitution, for example, serves as a better alternative to 
simply assessing damages. It is argued that the principle of Al-Maslaha Al-Mursalah is 
better carried forward in this manner.   
 
6.3.1.3 Economic loss 
 
From some of the decisions of the Board it is clear that economic loss is recognised as a 
type of harm.  Economic loss can be divided into two categories; ‘pure economic loss’ and 
‘derivative’ economic loss including, for example, economic loss deriving from physical 
injury (such as loss of earnings) or damage to property. It has been noted that with regard 
to public authorities, the English (and presumably, Scots law) courts are reluctant to award 
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damages for ‘pure economic loss’ while their French counterparts are more disposed to 
this.26 It is arguable that in theory, the position of Islamic law and the Board is the 
‘generous approach’ of the French courts which will more readily accommodate claims for 
pure economic loss arising from the conduct of public authorities.27 However, in practice, 
the Saudi experience suggests that cases of pure economic loss will remain few and far 
between.  
 
Most of the cases for economic loss determined by the Board are for derivative economic 
loss. However the facts of Z & 29 Ors v Municipality of Riyadh28 discussed in the previous 
chapter is an example of pure economic loss. In the case, the construction of a multiple-
floor public car park by the municipality was held to have depreciated the surrounding 
properties of the claimants.  
   
The Board awards compensation for loss of earnings arising from the conduct of public 
authorities which has resulted in unjustified harm. Y v Al-Dammam Municipality29 provides 
a good reference point on the Board’s approach to general and specific claims of loss of 
earnings arising from the misconduct of public authorities. The claimant made a claim 
against the defender concerning the confiscation of a quantity of fish, two cars, tools, and 
his fishing licence and two fishing boats. The claimant demanded the return of the 
confiscated items as well as compensation for the loss of the cars for the two years.  The 
claim also included a demand for compensation for the confiscation of the fish, boats and 
the fishing licence. 
 
The defender argued that the vehicles, the tools and the fishing licence had been returned to 
the claimant (after filing the case) and the boats were not confiscated. As for the fish, it 
was confiscated in accordance with the municipal regulations and, therefore, the claim 
ought to be dismissed. The claimant confirmed that he had received his fishing licence and 
the two cars after filing the case.  
 
The Board held that since the claimant had sold fish in a prohibited place he was subject to 
the prescribed fine in addition to the confiscation of his fish, and the possible suspension of 
his fishing licence. However, in confiscating the claimant’s vehicles, the defender had 
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exceeded its authority, as the prescribed penalties did not include such confiscation. This 
was regarded as a serious breach of the relevant regulations by the defender. The illegal 
seizure had caused economic loss to the claimant. The Board noted that this was 
particularly hard on the claimant, who was illiterate, and whose only actual and potential 
source of income was fishing.  
 
The Board awarded compensation to the claimant for the verified period of confiscation of 
his vehicles. However, it dismissed the claim for damages for the fishing licence and the 
two boats. The Board found there was no evidence they had been confiscated, while the 
fishing licence had expired even before it was seized. Consistent with its positive finding 
on the wrongfully confiscated vehicles, it is to be assumed that the Board would have 
awarded compensation for loss of livelihood if the license had not expired since there was 
no provision in the relevant legislation for confiscation of fishing licences.  
 
Furthermore, where a claimant has been unlawfully detained and thus prevented from 
pursuing a livelihood, the Board is disposed to granting compensation on proof of liability 
on the part of the detaining authority. There are now a number of cases where this issue has 
come up before the Board particularly in view of the rising numbers of detentions based on 
security concerns. In some unlawful detention cases such as N v Ministry of the Interior,30  
I v Hael Police31 and F v Department of Immigration,32 discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Board stated that the act of the public authorities was in violation of the law causing 
harm to the claimant by restricting his freedom and depriving him of running his business 
and caring for his family. The Board then awarded damages to the claimants for the whole 
period of their unlawful detention taking into account loss of earnings. 
 
Similarly, in N v Ministry of Finance33 the claimant claimed that the Customs Department 
used his truck in an operation to arrest a gang smuggling liquor from the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) to Saudi Arabia without telling him or arranging for such use in advance 
with him or with security agencies. The Customs Department simply arranged with the 
driver without the knowledge of his employer. During the journey, the driver was arrested 
and the truck confiscated by the custom authorities of the UAE. The driver was then turned 
over to the competent authorities in Saudi Arabia where he was jailed for two years until 
                                                 
30
 (2005) Unreported Case No. 2589/1/Q/1426. 
31
 (2006) Unreported Case No. 747/1/Q/1427. 
32
 (2001) Unreported Case No. 97/3/Q/1422.  
33
 (2006) Unreported Case No. 960/3/Q/1426.  
 
 Ch 6 Damage and Compensation 
 201
the truth emerged. The driver was released, and compensation for damage caused to him 
was paid to the value of 200,000 Riyals by a Royal Order. The truck remained impounded 
in the UAE for over five years.  
 
The claimant requested compensation for the impounding of the car for the afore-
mentioned period at a daily rate of (five hundred Saudi Riyals) travel costs he incurred 
over a period of five years to secure the release of the truck, a reimbursing of the fine he 
paid to the UAE arising from the impounding of the truck. One million Saudi Riyals for 
psychological damage and defamation of his brand name and his own reputation due to the 
false charges of alcohol smuggling. The defender responded by stating that this matter was 
the subject of the afore-mentioned Royal Order and thus there is no objective merit to the 
claim made by the claimant. 
 
The Board held that the defender’s actions resulted in damage to the claimant must be 
removed. This could only be achieved by payment of compensation for truck rental for the 
period during which the claimant’s truck was impounded. This is in compliance with the 
Prophet’s saying ‘There should be neither causing of harm nor reciprocation of harm.’ 
The Board awarded damages for loss of use of the truck and the fine paid for recovery of it 
by the claimant. As for the claimant’s demand for compensation for transport expenses for 
employees to pursue the matter of getting the truck back, the Board rejected this claim as 
unproven. With reference to the claimant’s demands for compensation for moral damage, 
the court considered the issuance of the afore-mentioned Royal Order (awarding the driver 
the sum of 200,000 Riyals) and the statement of facts and the verdict in his favour in this 
matter as well as the compensation for physical damage as sufficient to redress the alleged 
moral damage. This aspect of the case is further discussed in the section on immaterial 
damage to reputation. 
 
A key principle that is emphasised in the assessment and award of damages for economic 
loss by the Board is the ‘no-profit’ principle. This is to the effect that a claimant is only 
entitled to the actual loss and is not allowed to make a profit from the award. This approach 
is grounded in the general principles of compensation under Islamic law as stated earlier. 
This principle, when adhered to by the court would appear to have taken on renewed 
significance from a policy perspective in relation to the award of damages against public 
authorities.  
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Indeed, in N v Municipality of Riyadh34 the concern of the Board was expressed that the 
court should be mindful of the fact that the awards are paid from the public treasury. In that 
case, the claimant stated that his establishment had been operating in the business of 
general car-hire for several years. It moved to a new building that had a space for car-
parking and a small workshop and a building for the administration. At this location, the 
business had no ill-effects on the neighbours. The municipality then notified them that they 
had to obtain a licence to practice the business activity there. It then cut off their water 
supply for two months. The municipality also took two cars belonging to the claimant’s 
establishment and kept them in the municipality’s car pound. The claimant demanded 
compensation for the municipality’s disconnection of the water supply from his buildings. 
He also demanded the car-hire value of said two cars which were still in the municipality’s 
car pound. The judge inspected the car pound personally and found the claimant’s cars 
there. The municipality argued that they impounded the cars to force the claimant to vacate 
the site, since all other attempts to eject him had failed.  
 
The trial court found that there was no basis for the confiscation of the cars. It ordered the 
defender to pay the claimant the value of car-hire of similar vehicles for impounding his 
cars, that is: the amount of twenty-five thousand and two hundred riyals. The claim for cost 
of water incurred because of the Municipality’s disconnection of his building’s water-
supply was rejected for lack of evidence. On appeal, the Board’s Appeal Chamber queried 
the award for being excessive. The Appeal Chamber stated that it agreed with the Court on 
the eligibility of the claimant to compensation as a matter of principle but disagreed with 
the calculation of compensation. It noted that there was a need for a holistic view of the 
real economic loss that arises from a case in deciding the amount of damages that should 
be awarded. In this case, it noted that an allowance should have been made for the 
expenses the claimant would have incurred in running and maintaining the vehicles if they 
had not been impounded. These ought to be reduced from the award. It emphasised that 
such compensation should be sufficient just to cover damage suffered by the claimant 
without any excess, and urged the trial court to bear in mind that compensation would have 
to come out from the public purse. 
 
In compliance with this order, the trial court adjusted the award accordingly. It is 
interesting to note however that the trial court commented on the reference to the need for 
caution in making awards against public authorities since such are drawn from the treasury. 
                                                 
34
 (1995) Unreported Case No 774/1/Q 1415.  
 Ch 6 Damage and Compensation 
 203
According to the court, the need for caution was a general one. Caution ought to be 
exercised in all cases, whether the decision involved the public treasury or a private person 
or body. This statement prima facie is an affirmation of the need for even-handed justice to 
all parties in litigation irrespective of their status. It also can be interpreted as confirmation 
of the view canvassed throughout a substantial part of this study that the same principles of 
delictual liability apply to both private persons and public authorities under Islamic law. 
 
6.3.2 Immaterial Harm 
 
From the cases to be discussed below it may be observed that immaterial harm is of three 
forms: the pain and suffering of an injured person (including psychological pain); damage 
to reputation (defamation) and for loss of liberty (independently of any loss of earnings). 
Developments under each of these categories will be discussed further. However, it is 
appropriate to start by considering the recognition of immaterial harm in the jurisprudence 
of the court.  
6.3.2.1 The Question of Recognition of Immaterial Harm 
 
In light of the previous discussion in chapter four regarding the controversy on immaterial 
harm among the Muslims scholars, it is not surprising that there is some difficulty in 
identifying the firm position of the Board on the issue of immaterial harm. While the cases 
show that sometimes the Board appears to have taken the liberal view that immaterial harm 
ought to be compensated, it has not done so in a decisive manner. A good starting point 
may be to refer to the view expressed by a senior judge of the Board on immaterial harm. 
According to him, generally, ‘no compensation is paid for intangible personal damage such 
as psychological pain and anguish.’ 35  
 
In support of this view, he cited one of the early decisions of the Board where it held that 
‘compensation should include all definite actual damage that is both clear and direct 
according to convincing evidence with relevant documents.’36 This clearly suggests the 
Board will not grant claims for immaterial harm. This position may not be unconnected 
with the dominant jurisprudential approach of the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence 
with its heavy reliance on textual sources in rulings and adjudication. While this approach 
may have been the position of the Board in the past, a number of its decisions delivered 
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after its reconstitution as an independent body, shows it is gradually moving towards a 
more progressive view on compensation for immaterial harm as the following cases 
show.37 The researcher found through informal discussions with some judges of the 
Shari’ah court that the Shar’iah courts have consistently refused to recognise immaterial 
harm as a head of claim and to award any compensation for such claims. This also includes 
pain and suffering that may have arisen through physical injury. This approach is in line 
with the restrictive view mentioned in chapter four.38  
 
6.3.2.2 Pain and Suffering  
 
As stated above, pain and suffering does form a category of material harm but it may also 
fall under the category of immaterial harm in the form of mental anguish, for example. As 
will be discussed presently, the Board has recognised this distinction and awarded 
compensation for immaterial harm of this nature.  The decisions of the the Board suggests 
that in a few cases as in C v Ministry of the Interior, the Board treats pain and suffering as 
material harm. The Board sometimes also treats pain and suffering as immaterial harm but 
some confusion remains as to what the status of immaterial harm is.  
 
One example of when the Board has recently preferred to award compensation on such a 
basis can be found in M and N v Ministry of Health39 . This was a case which involved a 
claim for trauma arising from the defender’s alleged delict for the kidnap of the claimants’ 
baby from a public hospital shortly after delivery. In holding the hospital liable for the loss 
of the baby, the Board awarded compensation to the claimants ‘to console the parents for 
the loss of their son and to compensate them for the material and immaterial harm that has 
resulted from the defender’s delict.’40 The immaterial harm in this case was the 
psychological trauma suffered by the parents as a result of the loss of their child while the 
actual loss constituted the material harm. 
  
However, despite this decision and the decision of C v Ministry of the Interior mentioned 
above recognising the material and immaterial harm of pain and suffering, the Board 
clearly remains reluctant in awarding damages for such heads of claim. Indeed in K v 
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Ministry of the Interior41 an employee of the defender brought an action for judicial review 
to quash his transfer to another city. He was successful in his claim but the judgement was 
not implemented by the defender. The claimant then returned to the trial court with a claim 
for compensation based on the psychological pain and anxiety he suffered as a result of the 
non-implementation of the judgement. The trial court then awarded him the sum of three 
hundred thousand riyals. The defender appealed this latter decision. The Appeal Chamber 
of the Board overturned the trial court’s award of damages. This was because according to 
the Appeal Chambers, there are no guidelines governing the issue of immaterial harm, and 
‘it involves conjecture and speculation, especially since there are no valid criteria for 
assessing the extent and value of immaterial harm.’42 The Appeal Chambers has followed 
the first opinion explained in chapter four. 
 
There remains an inconsistency and a lack of certainty in the decisions of the Board with 
respect to awarding compensation for immaterial pain and suffering. This is evident 
through the fact that both K v Ministry of the Interior and M and N v Ministry of Health 
were in 2008 but the final judgement in each is, remarkably, diametrically opposed. It 
would appear that there exists a tendency among some judges towards the liberal view to 
compensate for immaterial harm, which is suggested within the spirit of justice in Shar’iah. 
 
6.3.2.3 Damage to Reputation 
 
Damage to reputation is another form of immaterial harm which has been considered by 
the Board. In X v Ministry of Information and Culture43the claimant claimed that the 
defender’s act of withdrawing his book on judges and the judiciary in Saudi Arabia from 
sale to the public caused him harm and loss for which the defender ought to compensate 
him. He had obtained clearance of the defender as the appropriate body for granting 
permission for all publications in the country. He sought a number of reliefs from the court. 
One of them was for compensation for immaterial harm. This included loss of reputation 
leading to the stoppage of his contribution to knowledge as since the withdrawal of the 
book by the defender, his newspaper columns had been stopped by the publishers. In 
addition, his health was negatively affected. He demanded four hundred thousand Saudi 
Riyals for this heading of loss. On this specific claim, the Board held: 
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… it must be noted that compensation must be for actual, certain and clearly 
ascertainable harm. The claimant has failed to provide what can be relied on 
for this (claim) other than mere allegation. Therefore, the Board considers 
that the compensation he was awarded (under other headings) is sufficient 
to repair any other harm that he (the claimant) is claiming.44 
 
Thus, the Board summarily dismissed the claim for loss of reputation. It can be argued that 
at least in theory, if the claimant had provided what could have been relied upon in proof of 
his claim, the Board would have granted it. As will be argued further below, the approach 
in this case amounts to a fictional recognition of immaterial harm since it suggests in one 
and the same breath that the award made for material harm suffices for it. It is reasonable 
to expect that if unproven, there should be no basis for any award being made particularly 
since the tenor of the judgments which adopted this approach suggests a reluctance to 
compensate for it based on aversion to compensate for  a harm whose value cannot be 
determined. 
 
The reluctance of the Board to go beyond recognition to actually making an award for 
moral or immaterial loss arising from damage to reputation is also demonstrated in N v 
Ministry of Finance45 (which has been discussed above and included claims for damage to 
reputation). The court considered the issuance of the afore-mentioned Royal Order (which 
awarded the driver of the truck the sum of SR 200,000), the positive finding on the 
innocence of the claimant as well as the compensation for material damage, sufficient to 
redress the alleged moral damage. 
  
This aspect of the decision ought to be criticised on two scores; first is the fact that the 
Royal Order was confined to the driver only. More important, however, is the point that the 
claim for damage to the reputation of the claimant was a very grave issue in light of the 
fact that Saudi Arabia is well known as an Islamic State which takes a strong view against 
the consumption of and trade in alcohol. There is good reason to believe that any 
imputation of engagement in this line of business will considerably hurt the business and 
reputation of an individual in the circumstances of the claimant. Thus, the decision of the 
Board to the effect that the positive finding on the innocence of the claimant and the 
compensation for material harm was sufficient to cover the immaterial harm in this case 
fell well short of delivering justice on the facts.  
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However, an example of where the Board did recognise compensation for pure immaterial 
harm for damage to reputation is T v Ministry of Information and Culture.46 The claimant 
appealed the decision of the Commission for Review of Violations of Printing and 
Publishing Law (the Commission) when it failed to award him adequate compensation for 
the damage to his reputation caused by the newspaper subject of the complaint. In 
upholding the appeal, the Board noted the prohibition of publishing false information or 
news about anyone by virtue of Article 9 of the Printing and Publishing Law.47 According 
to the Board, the newspaper had breached the law. It published incorrect news that 
damaged the claimant’s dignity and reputation and disclosed facts pertaining to an 
investigation without the permission of the competent authority, as required by the law. 
The Board further referred to Article 35 of the same law which provides that: 
 
A newspaper that incorrectly attributes a statement to any person or 
publishes inaccurate news must make amends by publishing a correction 
free of charge, at the request of the person concerned, in the first issue after 
the request for correction is made. This is to appear in the same place of the 
newspaper where the erroneous news or statement was published or in a 
prominent place in the same newspaper. Those who suffer any damage have 
the right to claim compensation.48 
 
The Board stated that the newspaper report contained innuendos that the claimant was a 
criminal, a murderer who killed his son. These completely untrue stories and news, the 
Board held, had a grievous impact on the claimant, since he was depicted as a criminal and 
murderer; and his sanity and morals were questioned. This is why the award made by the 
Commission was inadequate. It stated further that a central objective of Islamic law is the 
protection a personal’s mental well-being and personal honour. The claimant’s sanity and 
honour were questioned, his privacy was violated, his trade name, and financial and 
commercial transactions were also damaged. This damage should be covered by monetary 
compensation that matches and redresses its effects. The compensation specified by the 
Commission is less than the damage suffered in what Islam protects from harm and 
transgression and lists this amongst its five cardinal objectives. It thus quashed the award 
and remitted the application back to the Commission.  
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It has been suggested in X v Ministry of Information and Culture49 that compensation is 
awarded for material harm suffered would have been adequate compensation for any 
immaterial harm suffered in the form of a damaged reputation, provided, of course, it has 
been proven. In T v Ministry of Information and Culture50, however, compensation for a 
damaged reputation has been recognised independently of material harm. This is a 
progressive judgement moving away from the restrictive approach.  
 
6.3.2.4 Loss of Liberty  
 
Loss of liberty (independently of any loss of earnings) arising from unlawful detention has 
been demonstrated in several cases to amount to an intentional delict, as discussed in 
chapter five. It will be seen from the cases below that the Board has consistently accepted 
that loss of liberty through unlawful detention will give rise to a claim for immaterial harm. 
Compensation awarded in cases of this nature to cover pain and suffering as well as  
damage to reputation but the loss of liberty itself has been considered independently 
because there appears to be consistency in the decisions of the Board in respect of such 
cases.  
 
In D v Ministry of the Interior,51 for instance, the Board held that the wrongful detention of 
the claimant had led to the deprivation of his liberty as well as negatively affecting his 
dignity and reputation. The detention has also caused him mental anguish deriving in part 
from his separation from his family. Such damage, although immaterial, must be assessed 
by the Court for sufficient compensation fit to redress and remove its impact on him. The 
proper cause, it further held was to repair the situation with certain gratification brought 
about by an award of financial compensation.  
 
Likewise, in S v Ministry of the Interior52 the Board, in addition to claims for loss of 
earnings due to unlawful detention, granted the claim for the harm of depriving him of his 
freedom, and preventing him from caring for his family and the accompanying mental 
anguish and the sense of humiliation and contempt he suffered. It is clear from these 
decisions that moral damage was estimated separately and independently from the material 
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damage of economic loss. There remain, nonetheless, elements of both material and 
immaterial harm. 
 
In a recent decision concerning unlawful detention, the Board held that ‘it is an established 
jurisprudential as well as judicial principle that when the Khata of the administration 
causes harm to any individual, the victim deserves compensation to repair the material and 
immaterial harm suffered.’53The victim in this case suffered from a restriction to his liberty 
through unlawful detention. As such, immaterial harm was clearly established. The mere 
fact of unlawful detention was sufficient to establish immaterial harm in this case, there 
was no consideration of any psychological harm for example.  
 
It is clear that the Board has adopted a consistent approach in awarding compensation for 
immaterial harm in cases involving loss of liberty through unlawful detention. This is 
perhaps due to the severity of the unlawful restriction of liberty together with the far 
reaching implications in violation of the basic principle in Islamic law in respect of liberty 
as indicated in chapter five.  
 
6.3.2.5 Compensation for Immaterial Harm- From Fiction to Reality? 
 
It can be deduced from this line of cases that the Board does grant claims for immaterial 
harm despite a good number of instances where it disclaims the propriety of recognising it 
as a separate head of claim. However, some of the cases suggest this may be limited to 
instances of ‘mixed’ as opposed to ‘pure’ cases of immaterial harm. ‘Mixed’ cases of 
immaterial harm here refer to those cases where the claimant claims not only for 
immaterial harm like psychological harm or emotional pain but also material loss. ‘Pure’ 
cases of immaterial harm refer to those cases where the claim may only be for immaterial 
harm in any form.   
 
The Board’s approach in the mixed cases is significant to the extent that it shows the 
fiction in the Board’s rejection in some cases of the validity of immaterial harm as an 
independent head of claim. That fiction, implied in the discussion of some of the foregoing 
cases, plainly stated is that it is not logical for it to disclaim the validity of claims for 
immaterial harm in the same breath that it declared them covered in compensation awarded 
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for material harm as it did in some of the cases examined above. In other words, these 
‘mixed’ cases (claims for material and immaterial harm) provided an important opportunity 
for the Board to be categorical as to the non-recognition of immaterial harm. It did not 
disclaim the validity of immaterial harm claims but (in most cases) preferred rather to 
subsume them under material harm awards.  
 
In the progressive movement towards the more liberal approach, it would appear that it has 
been almost an essential factor that before the Board will entertain a claim for immaterial 
harm of any nature, that there must also have been material harm. Even in such cases the 
Board has suggested that compensation for the material harm is adequate to also 
compensate for the immaterial harm. However, it is envisaged that there will come a time 
in the near future when the Board could conceivably award compensation for immaterial 
harm independently of material harm. This is likely to come through the new generation of 
judges who appears to be in favour of the ‘liberal approach’.  
 
There are hardly any claims of pure immaterial harm in the decisions of the Board and the 
position of the Board on such cases remain ambivalent. However, the Board did recognise 
compensation for pure immaterial harm in T v Ministry of Information and Culture54 as 
indicated above. Note the attention of the Board to various ways a person can, and in this 
case, had been affected by immaterial harm. Interestingly, the Board did not request 
specific proof of the harm suffered by the claimant. This may be due to the nature of the 
case as one for judicial review where the application had already been determined as being 
meritorious by the relevant administrative body.  
 
It is also worthy of note that the Board in this case was determining a case which has a 
statutory basis as the cause of action. It is not clear whether the results would have been 
different if this was the equivalent of a ‘common law’ action- where the claimant relied on 
the general principles of Islamic law- rather than a statute. It is suggested that the result 
ought not to be different in view of the relevant legislation subject of this claim. This is 
because, the Board, like all other courts in Saudi Arabia is required to only uphold laws in 
conformity with the Shari’ah as stipulated by Article 48 of the Basic Law. Thus, the Board 
implicitly upheld the proceedings under the relevant law as one which it recognised as 
being in conformity with the Shari’ah. 
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This decision raises a number of issues worthy of some comment. First is the affirmation 
of the position that immaterial harm is recognised as a head of claim under Islamic law of 
delict as discussed earlier. Second is the emphasis of the Board in this case on the 
importance of moving beyond the fictional recognition of claims for immaterial harm and 
the need to actually make a definitive award for it. To secure the needs of justice as 
recognised under Islamic law. This it is suggested is a move to reality.  
 
It does appear that a new generation of judges who at present can be found mainly at the 
first instance (trial) level of the Board may be more disposed to recognising immaterial 
harm. Incidentally, this does not seem to be the case with the Shari’ah courts as stated 
above. The main challenge has been how to overcome the requirement of valid criteria to 
determine the existence or occurrence of immaterial harm. This concern is grounded in the 
general aversion of Islamic law to speculation; the courts require evidence to substantiate 
the claim of immaterial harm virtually in the same way they do material harm. This 
approach may be easily questionable from the perspective of a legal system which has 
taken for granted that immaterial harm can be inferred from or follows certain sets of facts 
or conduct. However, it does appear that a more rigorous threshold either exists in or has 
been required in practice under Islamic law.   
 
It is suggested that the lingering reluctance of the courts, both the Board and the General 
Courts in this regard can to a large extent be reduced, if not removed through the 
introduction of empirical evidence in such proceedings. This can be done through litigants 
introducing reliable reports of psychologists and related experts who can provide an 
assessment of the psychological health of the claimant. As it has been noted earlier (and 
further discussed below) the Board does rely heavily on expert evidence in traffic cases for 
instance. The relevance of expert witnesses in decision-making in Muslim society and legal 
determinations in particular is one with considerable pedigree. A recent study has analysed 
the important role that expert witnesses have played in the Qadis (Muslim judges) court 
from historical times till date. They have helped through the provision of their expertise, to 
make the Qadi and his court relevant to society in a changing world of science and 
technology.55 It is suggested that the use of expert evidence in the considerations of 
immaterial harm claims by the Board will further advance the legitimacy of Board in the 
same way.  
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In sum, it seems that with regard to the award of compensation for immaterial harm the 
Board is still waiting for someone to ‘ring the bell.’ The Board has on few occasions taken 
some tentative steps towards the tower as demonstrated in a number of cases discussed in 
this section. However, about the boldest step yet is that taken in T v Ministry of 
Information and Culture. As discussed in chapter four, the reluctance to award damages for 
immaterial harm is mostly due to the view taken by some scholars that it is impossible to 
determine the extent of the harm for the purpose of awarding compensation. Moreover, 
there is a criminal punishment to deter the wrongdoer. However, in view of the strong 
argument that immaterial harm is an integral part of the Islamic law of delict, one can only 
hope that the Board will abandon its ambivalence on this important aspect of 
compensation. The progressive, albeit slow, movement towards the second opinion, which 
allows compensation for immaterial harm as discussed in chapter four, may be attributed to 
the appointment of a new generation of judges who seem to be more liberal in their 
thinking than perhaps their predecessors. This may be due in part to the educational 
benefits of globalisation. There is certainly an increased contact with other disciplines in 
the social-sciences and other branches of knowledge that have a bearing on law among the 
younger generation in Saudi Arabia. It is relevant at this point to turn to the issue of 
assessment of damages, calculation and award of damages with specific reference to 
personal injury cases and immaterial harm.  
 
6.4 Assessment and Award of Damages 
 
The discussion here on assessment, calculation and award of damages does not focus on 
economic loss and damage to property, as these issues have been considered in the general 
consideration of the two above. As stated above, the practice of the Board in cases 
involving damage to property is to award the depreciation in the value of the property 
following the occurrence of harm to the property. In addition, there is a codification of the 
rules for assessment and award of damages for depreciation to the value of the property, as 
a result of public works, which operates on the principle that the depreciation in value of 
the property must be made good. Royal Order No. 22037 which is the operative legal 
instrument on the matter is quite clear on the point. The Board, as mentioned earlier, has 
followed the provisions of the legislation since it is in accordance with the position in 
Islamic law. Suffice it to say that the key principle in economic loss is the no-profit 
principle. In awarding compensation, the Board considers the relevant costs that would 
have been incurred by the claimant if the delict had not been committed. Further, the Board 
will award damages only based on determinable, actual, rather than possible loss as 
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established by the evidence. Issues around assessment and award of damages on personal 
injury and immaterial harm will now be further considered below.  
 
6.4.1 Personal Injury 
 
In Islamic criminal law, determination of liability for causing personal injury or death takes 
account of intent in the determination of culpability and punishment. In contrast however, 
as a western modern author rightly states:  
 
for tortious liability it is only required that someone has caused the damage 
(i.e. the victim’s death or wounds), not that he was at fault, for example by 
acting intentionally or negligently. As a consequence, children and insane 
persons can be held financially liable for any harm caused by them.56   
 
As discussed earlier in chapter four, the rationale for this is two-fold. First, the lack of 
capacity one way or the other does not count as legal justification for harm to others. 
Secondly is to achieve the ends of justice in a manner that is fair to all and protect even the 
defender from possible acts of vengeance despite his lack of capacity which may be a real 
possibility. In other words, Islamic law posits that ensuring compensation for unjustified 
harm is the sure-footed route to ensuring al-Taharuz and As-Salamah, social harmony in 
society.  
 
It has been stated above that compensation for physical injury claims are typically 
straightforward as far as the practice of the Board, and indeed, the General Courts are 
concerned. This, as stated above, is due to the fact that the sources of Islamic law have 
prescribed the applicable scheme for punishment and compensation in this aspect of 
Islamic law. The Board, as it has been indicated, is expected to apply Islamic law following 
the sources and it is not at all surprising that it avails itself of the prescriptions in the 
classic literature in this regard.  
 
Islamic jurisprudence has fixed the amount of compensation for the loss of souls and limbs 
and did not leave it to the judge’s discretion except in what can be regarded as minor cases 
of personal or physical injury. The general principles for the assessment of damages under 
classical Islamic law stipulate specific remedies based on the nature or extent of the injury. 
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Depending on the three factors, the applicable remedy could be Diyah, Irsh or Hukumat-al-
‘adl. The applicability of any of these three forms of remedy is guided by incidental rules- 
the assessment of the impact or nature of the injury. Compensation is guided by incidental 
rules of whether the injury has led to a loss of life or functional impairment of a body part 
or organ, or the disruption of natural beauty of the limbs or part of the body. 
 
Diyah is fixed compensation for the loss of life, complete loss of a faculty or limb. Full 
Diyah is awarded for loss of life. Where the limb or faculty lost or permanently damaged 
so as to be functionally useless consists of only one such limb or faculty, then full Diyah is 
awarded. An example is the loss of sense of taste or smell or sight in the two eyes or 
hearing in the two ears. However, where the limb consists of two independent parts like the 
eyes (where only one is lost or sight in one is lost), or the loss of a hand or leg, then half 
Diyah is awarded. Where the limbs consists of parts, for example, the ten fingers of the 
hands, the amount of Diyah  payable will depend on the per centum lost. 57  
 
Irsh is the fixed compensation awarded for the impairment of a faculty or limb. Like 
Diyah, the application is according to the level of the impairment if it is possible to 
determine or recognise the amount of the loss in issue. Where it is not possible to 
determine the level of diminished functionality of the limb or faculty the judge’s 
discretionary power Hukumat-al-‘adl comes into play. The judge’s discretion also applies 
in the award of damages for other types of injury like those which affect the natural beauty 
of a limb.58        
 
The application of the aforementioned principles has been demonstrated in a number of 
cases. In S v Al-Madinah Municipality59 mentioned above the Board stated that it is 
established in Shari’ah that ‘there is for (the loss of) every sense a Diyah.’ The medical 
report on the incident stated that the child’s mental capacity, speech, sight, hands, feet, 
ability to discharge (urine and faeces) had been affected. The Board held that the claimant 
was entitled to complete Diyah for loss of each of these faculties. The clinical report 
further stated that there is a ninety-five percent loss of the child’s ability of perception and 
recognition. The Board awarded compensation, Irsh, for this loss which was ninety-five 
percent of the applicable Diyah. Therefore, the Board awarded the claimant a sum of 
695,000 Riyals reaching the level of compensation for the loss of senses and abilities as 
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stated.60 In this case, no medical costs were claimed or awarded because the injured boy 
was treated in a public hospital where all medical treatment is free. It is logical to expect 
that the Board would award claims for medical expenses in deserving cases where this is 
incurred.  
 
D v Al-Madinah Municipality61 discussed earlier, involved a claim for loss of life. The 
Board held that the defender, like an individual, or any other body, is liable for the 
consequences of its delictual conduct. It ordered the defender to pay the Diyah for 
manslaughter; the sum of SR100, 000 for the death of the child. 
 
6.4.2 Immaterial Harm 
 
In those cases where the Board does award compensation for immaterial harm, it takes a 
number of factors, including social status and income, into consideration in assessments 
and calculation of the appropriate award. In W v Ministry of the Interior,62 the Board 
awarded the claimant compensation for unlawful detention. The Board compensated him 
for his suffering resulting from the deprivation of liberty and unlawful separation from his 
family. The Board stated in the judgement that : 
 
Damage caused to people by imprisonment and detention varies, depending 
on their circumstances and social status, as well as their income. Hence, the 
amount of compensation sufficient to redress and cover such damage varies, 
depending on the circumstances of each case. Therefore, the court 
endeavours to estimate the compensation to award the claimant for both his 
material and moral damage, taking into account the claimant’s employment 
status. 
 
In fact this statement of the Board is in compliance with Royal Order No. M/1407.63 This 
Royal Order provides for the right of people unlawfully detained to address their claims to 
the Board. It provides in part that: 
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 the Board of Grievances shall examine lawsuits of that kind and decide the 
suitable decision and compensation to repair the harm in order to achieve 
justice. This is because the harm that affects those individuals, as a result of 
unlawful detention, varies according to their status, situations and the 
circumstances. Therefore, the compensation for this damage will vary 
accordingly.  
 
There is no definition of what constitutes status in the Royal Order, but it can be assumed 
that status here would include social standing like educational attainments and professional 
standing, among others just as the Board alluded to in W v Ministry of the Interior.  
 
In its judgement in this case, the Board found that the claimant earns a monthly salary of 
ten-thousand, eight-hundred and fifty riyals, for regular 7-hour duty, which he was unable 
to perform due to imprisonment but since he was paid, the Board excluded his working 
hours from its calculation. The court calculated for the claimant the seventeen hours left in 
his day, using his hourly rate. Thus, the amount of compensation for 239 days of 
imprisonment was calculated at two-hundred and thirteen-thousand, five-hundred and fifty-
two Saudi Riyals.  
 
In exercising its discretion, the Board has, in this case, applied the same method for 
calculating compensation for the remaining period of unlawful detention as it did for loss 
of earnings. The loss of earning approach has been adopted in an area which does not 
concern loss of earnings. This means that a person having a higher social standing and a 
higher income would be awarded more compensation for the same period of unlawful 
detention as a person of a lower social standing and income. However, in doing so, the 
Board has given consideration to wider circumstances as it is required to do under Royal 
Order No. M/1407 though perhaps focussed heavily on income, to the detriment of family 
life, for example.  
 
A striking feature of these cases where the claims for immaterial harm were granted was 
the use of wide discretionary powers by the courts in determining the appropriate amount 
of compensation. None of the cases provide an insight on how the award was made. Thus 
further to the Royal Order No.1407, there remains a lack of guidance on the calculation 
method that is to be adopted in making such awards, raising the possibility of inconsistency 
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in this area of the Board’s compensation practice. Indeed in D v Ministry of the Interior,64 
concerning unlawful detention, the Board held that in estimating immaterial harm, the 
court endeavours to use its discretion, without limiting itself to elements of certain physical 
evidence, as would happen in the case of compensation for material harm. This is because, 
according to the Board: 
 
 estimating sufficient compensation is neither easy nor straight-forward. But 
that must not hinder the court, since difficulty is no excuse for depriving the 
claimant of his right to compensation to redress his material harm and 
reinstate his social status, and to compensate him for the cost he put forth 
while following up this case.  
 
The Board further stated that the estimation of damages in such cases is done in the manner 
it deems ‘sufficient to achieve justice and redress injury or damage.’ This decision is to be 
welcomed for its progressive views on the proper approach to assessment and award of 
compensation for immaterial harm. It certainly conflicts with the approach in other cases of 
immaterial harm discussed above including K v Ministry of the Interior. It is argued that 
such a liberal approach gives the judges the needed liberty to award damages for 
immaterial harm taking variable but relevant circumstances of the claimant and the nature 
of the harm among others into consideration. It is such an approach that can provide the 
Board with the much-needed flexibility to address claims of immaterial damage that are 
likely to increase both in volume and complexity with the growing awareness of people of 
their rights and liberalisation of governance in the country. The Board should utilise this 
freedom with more regularity in order to best achieve justice for the victims of immaterial 
harm. 
 
6.4.3 Use of Experts and Expert Evidence 
 
A marked feature of the approach of the Board to determining liability of public authorities 
is the recourse to expert evidence. This is commonly done in cases involving technical 
matters like traffic accidents and construction issues. But the use of experts, as the 
discussion above shows, also extends to the determination of technical issues in any type of 
case. This practice of the Board is not unique to it. Indeed, following the Islamic legal 
system, the Board, like all other courts in Saudi Arabia, relies where it considers 
appropriate on expert evidence. As stated above the classic Jurist Ibn Qudamah says, with 
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regard to estimating the value of similar items: ‘Its evaluation should be referred to 
competent experts.’65  
 
As it has been noted in chapter four, the General Courts similarly rely heavily on experts in 
their adjudication. Thus, the Board sometimes relies on the Council of Experts of the 
Shari’ah Court for advice in matters which it considers requires technical assessment. 
Whether expert evidence is to be used is a matter for decision by the Board and the 
incidences around the attendance and costs of the experts are borne by the Board. This goes 
back to the mention earlier made of the hybrid nature, partly inquisitorial and partly 
adversarial, of the power of the judges and the conduct of proceedings in the Board (and 
indeed other courts in the country). 
 
The use of expert evidence is also a codified matter with regard to the Board. Article 24 of 
the ‘Rules of Procedure and Proceedings before the Board’ provides that the Board, where 
it requires it, can appoint an expert with a clear mandate on the scope of work/evidence 
required from the expert. The panel may call the expert to give his evidence viva voce 
which will then be entered into the case record.   
 
The significance of the use of experts is two-fold. First the Board uses expert evidence in 
the calculation and award of damages generally. Second, expert evidence not only assists 
judges in particularly complex cases to determine the appropriate award of damages, but 
also the contributory nature of any loss suffered. This is most notably so in road traffic 
accident cases. Such information is then used to determine any reduction that may be 
required in an award of compensation. 
 
6.4.4 Conduct of the Claimant which may Affect the Award of Damages  
 
As stated in chapter four, the conduct of the victim may negate liability. However, there are 
instances also where the conduct of the victim, although it does not negate liability, may 
reduce the award of compensation. The latter instance is equivalent to the concept of 
contributory negligence in Scots and English Law. More importantly, the practice of the 
Board on contributory negligence is similar to the general approach of the General Courts 
as highlighted in the case G v Saudi Telecommunication Company66 discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
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There are a number of cases that have been decided by the Board where the conduct of the 
victim affected the award of damages. In I v Municipality of Al-Madinah67 mentioned 
earlier, the Board found from the report of the Traffic Agency investigation into the 
accident that 75% of the responsibility for the said accident fell on the person who left the 
asphalt piles on the road and the remaining 25% was a result of speeding of the claimant. 
Thus, the defender must bear 75% of the cost of the damages sustained by the claimant’s 
car in the accident. T v municipality of Qaseem68  presents similar facts. It was proved from 
the accident report by the Traffic Agency that the defender was in Khata in its construction 
of humps implicated in the road accident. However, the fact of speeding by the claimant 
was also established to have contributed 50% of the cause of the accident. The Board 
accordingly awarded the claimant half of the loss he suffered from the accident.  
 
Further, in D v Ministry of the Interior69 the Court noted that the claimant demanded a 
compensation of ten thousand riyals for every day he spent in jail, that is a total of five-
hundred thousand riyals for the entire period of his unlawful detention. The Board also 
considered evidence of the claimant’s partial responsibility for the long period of 
incarceration. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Compensation, to paraphrase the language of the introduction of this chapter, is the raison 
d’être of adjudicating delictual liability. This, it has been argued is the same across legal 
systems, the Saudi legal system inclusive. It is not likely there will be a fundamental 
change in this area of the law. Interestingly, Saudi law shares with Scots and English law, 
the principle of restitutio in integrum.    
 
This chapter has evaluated the Board’s practice regarding compensation for public 
authority liability in delict. An examination of various cases of the Board demonstrates that 
Saudi law lays emphasis on the need for compensation for unjustified harm done by public 
authorities for material and immaterial harm. An important feature of the compensation 
practice of the Board of Grievances is the need to ensure that compensation follows 
unjustified harm but without profit. This aspect of the Board’s jurisprudence is an 
important one given the implications for delictual liability claims against public authorities. 
This issue will be further addressed as part of the conclusion of this study.  
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As discussed above, the Board, in accordance with the general principles of delictual 
liability in Islamic law does recognise material and immaterial harm. Assessment and 
award of damages for material damage are fairly straightforward. However, the dominant 
jurisprudential approach of the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence which relies 
heavily on textual sources in rulings and adjudication has impacted on the recognition of 
immaterial harm in regard to the Board’s method of assessing the damage resulting from it. 
Consequently, the recognition of immaterial harm has largely proceeded in a fictional 
manner with regard to the award of damage for it unlike other heads of damage.  
 
This approach has proceeded through the requirement of the Board that the claimant proves 
immaterial harm basically in the same manner as material harm. The fictional approach, in 
the opinion of this researcher, is wrong and as the latter category of cases discussed above 
demonstrates, the Board should adjust its approach to a more liberal and consistent view 
that is arguably more in tune with the spirit, if not letter of Islamic law of delict.  In this 
regard, the decision in D v Ministry of the Interior, it is argued is the appropriate way to 
proceed. Surely, as the Board stated in this case, any perceived or real difficulty in 
determining the extent or worth of the immaterial harm should never operate as a bar to the 
award of damages. At best, such difficulty should be viewed as a challenge and many more 
that will come the way of the Board. It must rise to the occasion, otherwise its important 
role in its classic origins and relevance in contemporary times risk obliteration or will 
become undermined at least. The Board may do so by extending its use of expert evidence 
to cases of immaterial harm as such assessments may result in more consistency in the 
decisions of the Board. However, even with the use of experts, the difficulty remains that 
there is a lack of guidance on the assessment of damages for immaterial harm.  
 
As a procedural matter, the foregoing examination also discloses that the Board relies 
heavily on expert opinion in cases where technical issues are involved in determining the 
liability or otherwise of any of the parties. The use of experts for determining technical 
matters can be considered ‘pragmatic.’ While this follows classic Islamic law principles, it 
is suggested that the use of experts and expert evidence needs to be properly monitored and 
controlled to ensure the integrity of their evidence and ultimately that of the court. Experts 
are also human from whatever perspective one looks at and it may be relevant to consider 
introducing some forms of check like the ability to cross examine them.  
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Chapter Seven:       Conclusion 
 
The Saudi state, like any modern state, has the necessity to contend with the challenges that 
arise from governmental activity and interaction of public authorities with the citizens and 
residents within its borders (and even sometimes beyond).1 The role of courts in checking 
the power of the (political) organs of the state has become a common and important theme 
in constitutional legal theory. The comparative literature in this regard has continued to 
grow. While this work is not exactly on that theme, the work of courts in checking power is 
of at least tangential relevance and interest to this study. Specifically, this study has 
brought attention to the significance of the judicial institution, in this case, the Board of 
Grievances, to the exercise of state power.  
 
The separation of the grievance jurisdiction from the general courts (Shari’ah) in Saudi 
Arabia can be traced to the historical founding of the former jurisdiction. The issue had 
never really been the distinction in the law applied to state officials as much as the need to 
emphasise the superior status of the court (and its judges). The grievance jurisdiction has 
always been recognised as a special one requiring the direct or implicit power (and 
sometimes personality) of the head of the Muslim state for addressing claims of harm 
caused by (officials of) the state who may be quite powerful themselves and may even be 
reluctant to obey the general court. Thus we find as discussed that the position of the Sahib 
al-Madhalim was held by the highest judicial authority, was even regarded as a higher 
office than the Grand Qadi (Chief Justice) office and sittings were held in the court of the 
ruler and sometimes with his attendance and on specific day (s) of the week.  
 
This approach to the adjudication of state liability can be traced to the fact that under 
Islamic social system, the head of state (who in practice was almost invariably the head of 
government too) was considered as being directly responsible for the welfare of the 
citizens and, from the religious point of view, was personally accountable to God for the 
conduct of state affairs by his officials. Hence the interest in ensuring that delictual and 
other claims against the state were accorded the highest level of attention and adjudication 
since this relate to the functions of officials who represent him. This separation would 
appear to be then due essentially to the need to secure the highest level of respect for and 
                                                 
1
 A conceivable instance of this will be the delictual liability arising from the conduct of its embassy staff in 
foreign countries for example. Another example by analogy can be drawn from the cases against the United 
Kingdom by some former detainees in Guantanamo Bay, the most famous of whom is Moazeem Beg, a 
British citizen who brought a legal challenge against the government of the UK in a British court for its 
culpability in his unjustified detention and torture there. 
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compliance with the decisions of the Board by (sometime powerful) state officials. Despite 
the foregoing, it is also important to acknowledge that the opportunity to secure not only 
definitive and swift enforcement of and compliance with the decisions of Diwan al-
Madhalim promoted this separation, but also, in a limited number of cases, the need for 
more flexibility in dealing with the distinct nature of the state liability for delict seems to 
have played at least a minor part. Given this background, it is not exactly clear whether the 
jurisdiction would have developed differently if it had been merged with that of the general 
courts. 
 
A gap currently exists in determining the liability of public authorities for delict through 
the decisions of the Board. It is important that the Board develops a formal theoretical and 
analytical framework similar to that which exists in western legal systems to make for 
consistency in decision-making by the judges. A correlation of this is the need for the 
adequate training in the Shar’iah colleges and law schools and continuing education 
programmes introduced along such theoretical and analytic framework. This is in order to 
ensure that they are able to consistently apply general principles of Islamic law to current, 
and in particular, future (and presumably), more complex cases of delictual liability. 
 
A focal point of this study is the focus on a system of law which claims universal 
applicability, even more, a law for all times. For Muslims, the Shar’iah is a code that 
covers all aspects of life and is applicable to all situations. It governs individual and social 
relations and as such is claimed to be applied, to various degrees, all across the Muslim 
world and beyond where Muslims live even as minorities. However, a persistent concern, 
with advocates and sceptics of the system, remains the viability of a legal system steeped in 
a specific historical and even contextual setting, in societies and climes across the world. 
This study has sought to engage an aspect of that issue; namely the applicability of 
Shar’iah principles to state liability for delictual conduct through an interrogation of the 
experience in Saudi Arabia, commonly perceived to be a conservative society. The 
exploration in this study hopefully provides useful insight on the veracity or otherwise of 
the adaptability of Islamic law to all aspects of life and in the contemporary period. The 
position argued in this study is that Shari’ah does contain mechanisms that make its 
application viable even in complex areas of law like the delictual liability of the state.  
 
State liability for delict in modern legal systems is a complex area of law. This research has 
attempted to present a critical perspective on whether the application of the current 
principles of delictual liability in Saudi Arabia is useful and sufficient for effectively 
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tackling the (slowly) growing number of claims for delictual liability of the state. The 
analysis of Saudi Law with referential comparison to Scots and English law shows that 
legal systems are not just a set of rules, but made up of, and influenced by, a number of 
factors in their design. Prominent in this regard are religion, customs and cultural practices, 
social, ethnic and even tribal standards. This calls to mind the view expressed by Zweigert 
and Kotz that ‘the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and 
solves these problems by quite different means, though very often with similar results.’2 It 
is true that the differences in the experiences of two societies that have shaped their legal 
systems could produce different results. However, the point remains that there are 
opportunities for learning in examining the process utilised in addressing shared 
challenges. Thus, the value of even a referential comparative approach adopted in this 
study which has required further reference to French law specifically in the area of 
responsabilitie sans faute. 
 
A salient issue that has been highlighted in this research is the confusion around the 
concept of Khata and Ta’ady in considerations of delictual liability of the state. It has been 
argued that Ta’ady, rather than Khata is the appropriate basic requirement of delictual 
liability in Islamic law. This is so, despite the prevalence of the use and adoption of the 
latter term in the courts across the civil jurisdictions in Arab Muslim countries in the 
contemporary period. The confusion has been traced to historical factors surrounding the 
establishment of the judicial institutions in the various countries in the post-colonial period 
and the initial influence of the French and then (by some of transmutation), the Egyptian 
sources. The scholarship and literature on the issue have not been spared the confusion as 
the review of the literature on the issue as shown. 
 
It is important to note that al-Majalah, considered by not a few, as the most notable 
attempt at codifying Islamic law in the last century, has played a key role in the spreading 
of this confusion. It is important that jurists, legal practitioners as well as the general public 
in the relevant countries take a close and critical look at the issue since the confusion 
suggests a different, arguably narrower basis for delict in Islamic law. This is important 
because of the obvious implication of the element on claims for delictual liability against 
individuals and the state. A related, and perhaps more fundamental, even if less obvious, 
issue is the appropriateness of retaining it within a system which claims to be based on 
Islamic law. At the least, there is a need for clarification that it is at variance with the 
                                                 
2
 K Zweigert and H Kotz An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998) 
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Shari’ah particularly for those jurisdictions, like Saudi Arabia that declare its law on delict 
is based on the Islamic legal system.    
 
Some may question the engagement with the critique of the use of terms like Khata and 
‘risk-based liability’ by the Board and view it as unnecessary, if not downright 
unproductive. However, deeper reflection suggests the relevance of the critique in this 
study. There are a number of reasons, some already advanced (but which bears repeating) 
for the attention paid to these terms in the jurisprudence of the Board. One is the context of 
the research; investigating what is the state of the law of public authority liability for delict 
through an examination of the decisions of a specific judicial institution and national 
jurisdiction; the Board of Grievances and Saudi Arabia respectively. The jurisdiction, its 
institutions and laws are commonly referred to both positively and negatively but hardly 
studied outside in the comparative literature. More telling still, there are relatively few 
analyses, given its relevance in the middle-east and beyond, even in Arabic. There are 
fewer still critical and detailed socio-legal studies on Saudi Arabia and its legal system in 
the English language. This immediate context highlights the need for every effort to ensure 
thoroughness of analysis and clarity on terminology in any attempt to identify the 
jurisprudence in action in the specific limited confines of the research focus.  
 
This leads to the second point which is the focus of the research; delictual liability of 
public authorities, an area which by all accounts is complex even in the western developed 
legal systems like the United Kingdom and France. This much is attested to by the 
academic literature on the topic, some of which have been highlighted in this study. This is 
germane in the context of a developing country with a comparatively different system 
which aspires for fidelity to its values and legal heritage. It is of academic interest to 
identify extraneous influences (deriving mainly from historical factors) from other legal 
systems. Such identification logically leads to investigation and analysis of their 
compatibility or otherwise with the subject system, in this case, Islamic law. Put another 
way, it is relevant to interrogate what is as against what ought or, in some cases perceived 
to be the law.  
 
Thirdly, in a globalising world with the inevitable growing interest in comparative studies 
across the social sciences, including law, it is particularly important to make an attempt at 
least, at clarifying what is the correct statement of the law of any jurisdiction. This is a 
foremost requirement before such legal system can be validly ‘compared’ with any other. 
Otherwise, any attempt at comparison stands suspect at best. If attention is not paid to the 
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issue, there is a serious danger of furthering misconceptions of law through the uncritical 
adoption and use of terms strange to the subject system. This, it has been argued, is the 
case for example with the use of a term like Khata in delict. Analysis shows it has a 
different jurisprudential connotation in other aspects of Islamic law e.g. application of 
criminal law.  
 
Finally on the point of the need for terminological clarity, one of the likely consequences 
of terminological confusion is the prospect of horizontal and parallel misapplication of the 
concept (s) involved. Horizontal here will refer to the possibility of importation of 
extraneous meanings or conceptualisation of the term from foreign sources as is the case 
with Khata not so much in the jurisprudential application of the Board (at least in practice), 
but in some other Arab Muslim jurisdictions. Parallel misapplication here refers to the 
possibility of misapplication deriving from internal (like other areas of Islamic law) 
sources. The result of either is the same; confusion in the law. In the case of the Saudi 
jurisdiction, struggling with the challenges of modernisation, such a jurisprudential 
situation will, to say the least, be quite problematic. That will be even more so in an area 
that is developing in the jurisdiction and promises to become more complex to adjudicate. 
Consider that even in better developed legal systems of the United Kingdom and France, 
delictual liability of the state is notoriously complex. Surely, a system that is developing 
will require all the clarity it can muster to meet the challenges ahead. 
 
The distinction between Shari’ah and Fiqh is very important for the application and 
development of Islamic law in general and relevantly here, delict in countries whose legal 
systems are based on that system of law like Saudi Arabia. Fiqh, the methods of Islamic 
Law, is subject to change depending on circumstances. Fiqh allows for the evaluation of 
foreign law, practices and experiences with a view to their adoption and application where 
they are compatible with the Shari’ah. This process is possible through a number of 
jurisprudential mechanisms one of which is al-Maslaha al-Mursalah. 
 
The jurisprudential concept of al-Maslaha al-Mursalah, protection or preservation of the 
public interest, is central to law making and governance in the Islamic socio-legal system. 
In order to validly act on or determine what is in the public interest however, recourse must 
be had to the objectives or aims of Islamic Law, Maqaasid al-Shari’ah. Its potentials and 
capacity for adapting Islamic law to social-change are profound given that it is an inbuilt 
mechanism for preserving the fundamentals of the faith-based law to evolving human 
needs and temporal circumstances. 
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 A liberal construction of al-Maslaha al-Mursalah, it is argued provides a viable basis for 
the development of appropriate principles in the challenging and ever-expanding area of 
delictual liability of public authorities. Through the principle of al-Maslaha al-Mursalah 
the (UK) sources may be drawn on as appropriate in enriching the law and jurisprudence of 
Saudi law in the area of delictual liability of public authorities and indeed, any other area 
of Islamic law. The operative condition or proviso for such adoption remains that such 
principles must not be contrary to the Shari’ah, the source of Islamic law. This is much 
like the ‘Repugnancy Test’ laid down by the UK for the reception of local or customary 
law in its colonial territories.3 
 
The issue of recognition of and compensation for immaterial harm in cases of delict 
arguably presents an important point of dissonance between doctrine and practice in 
Islamic law, at least, as practised in Saudi Arabia. While in principle, all unjustified harm 
must be removed, in practice, there is recognition (at least in some cases) of immaterial 
harm for which distinct compensation is not normally made; hence the dissonance between 
doctrine and judicial practice. That dissonance, it has been suggested, ought to be removed. 
A way out, it is proposed, is the use of relevant expert witnesses. The use of witnesses, it 
has been noted, is an established practice in the Islamic legal system with an enduring 
history and significance. And so it is in Saudi courts in many cases. Somehow, it has not 
been deemed necessary or appropriate to take recourse to experts to secure evidence (or the 
lack of it) on a rather contentious issue which lends itself, at least in these times, to 
specialised testimony. That simply should not continue. 
 
The case for the use of expert evidence on claims for immaterial harm may be considered 
by not a few judges of the Board (and especially the Shari’ah courts) as one for undesirable 
change. Incidentally, change, while a constant phenomenon in human life is rarely 
welcome, at least not usually at the beginning. It is logical then to expect that there may be 
an initial resistance to the use of expert witnesses to establish immaterial harm. 
Notwithstanding, the case for it, and the prospects for its acceptability it is suggested, can 
be quite viable. The use of expert witness’ evidence to establish immaterial harm, as the 
Board requested in the case of H v Saudi Airlines, is likely to secure recognition with an 
increased social-acceptability of immaterial harm as a form of damage which requires 
compensation. The matter of societal recognition and acceptability, it is suggested, holds 
an important key to positive resolution of the contentious issue. 
                                                 
3
 See generally  B Ibhawoh Imperialism and Human Rights-Colonial Discourses of Rights and Liberties in 
African History ( Suny Press New York 2006) 58-60. 
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 A number of cases on immaterial harm discussed in this study clearly speak to the fact that 
claimants regard immaterial harm as a distinct form of harm requiring reparation. It is 
logical to assume that this approach on the part of claimants is likely to increase to the 
extent that it will be regarded as part of the custom, Urf of Saudi society. As stated earlier, 
the judges are required to consider custom in their adjudication. The judges will then have 
little choice on the matter. This view is premised on the fact that judges in all legal 
systems, the Islamic one like that in Saudi Arabia being no exception, will seek to remain 
relevant in the socio-political scheme of society. No doubt, a contrary approach by the 
courts (were the matter to become recognised as custom), will risk a loss of relevance.   
 
In the United Kingdom, an important issue that has exercised the minds of judges, 
academics, the political branches of government and presumably the general public 
regarding delictual liability of the state is the development of a ‘compensation culture.’4 
Compensation culture is an ‘unhealthy’ culture ‘which says that someone must be liable to 
pay every injury.’5 It is condemned because it stultifies ‘reasonable risk-taking.’6 The 
major concern raised about it from a governmental perspective is how it may tend to 
undermine implementation of policy.7 However, it is interesting to note that a recent study 
points out quite importantly, that the concerns in the light of empirical surveys, are 
‘somewhat inflated.’8 Indeed, a number of empirical surveys have demonstrated a fall in 
personal injury claims in the past decade in the United Kingdom for instance. 9  
 
The reason for the inflated view on the dangers of a ‘compensation culture’ may have more 
to do with the fact as observed by one author, that it is not a legal, but rather a political 
term.10 The media has been identified as a major promoter of this state of affairs.11 Given 
this construct, discussions of the issue may easily lend itself to the vagaries of (political) 
manipulation by politicians and even government bureaucrats seeking a convenient shield 
against public accountability. This is precisely a situation the precursor of the Saudi Board 
of Grievances, Diwan al Madhalim was developed to combat; the state is to be protected 
                                                 
4
 See for instance S Halliday, J Ilan and C Scot ‘The Public Management of Liability Risks’ (2011) 31 (3) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Advanced Access 1-24. 
5
 J Steele Tort Law- Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 559-560.  
6
 Ibid at 560 (emphasis in original). 
7
 Halliday et al note 4 supra at 2 and W Haltom and M McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media and the 
Litigation Crisis (University of Chicago Press 2004); K Williams, ‘State of Fear: Britain’s “Compensation 
Culture” Reviewed’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 499; A Morris, ‘Spiralling or Stabilising? The Compensation 
Culture and Our Propensity to Claim Damages for Personal Injury’ (2007) 70 MLR 349. 
8
 Halliday et al note 4 supra. 
9
 Steele note 5 supra at 560.  
10
 Ibid. at 559.  
11
 Ibid at 560. 
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only to the extent required for the performance of its legitimate duty under the law. That 
same law requires the duties of the state to be fulfilled with the utmost regard to the 
individual and general well-being of its citizens.   
 
It is logical to argue that the fear of the ‘compensation culture’ as well as the flood-gate 
argument emanates essentially from the opposition to profit that appears available to be 
made given the nature of the assessment of damages practice. In other words, a critical 
factor in the concern on development of a ‘compensation culture’ is the amount of awards 
made in individual cases by the courts. Taking the argument to the Saudi context, it could 
be argued that the practice of delict by the Board would lead to the rise of a ‘compensation 
culture.’ With the development of such a culture, the state would be over cautious in 
initiating any development, because the presence of even a slight reasonable risk could 
raise the possibility of a claim against the state.   
 
The current practice of the Board based on the precepts of Islamic law however negates 
and reduces this possibility. In Islamic law, a claimant would only be restored to the state 
previous to the harm occurring, and no profit would be gained. This would balance against 
any the development of a ‘compensation culture.’  In essence, where the courts in the UK 
limits liability to prevent the rise of a ‘compensation culture’ from which claimants may 
seek to profit, Islamic law limits ‘the profit’ by only allowing restoration to the 
ascertainable  pre-harm state, thereby balancing against the rise of a compensation culture 
and ensuring equality for all before the law. This is exemplified by the reluctance of the 
Board to award for immaterial damage as discussed earlier, that reluctance extends from its 
aversion to not ensuring justice in award of damages. It is not so much that it does not 
recognise immaterial harm as the fact that it wants to ensure there is no profiting from that 
head of claim. Despite that fact however, it is important to recognise it as it has been 
emphasised in this study.  
 
In some cases, the awards for delictual liability of the state have been quite sizeable. The 
large size of compensation awards against the state clearly has the tendency to, and indeed 
seems to have fostered an interest in pursuing claims for delictual liability of the state 
under various guises. This has formed part of the concern by observers. Similarly, the 
current practice of the Board based on fidelity to Islamic law principles of ‘no profit’ from 
delictual liability claims irrespective of the deep pocket of the defender is relevant. This 
feature of the equality principle in Islamic law should work against what in some cases, 
may be considered as inappropriate compensation awards for delictual liability of the state. 
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Moreover, the fixed system of award for personal injury further shows the emphasis in 
Islamic law on ‘no profit’ from delictual claims against either the individual or the state. 
This is argued as the balanced approach, where the injured individual is not left without 
compensation and the public purse is not unduly burdened by indiscriminate awards of 
damages which can be viewed as being detrimental to the public interest. 
 
Even if a ‘compensation culture’ as commonly assumed has developed in the context of the 
United Kingdom, Ireland or even France, it is doubtful that it would, or should, be an issue 
of major concern in the context of the Islamic system. It is argued that a court like the 
Board of Grievances in Saudi Arabia, charged with the dispensation of justice in Islamic 
law is obliged to maintain a just balance always between the individual and social interest. 
This is in line with one of the cardinal objectives of the state in Islamic law which is to 
maintain social harmony. No doubt, there may be a tension in practice on the matter but 
Islamic fiqh with its various interpretive mechanisms like al-Maslaha al-Mursalah comes 
to play to ensure a balancing act that takes cognisance of the social context and specific 
situation of claimants to achieve justice.  
 
An instance, even if not entirely free of possible criticism, is substituting the foundational 
rule of mithlun bi mithli, ‘like for like’ rule for compensation in lieu option in deserving 
cases of road accidents. At one at the same time, such a compensation regime works fairly 
in the interest of the individual and the state. It protects the interest of claimants who are 
not barred form receiving compensation through the introduction of complex rules (of a 
legal and policy nature) and it serves the interest of the state which does not have to pay 
considerable sums in compensation at a level that hampers the discharge of its overall 
obligations of public welfare.  It is hoped that the Board will continue on this footing that 
seeks to achieve the spirit of the law rather than a fixation on literalist interpretation or 
application of black letter law. Such an approach is required in the face of changing social 
circumstances and is important for achieving a required balance in the conduct of affairs in 
Muslim societies.  
 
An issue connected to the concern on the ‘compensation culture’ is the ‘flood-gate’ 
argument. Here the point is that awarding compensation against the state may lead to so 
much litigation which will hamper government initiatives, delivery of welfare services and 
socio-economic development. However, virtually the same arguments relevant to the 
concern on the promotion of a ‘compensation culture’ apply here too. The Islamic position, 
where adhered to, as is arguably the case with the Board, provides a ‘check and balance’ 
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platform to mediate possible tension: (reasonable) compensation is awarded to a deserving 
claimant and the state is allowed to carry out its functions as reasonably as possible.  
 
From the perspective of Islamic law, the whole existence of delictual liability is to ensure 
that the injured is compensated and it would be unjust, particularly given the power of the 
state, to proceed with an institutional approach which diminishes the relevance of 
compensation. It is arguably in the best interest of the state and the public that the concerns 
of both parties are even-handedly dealt with by the justice system to ensure the desired 
peace, justice and development in society. As mentioned earlier, the Islamic system is 
based on social harmony and peace. Each of the structures of the state as an aspect of 
Islamic law is directed at achieving that purpose. Recognition and satisfaction of the 
victims of state delict is an important mechanism for achieving and sustaining that purpose.     
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